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Introductory Chapter  
2 
I. Entrepreneurship and Human Capital 
Although entrepreneurs were largely relegated to making small cameos in economic 
theories of the past (Schultz, 1980), entrepreneurship research has experienced rapid growth over 
the past three decades. This growth may be attributable to increased interest among policy makers 
in promoting entrepreneurship to help ailing economies as well as researchers’ interest in 
understanding how economic agents like entrepreneurs make decisions (Wennekers & Thurik, 
1999; Holmes & Stone, 2010). While there are now several journals dedicated solely to 
entrepreneurship research, major management and economics journals have increasingly been 
publishing articles on various aspects of entrepreneurship, signaling broader acceptance of the 
field as an important scholarly discipline (Busenitz et al., 2014). The result has been significant 
theoretical and empirical advances over the years, leading to better understanding of the various 
aspects of the entrepreneurship phenomenon (Davidsson, 2016). In fact, with the growth in the 
field, we have seen the emergence of several sub-fields that explore the intersection of 
entrepreneurship and other constructs, such as immigrant entrepreneurship, female 
entrepreneurship, international entrepreneurship, etc.  
In parallel, there has been a significant increase in the recognition by policy makers of 
entrepreneurship as an important tool for economic growth and employment creation (Audretsch, 
Grilo, & Thurik, 2007). For instance, in order to help deal with the structural changes facing the 
Norwegian economy, the government has identified the creation and growth of new businesses as 
an important strategic tool; consequently, it has introduced a range of initiatives to promote 
entrepreneurship (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries, 2016). Not only national 
governments but also the supranational institutions such as the United Nations and the European 
Union have formulated various policies over the years to help member countries prosper via more 
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and/or better entrepreneurship. Such policies aimed at promoting new business formation and 
growth will be only successful if based on solid entrepreneurship research. 
In their review of entrepreneurship research, Praag and Versloot (2007) find that 
entrepreneurship adds significant economic value not only through employment creation, 
productivity growth, production and commercialization of innovations, but also via positive 
regional spillover effects on the employment growth of other firms. While these findings may 
give the impression that entrepreneurship is a bed of roses, plenty of thorns do admittedly exist. 
Most new firms fail to survive beyond 10 years, and only a small minority of firms are 
responsible for the vast majority of job creation (Decker et al., 2014). Mata and Portugal (1994) 
find that one fifth of new firms in their sample of Portuguese firms failed in the first year, and 
only half survived for four years. Similarly, Storey and Strange (1992) find that a third of all jobs 
in new firms were created by only two percent of the new firms in their sample. At the same time, 
the net job creation by new firms may not be substantial, meaning that they may simply be 
replacing jobs of existing firms1 (Van Stel & Storey, 2004). Shane (2009) cautions against 
entrepreneurship promoting policies that induce “typical start-ups that are not innovative, create 
few jobs, and generate little wealth” (p. 141). Instead, he argues that the focus should be on high 
quality, high growth firms. This points to the need to focus on factors and characteristics that help 
(or hinder) the growth and success of entrepreneurial firms. 
Policy makers need more insight from entrepreneurship research to help nurture “the right 
firms” since it is clear that simply creating as many new firms as possible is unlikely to produce 
net value for society as a whole. While policy makers are beneficiaries of entrepreneurship 
                                                            
1 If the new firms create jobs with higher productivity than existing firms, then they are creating value in the 
economy even if they are merely replacing jobs. 
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research at the macro level, entrepreneurs, investors, creditors, and other stakeholders are prime 
beneficiaries of such research insights at the micro level. For instance, if there is overwhelming 
agreement in the literature that having a board member with industry experience has a positive 
effect on the performance of new firms, policy makers can facilitate conditions whereby 
entrepreneurs are matched with such prospective board members, or entrepreneurs can take such 
action on their own. 
As such, both policy makers and entrepreneurs take an interest in knowledge that 
increases the chances of new firm survival and high performance. One cause of performance 
differences that has been the subject of extensive study by entrepreneurship scholars is human 
capital.  
The OECD defines human capital as “the knowledge, skills, competence, and attributes 
embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social, and economic well-being” 
(Liu Gang, 2011, p. 7). Indicators of human capital include education, experience, health, and 
even migration (Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1961). 
Although the widespread recognition of human capital as an important explanatory 
variable in economic growth emerged in the second half of the twentieth century through the 
works of Mincer (1958), Becker (1964), and Schultz (1961, 1975), there have been references to 
it since long before that, as documented by Kiker (1966). Now, human capital is a distinguished 
field of scholarship in its own right. Human capital has been established as one of the most potent 
sources of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012). In their 
meta-analysis of the relationship between human capital and firm performance, Crook, Todd, 
Combs, and Woehr (2011) find that the two are strongly related, particularly when the human 
capital in question is firm-specific. 
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Besides having a direct effect on firm performance through enhanced productivity, human 
capital can also affect an individual’s social capital, thus also affecting firm performance 
indirectly. Social capital refers to “networks together with shared norms, values, and 
understandings that facilitate cooperation within or among groups” (Cote & Healy, 2001, p. 41). 
A high level of human capital can help individuals attain central positions in networks, which in 
turn increases the social capital of individuals (Nahapiet, 2011), with consequent direct as well as 
indirect effects on individual and firm outcomes.  
Following the establishment of human capital as a scholarly discipline, its application to 
the understanding of entrepreneurial performance also gained momentum. Schultz (1975, 1980) 
was one of the more significant proponents of the role played by human capital in 
entrepreneurship. He envisaged human capital as an individual’s ability to deal with disequilibria 
by reallocating resources. As such, entrepreneurs’ ability to create and capture value through 
reallocation of resources and push the market from disequilibrium to equilibrium was dependent 
on their human capital.  
Scholarly inquiry into human capital in entrepreneurial firms has been growing in recent 
decades. Marvel, Davis, and Sproul (2016) conducted a critical review of human capital in 
entrepreneurship research. They summarize the arguments made in entrepreneurship research 
linking human capital and entrepreneurial outcomes as follows. Human capital affects 
entrepreneurs’ ability to discover, create, and exploit opportunities. Human capital also helps 
entrepreneurs acquire financial and additional human capital. We may even argue that human 
capital is even more important for entrepreneurial firms because they face rapid internal changes 
as they grow, in addition to the external uncertainties that all firms face. Based on these and other 
arguments, various entrepreneurship scholars have studied the effect of human capital on 
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outcomes such as opportunity identification (Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 2008; 
Bhagavatula, Elfring, Van Tilburg, & Bunt, 2010), firm entry (Bates, 1995; Kim, Aldrich, & 
Keister, 2006), firm survival (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 
2011), firm growth (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1997; Colombo & Grilli, 2005). In their 
meta-analytic review of the empirical relationship between human capital and various indicators 
of entrepreneurial success, Unger, Rauch, Frese, and Rosenbusch (2011) document a positive 
relationship between the two. 
Entrepreneurial firms and non-founder human capital 
One striking observation from the meta-analysis by Unger et al. (2011) and the critical 
review by Marvel et al. (2016) is that whereas there is significant focus on the human capital of 
the entrepreneur, scant inquiry has been conducted into the role of other sources of human capital 
in entrepreneurial firms, such as employees and board members. In fact, if we look at extant 
studies in strategic human capital (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Hatch & Dyer, 
2004), upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007) and entrepreneurship 
research, it seems like the human capital of top-level management2 and employees take primacy 
in studies based on established firms (addressed by strategic human capital and upper echelons 
literature), while the human capital of founders take primacy in entrepreneurship research. This 
leaves the research on the human capital of employees in entrepreneurial firms neglected. 
Similarly, in the corporate governance literature, there is a paucity of research on the effect of 
board members’ human capital in new firms, and the relationship is not well understood (Li, 
Terjesen, & Umans, 2018). 
                                                            
2 Top-level management may or may not include founders. 
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In entrepreneurship research, the focus on the entrepreneur is quite understandable since 
entrepreneurship primarily concerns the actions of entrepreneurs. The human capital of 
entrepreneurs, as an antecedent of their actions, does deserve considerable attention. However, 
the human capital of other individuals in the firm can also have significant effects on its success 
or failure. For example, it may be the case that an entrepreneur is good at opportunity-spotting or 
creation but lack sales skills or the ability to build a well-functioning team. More generally, an 
entrepreneur often needs complementary human capital to convert a good idea into a successful 
venture. Good employees might take information from their tasks, interaction with clients, etc., 
and convey it as feedback to entrepreneurs to improve their services/products or their way of 
running the business. Sharp board members might anticipate or sense changes in the environment 
at an early stage and alert entrepreneurs or assist in developing strategies and solving problems. 
The quality of the feedback given by employees or the interpretation of events in the environment 
by board members will depend on their human capital. Bennett and Robson (2004) even argue 
that directors and external consultants’ human capital may function as a substitute for that of 
internal management. 
Therefore, even though the significant focus on the human capital of entrepreneurs is 
justified, the lack of adequate attention on other sources of human capital in entrepreneurial firms 
is lamentable. This oversight implies that we assume one of the following two arguments to be 
true. The first is that the other sources of human capital in entrepreneurial firms are simply not 
important. However, even to confirm that this is true, we would need extensive research on other 
sources of human capital. The second argument is that the roles played by the other sources of 
human capital in entrepreneurial firms are the same as in established firms; hence, we can simply 
extrapolate the findings of research on established firms to new firms. This argument is not 
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particularly plausible, because of the obvious and important differences between new and 
established firms in terms of their characteristics and challenges they face. 
There has been some research on small and medium enterprises studying the effect of the 
human capital of employees (Hayton, 2003; Andries & Czarnitzki, 2014) and board members on 
firm performance (Huse, 2000; Bennett & Robson, 2004; Neville, 2011; Wincent, Anokhin, & 
Ortqvist, 2010). The relevance of these studies on new firms is questionable because SMEs are 
different from new firms in a number of ways.  Entrepreneurial/new firms represent the 
classification of firms by age (usually less than 10 years), whereas SMEs are a result of 
classification by firm size (usually, firms with 10–249 employees are classified as SMEs). 
According to this classification, many new firms are actually micro-SMEs, i.e., have fewer than 
10 employees. The difference can be illustrated by looking at the average firm age in studies that 
use SMEs. For example, the average firm age in Bennet and Robson (2004), Brunninge, 
Nordqvist, and Wiklund (2007), and Basly, (2007), which study the effects of board members on 
firm outcomes in SMEs, are 13, 31, and 55 years, respectively. Similarly, the average firm age in 
Andries and Czarnitzki (2014), which studies the effects of employee human capital on 
innovation outcomes in SMEs, is over 20 years. As firms grow old, their age-related diversity 
declines as the differences from their early age disappear (Bennet & Robson, 2004). Furthermore, 
new firms are in their formative years; hence, they are more open to imprinting (Burton & 
Beckman, 2007). Therefore, employees or board members may be more likely to leave a lasting 
impact on the firm, while this is probably less likely to happen in SMEs that have moved beyond 
their formative years. For example, since new firms are characterized by a lack of routines, 
procedures, culture, values, etc., an employee can be instrumental in shaping them as they are 
built, whereas in older SMEs, such characteristics are already built-in and, thus, more resistant to 
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change. For such reasons, SMEs are unlikely to be an appropriate sample to use to study new 
firm phenomena.  
Based on these arguments, it is clear that non-founder human capital and its effects on 
entrepreneurial firm performance is a research area with significant gaps. Referring back to the 
attractiveness among policy makers of entrepreneurship as a tool for employment generation and 
economic growth, understanding factors that explain entrepreneurial success is important. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs themselves would benefit from a better understanding of the 
importance (or lack thereof) of other sources of human capital in the firm and an ability to act 
accordingly. As such, filling in the research gaps herein identified has not only scholarly value 
but also significant practical implications. In order to address these gaps, this research focuses on 
two sources of non-founder human capital—board members and early employees—and examines 
their performance impact on entrepreneurial firms. 
Entrepreneurial firms and human capital of board members 
A large body of corporate governance literature has studied the antecedents (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1988; Burton, 2000; Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; Linck, Netter, & Yang, 
2008; Kaczamarek & Kimino, 2012) and, more importantly, consequences (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Rose, 2007; 
Guest, 2009; Garg, 2013) of various board and/or board member characteristics. Some studies 
find a relationship between board characteristics and firm outcomes (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; 
Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007; Kim & Lim, 2010; O’Connell & Cramer, 2010), while others do not 
(Daily & Dalton, 1992; Bhagat & Black, 2002). Surprisingly, two meta-analyses that examine 
these links—Dalton et al. (1998) and Rhoades, Rechner, and Sundaramurthy (2000)—arrive at 
different findings: the former finds no relationship while the latter notes a small positive 
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relationship. One inference from these divergent findings is that there is a need for a more 
detailed look at the characteristics of individual board members. As Boyd (1990) and Hillman, 
Withers, and Collins (2009) suggest, resource-rich board members should be the focus of these 
studies.3 One such important resource a board member can bring is human capital, which is our 
focus here. 
Most of the studies in the corporate governance literature, including those linking the 
human capital of board members to firm performance, seem to be based on 
large/established/public firms. The reason for this might be as follows. The primary function of 
the board in such firms is generally understood to be the oversight of management. The board is 
there to protect the interests of the shareholders against any self-serving actions of top 
management. This is evident from the fact that the literature predominantly uses agency theory to 
study this control function of boards (Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016). This research 
premise lends itself to a sample of large and public firms in which the owners may not be very 
close to the day-to-day operations or even be able to keep track of the strategies the firms are 
pursuing. This is not the case for new/entrepreneurial firms, where the founder is usually in 
command of the firm. This implies that the control function of board members takes primacy in 
mature firms, while strategy, service, and legitimacy functions (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Neville, 2011) take primacy in new firms.4 Strategy function refers to aiding the 
management of the firm in formulating strategies to help enhance performance. The service 
function of board members includes providing advice, counseling management, and helping them 
access critical resources. Legitimacy function refers to tasks that help improve firms’ image in 
                                                            
3 However, in order to understand the effect of resource-rich board members, we need to contrast them with 
resource-poor board members. 
4 There is an emerging literature (Garg, 2013) on venture boards, where board members have significant  monitoring 
obligations (although distinct from those of large public firms) to protect the interests of external investors. 
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their environment. Strategy, service, and legitimacy functions are sometimes bundled together as 
resource-provision roles (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
It is intuitive that the human capital of board members would be a good predictor of how 
well they can fulfill the demands of the service role, that is, advising, strategizing, and providing 
legitimacy by lending their reputation to the firm. Those studies that have looked into the effect 
of board members’ human capital on firm performance generally find a positive relationship (Kor 
& Sundaramurthy, 2009; De Villiers, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2011; Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 
2013; Khanna, Jones, & Boivie, 2014). These studies tend to focus on established firms; 
furthermore, these studies cannot distinguish between the selection and treatment effects of board 
members since they are riddled with endogeneity issues. 
Some studies also examine the relationship between board member human capital and 
firm outcomes in small and medium enterprises (Bennett & Robson, 2004; Pugliese & Wenstøp, 
2007; Neville, 2011). These studies highlight the service role of board members and find a 
positive relationship between board member human capital and firm outcomes. Van Gils (2005) 
finds that SMEs do not take sufficient advantage of the resource boards can represent and advises 
them to do so. While the findings from these studies can be useful in speculating about the link 
between boards of directors in entrepreneurial firms and performance, we must keep in mind that 
there are significant differences between SMEs and entrepreneurial/new firms, as explained 
above. 
Conceptually, the potential importance of board of directors’ human capital for 
entrepreneurial firms seems obvious. Entrepreneurial firms’ liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 
1965) is a good starting point from which to understand why director human capital can be 
crucial for survival and performance. Summarizing the essence of Stinchchombe’s original idea 
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of the liability of newness and subsequent developments in the construct, Wiklund, Baker, and 
Shepherd (2010) distinguish between internal and external sources of liability of newness in new 
firms. Internally, a new firm has roles that are ill defined or remain undefined. Figuring out those 
roles and creating appropriate routines takes time, and until this is achieved, it is unlikely that 
these new firms will be economically efficient. Furthermore, a new firm likely consists of 
individuals (founders and employees) who have not worked together before. These individuals 
need to be able to adapt to each other and gain each other’s trust, which also takes time.5 
Externally, new firms may not have built a competitive knowledge stock of their environment or 
the capability to scan the environment and identify threats and opportunities. Similarly, they have 
to spend resources to establish legitimacy with their stakeholders and mobilize their required 
contributions. Singh, Tucker, and House (1985) find that external legitimacy constitutes a bigger 
source of liability of newness than do internal coordination processes for new firms. 
These external and internal challenges that new firms face, combined with their bare-
bones resource stocks, mean that they should accept any help they can find. Board members can 
be of value in offsetting these challenges. For example, a board member with industry experience 
may be able to help the entrepreneur define rules and set up routines. A board member can also 
help the entrepreneur recruit employees from her network and thus alleviate the trust issue that 
arises from hiring complete strangers. Similarly, a board member is often expected to act as a 
“linking pin, connecting the firm and its environment (Zahra & Pearce, 1989, p. 299). Huse and 
Zattoni (2008) observe that the board is involved in helping a firm gain legitimacy during the 
start-up phase. A board member with high human and social capital can accomplish these tasks 
                                                            
5 At the same time, new firms are likely to be internally less complex, which somewhat mitigates the liability of 
newness. 
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better on behalf of a resource-constrained firm, thereby helping it to overcome the external 
challenges. In sum, board member human capital can potentially be used as a strategic resource 
for an entrepreneurial firm. 
We have only a handful of studies that actually explore the role played by board member 
human capital in firm performance in the context of entrepreneurial firms. Kor and Misangyi 
(2008) find that outside directors’ industry-specific experience can compensate for the lack of it 
in entrepreneurial firms’ top management. Looking at early-stage high-tech firms, 
Vandenbroucke, Knockhaert, and Ucbasaran (2016) find that specific experience, diversity, and 
tenure exert significant positive performance effects. Christman and McMullan (2004) find that 
use of outside assistance in terms of advice and counseling can help new ventures’ survive. 
Therefore, bringing advisors into the firm in the form of directors should enhance new venture 
performance. Indeed, Knockaert and Ucbasaran (2013) find that firms that lack certain types of 
human capital in their top management teams receive higher levels of support from their outside 
board members. This indicates that board member human capital is indeed used to supplement 
founders’ human capital, as Bennett and Robson (2004) suggest.  
Zhang, Baden-Fuller, and Pool (2010) find a more intriguing link between venture board 
and top management team human capital. They find that in high-tech ventures, the board 
functions as an extension of the top management team, thus transcending the duties emphasized 
by the principal-agent model that dominates the corporate governance literature. They claim that 
the board members in their study “often act as business model architects, both initiating and 
developing strategy in collaboration with—or even leading—their less-skilled top executives” (p. 
113). It is easy to imagine how important the human capital of board members would be in 
undertaking such roles. 
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One noticeable aspect of the handful of studies examining the human capital effect of 
board members on firm performance is that they all focus on the high-tech sector and 
predominantly investigate venture boards. This focus is understandable, given that such firms 
make a significant contribution in terms of economic and employment growth. However, the 
contributions board members make to the “normal” new firm should also be of interest from an 
academic as well as a policy perspective. At the very least, not all successful startups originate in 
the high-tech sector, and not all successful startups rely on venture capital. In the research design 
and methods section below, detailed discussion is provided of what constitutes entrepreneurship 
and why the types of firms in the samples have been selected. 
Immigrant entrepreneurial firms and human capital of board members  
While immigrant entrepreneurship is an important phenomenon and now an established 
scholarly discipline in its own right, it is also appropriate to view it as a special context of 
entrepreneurship. We expect immigrant entrepreneurs to face a more severe form of liability of 
newness. Immigrant entrepreneurs are likely to face bigger challenges obtaining external 
legitimacy with their stakeholders, compared to native entrepreneurs, because of their lack of 
social embeddedness (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). They may also struggle to design roles and 
routines that fit the host country’s institutions and practices. Immigrant entrepreneurs may face 
bigger trust and communication issues while hiring local employees, or even other immigrant 
employees from different countries, due to cultural differences. This implies that they may end up 
either hiring inferior employees or even getting less output from their competent employees. 
Furthermore, it is also possible that they face discrimination from consumers in the product 
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market, from suppliers in factor markets, and from financial institutions in capital markets 
(Parker, 2018). 
Consistent with these arguments, studies suggest that firms with lower levels of social 
embeddedness exhibit a lower level of performance (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002; Jack & Anderson, 
2002). In this context, having a resource that can connect immigrant-owned firms to local socio-
economic institutions would be valuable. One such resource can be a native board member. It is a 
plausible argument to make that most of the disadvantages that an immigrant entrepreneur faces 
in the host country that are due to foreignness can be alleviated by recruiting a board member that 
can function as a bridge between the firm and the socio-economic institutions of the host country. 
As such, native board members with relevant human capital (such as industry experience) can 
help immigrant entrepreneurs be competitive with native entrepreneurs in the host country. 
It appears that the intersection of immigrant entrepreneurship and corporate governance is 
a fertile ground for research, especially for boards’ service and strategy roles. Despite the fact 
that this is a seemingly obvious observation, I cannot find any study that has looked into it. 
In conclusion, the relationship between the human capital of board members and firm 
performance in the context of entrepreneurial firms is an under-researched area. Extrapolating 
from the research done in the context of established public firms and SMEs, as well as the 
handful of studies conducted in the context of high-tech entrepreneurial firms, we expect to find 
that board member human capital positively and significantly affects entrepreneurial firm 
performance. The research gap needs to be addressed not only because there is scholarly value in 
it but also because it can help policy makers design policies capable of improving new firm 
growth and helping both native and (perhaps particularly) immigrant entrepreneurs understand 
how they can strategically use boards rather than treating them as some formality to be fulfilled.  
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Human capital or board capital? 
Board capital is comprised of the human and social/relational capital of board members 
(Hillman & Dalzier, 2003; Wincent, Anokhin, & Ortqvist, 2010). It has been argued that the 
human capital of board members is essential for them to perform their strategy role, which 
consists in helping the firm develop strategies to be competitive in product or factor markets; 
moreover, social capital is essential to performing the service role, which concerns linking the 
firm to the external environment to gain legitimacy and build reputation (Wincent, Anokhin, & 
Ortqvist, 2010). Haynes and Hillman (2010) have developed a construct of board capital that 
combines the breadth and depth of the human and social capital of board members. In order to do 
so, they integrate occupational heterogeneity (human capital), functional heterogeneity (human 
capital) and directorate interlock (social capital) to form board capital breadth. Similarly, they 
integrate industry occupation (human capital) and industry directorate interlocks (social capital) 
to form board capital depth. Then, they combine board capital breadth and depth to form 
composite board capital. While this is an intuitive way of looking at the value a board can add to 
a firm, there are reasons why the current research sticks with human capital. 
First, our overall quest is to determine the importance of the human capital of non-
founders in the firm. Therefore, we are primarily interested in human capital as a variable. 
Second, with our data, it is not possible to accurately measure all the components required by the 
Haynes and Hillman (2010) approach, for example, the functional heterogeneity measure of 
board capital. Additionally, due to the interdependent nature of human and social capital, 
especially measures such as industry experience, we may already be capturing the essence, albeit 
crudely, of board capital with some of this study’s human capital measures. For example, as 
Nahapiet (2011) states, “education level is a good predictor of centrality in networks and thus 
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high structural social capital. Educational credentials may deliver social capital through social 
prestige and access to high-status networks” (p. 88). 
Entrepreneurial firms and human capital of employees 
The entrepreneurship literature has, by and large, neglected the human capital of initial 
employees. Still, a handful of studies have looked into employee human capital in entrepreneurial 
firms, and these find significant effects on firm outcomes. Initial employees could be valuable 
resources for helping new firms overcome the liability of newness and increase their chances of 
survival (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010). They can also contribute 
to innovation performance (Andries & Czarnitzki, 2014). Coad, Nielsen, and Timmermans 
(2016) conclude that employee characteristics seem less important for firm success, although they 
find a positive relationship between college-graduate employees and firm success when they 
exclude family hires from their analysis. Rocha, Praag, Folta, and Carneiro (2018) find that initial 
employees’ human capital has a significant effect on the survival and performance of 
entrepreneurial firms.  
Initial employees in an entrepreneurial firm might contribute to its performance through 
various mechanisms. The first reason is the direct value they add via their human capital. 
Numerous studies in the strategic human capital discipline look at the importance of employee 
human capital (Hitt et al., 2001; Crook et al., 2011; Oldroyd & Morris, 2012) and find a positive 
effect. There is also recognition in the strategic human resource management literature that 
certain employees are more important than other employees in terms of the value they add to the 
firm (Becker & Huselid, 2006; Hausknecht, Rodda, & Howard, 2009; Call, Nyberg, & Thatcher, 
2015). These studies are not conducted in the context of entrepreneurial firms, but it is not 
difficult to conceive of the importance of employee human capital in entrepreneurial firms as 
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generally demonstrated by the few studies in this area (Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010; Rocha, 
Praag, Folta, & Carneiro, 2018; Rauch, Frese, & Utsch, 2005). For example, employees with 
industry experience can help the founder establish industry-standard practices in the new firm, 
thus enhancing productivity and helping gain legitimacy. Similarly, employees with high human 
capital have a higher capacity to learn and produce new knowledge, which is the basis of 
innovation (De Winne & Sels, 2010). 
Imprinting theory (Stinchcombe, 1965; Johnson, 2007; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013) offers a 
second mechanism through which initial employees’ human capital leaves a long-lasting mark on 
the firm. While the first mechanism refers to immediate effect and would cease upon the 
individuals leaving the firm, the imprinting effect persists even after individuals leave the firm. 
The individuals shape the roles and routines in a new firm and thus leave their unique imprints. 
The subsequent occupants of such roles can be affected those position imprints left by initial 
employees (Burton & Beckman, 2007). 
The third mechanism involves a signaling effect (Spence, 1971) that the human capital of 
one employee can potentially have in attracting future employees. Recruitment is a process 
riddled with information asymmetry in which firms know little about the actual abilities of 
candidates and candidates have no first-hand knowledge of the quality of the firm. This issue is 
even more prominent for the recruitment process in entrepreneurial firms. On the one hand, 
entrepreneurial firms do not have the same name recognition and reputational assets that 
established firms have; thus, the candidates have even less information about job quality. 
Conversely, entrepreneurial firms do not usually have a dedicated human resource management 
department or established screening mechanisms, and they lack the experience of hiring 
numerous employees that large firms, or even SMEs, have. Therefore, they have to make the 
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most of whatever resources they possess. Their existing employees, in this context, can be 
valuable in projecting the quality of the firm. A firm that has hired a high-quality initial employee 
can introduce her to prospective candidates and thus convey the quality of the firm. 
The fourth (and related) mechanism through which employees can be an important 
strategic resource to entrepreneurial firms is by giving the founder access to their social network. 
There is an extensive literature in personnel economics that studies how entrepreneurs can use 
employees’ referrals to hire subsequent employees (Rees, 1966; Rees & Shultz, 1970; 
Montgomery, 1991; Hensvik & Skans, 2013). It is less costly in terms of time and money to hire 
through existing employee referrals, and such hires are found to have higher productivity and 
lower turnover (Holzer, 1987; Montgomery, 1991). Since social networks are characterized by 
homophily (McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 2001), an entrepreneur is likely to attract high ability 
candidates through the social network of her high ability employees. Employee referrals can be a 
particularly effective recruitment mechanism because it reduces information asymmetry problems 
for both the firm and candidates. A survey by CareerBuilder (2010) suggested that 26% of 
external hires are generated from employee referrals and 88% of employers considered employee 
referrals to be the best hiring method in terms of the quality of matches. 
While the first mechanism pertained to the direct contribution of employee human capital 
through productivity, even in the third and the fourth mechanisms, the human capital of the 
employee continues to play an important role. The second and third mechanisms offer insight 
into the process of human capital accumulation in firms in their early stages. Considering that we 
take the importance of human resources in firms for granted, inquiry into how such human capital 
is accumulated in the first place is an important research question. I explore these mechanisms in 
one of my papers. 
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II. Research Design and Methods 
Measuring Entrepreneurship 
“Who is an entrepreneur and who is not?” is a question that has gained significant 
attention in entrepreneurship literature (Hebert & Link, 1988; Wennekers & Thurik, 1999; 
Henrekson & Sanandaji, 2019). How we define entrepreneurs has direct implications for how we 
measure entrepreneurship. By synthesizing the works of Cantillon, Schumpeter, Schultz, and 
Kirzner, Hebert and Link (1988, p. 39), we propose that an entrepreneur is “someone who 
specializes in taking responsibility for and making judgmental decisions that affect the location, 
the form, and the use of goods, resources, or institutions.” Winnekers and Thurik (1999) argue 
that the definition provided by Hebert and Link (1988) does not fully capture entrepreneurship 
from an economic growth perspective, which policy makers and the majority of scholars are 
mostly interested in. They build on Herbert and Link (1988) and define entrepreneurship as 
follows: 
the manifest ability and willingness of individuals, on their own, in teams, within and 
outside existing organizations, to: (a) perceive and create new economic opportunities 
(new products, new production methods, new organizational schemes, and new product 
market combinations) and (b) introduce their ideas in the market, in the face of 
uncertainty and other obstacles, by making decisions on location, form, and the use of 
resources and institutions (p. 46).  
While talking about entrepreneurship, it can be tempting to focus exclusively on 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs because of their supposed contribution to economic growth. 
However, routine or replicative businesses, which constitute the vast majority of new firm 
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registrations, contribute significantly to the economy even though they do not innovate 
(Henrekson & Sanandaji, 2019). While it is instructive to distinguish between firms that are 
involved in radical innovation and those that are involved in more routine businesses, it is also 
important not to lose interest in the latter types by maligning them as being non-entrepreneurial.  
There is a sense that entrepreneurship scholars have been overly focusing on high-tech and high-
growth firms at the expense of ordinary business start-ups even though the latter represent the 
vast majority of firms and contribute significantly to the economy (Lehmann, Schenkenhofer, & 
Wirsching, 2018). These ordinary firms contribute to the economy, besides through creating 
employment, by replacing less productive exits or merely by motivating established firms to 
improve in order to avoid being replaced. Also, some of the “non-glamorous” firms presumed not 
to be high growth have the potential to become high growth eventually. Therefore, from the point 
of view of measuring entrepreneurship, I believe that it is as erroneous to neglect legitimate firms 
doing replicative/routine activities as it is to include any entity just because it is registered in the 
company registrar’s office.6 
Translating the theoretical definition of entrepreneurship into the empirical measure is 
challenging. We need to make sure that the firms in our sample include elements of 
entrepreneurship as included in the definition, such as risk-taking, uncertainty, opportunity 
identification, exploitation, etc., particularly when using registry data as I do. However, it is 
possible to identify firms that represent greater entrepreneurial endeavors than others. One 
important measure to identify more entrepreneurial firms is their legal form. Levine and 
                                                            
6 Earlier, on page 3, there is a reference to Shane (2009) cautioning policy makers against making policies that 
promote creating firms that neither innovate nor create jobs or wealth. This is an argument for promoting high-
growth ventures. However, we do not know which firms are going to be high-growth firms ex ante. Therefore, 
researchers ought to include all legitimate firms, some of which may eventually be high-growth firms, while 
studying drivers of firm growth/performance. 
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Rubinstein (2013) study differences between unincorporated (sole-proprietorship) firms and 
incorporated (limited liability) firms. They highlight two characteristics of incorporated firms that 
distinguish them from unincorporated firms—limited liability and separate legal entity status. 
They explain: 
Limited liability reduces the potential downside losses to equity holders, 
increasing the appeal of purchasing equity in high-risk, high-expected return 
projects. A separate legal identity means that corporations can own property and 
enter into contracts independently of shareholders. This means that shareholder-
specific shocks are less likely to disrupt firm activities, increasing the appeal of 
investing in large, long-gestation projects. 
This means that limited liability firms are more likely to be entrepreneurial. They find that 
owners of limited liability firms are cognitively different from owners of sole-proprietorship 
firms in general and that limited liability firms outperform sole-proprietorships. Consistent with 
this finding, Åstebro and Tåg (2017) find that founders of limited liability firms are in general 
more educated, earn more as employees, and spend less time unemployed. Åstebro and Tåg 
(2015, 2017) also find that limited liability firms create significantly more jobs than do sole-
proprietorship firms. Guzman and Stern (2016) find that compared to sole-proprietorships, 
limited liability firms represent higher quality entrepreneurship. After comparing various 
quantitative measures of entrepreneurship, Henrekson and Sanandaji (2019) endorse the limited 
liability status of a firm as the only measure that captures potentially high-impact Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurship. 
Based on this assessment, I include only the limited liability firms that have had some 
economic activity such as having sales of at least NOK 50,000 or having hired one or more 
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employees. This ensures that firms that are investment vehicles, tax instruments, etc., are 
removed from the sample. Therefore, I believe that in my papers, I strike a sensible balance 
between excluding too much and including too much when sampling. In other words, I capture 
the essence of entrepreneurship that is of interest to scholars, practitioners, and policy makers. 
Measuring Human Capital 
Human capital in organizational research refers to skills, knowledge, and capabilities 
embedded in individuals associated with the organization, such as founders, top management, 
employees, and board members. Human capital is acquired through activities such as “schooling, 
on-the-job training, medical care, migration, and search for information about prices and 
incomes” (Becker, 1994, p. 11). These activities, which are called investment in human capital, 
are usually taken as proxies for an individual’s actual human capital, and evidence shows that 
human capital investments and human capital outcomes are related (Unger et al., 2011). 
Crook, Todd, Combs, and Woehr (2011) identify dozens of human capital measures used 
in organization research, such as education; general, industrial, managerial, and entrepreneurial 
experience; training; leadership capabilities; IT knowledge; selling skills, etc. Thus, extant 
literature uses both outcomes of human capital investments (skills, knowledge, and capabilities) 
and investment in human capital while assessing effects on firm performance. The distinction 
between human capital investment and outcomes of human capital investment is important 
because it has been found that the effect of the outcomes of human capital investment on firm 
performance is higher than the effect of human capital investment (Unger et al., 2011). 
Availability of variables is a limiting factor in determining which measures to use. Marvel, 
Davis, and Sproul (2016) report that the most common human capital constructs used in 
entrepreneurship research are work experience, education, and entrepreneurial experience. Since I 
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use registry data, investment in human capital such as education, experience, board experience, 
and industry experience are used as proxies for human capital rather than the outcomes of related 
investments. However, in one of the papers, person fixed effects of entrepreneurs and employees 
are used as indicators of their unobserved skill level. This measure is an outcome of investment 
in human capital. 
Human capital measures can and should vary based on context (Baron, 2011). The 
dimension of an individual’s human capital that is relevant in a particular setting depends on the 
role that person is supposed to play there. This argument is captured by the task-relatedness 
aspect of human capital. For example, experience being on boards of directors may be an 
appropriate measure of human capital for a board member but not necessarily for employees. 
Consistent with this argument, Unger et al. (2011) find that the human capital-firm performance 
relationship is stronger if the human capital is task-related. I have used different indicators of 
human capital for different roles.  
In the first paper, where the importance of board members to entrepreneurial firms is 
studied, I include education, general work experience, and the board experience of board 
members to measure their human capital. In the second paper, which explores the role of native 
board members in helping immigrant entrepreneurs overcome their lack of embeddedness in the 
host country’s socio-economic structures, education and industry experience are used as 
indicators of human capital because they are good measures of the ability and level of access of 
such board members. Similarly, in my third paper, which investigates the relationship between 
the human capital of founders and first and second employees, I include education, experience, 
and person fixed effects as indicators of human capital. Person fixed effects derived from a wage 
equation has been shown to be a good indicator of individuals’ productivity (Abowd, Kramarz, & 
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Margolis, 1999; Iranzo, Schivardi, & Tosetti, 2008), making it an appropriate human capital 
measure for that paper. This measure captures the skills acquired through unobserved activities as 
well as unobserved differences in skill quality, thus helping us alleviate the endogeneity arising 
from omitted variable bias (Rocha et al., 2018). 
Unger et al. (2011) also highlight the importance of exploring context as a moderator of 
the relationship between human capital and entrepreneurial firm performance. Keeping this in 
mind, this relationship is tested in different contexts in each of the papers. For example, in 
examining how important a board member is to an entrepreneurial firm, I test if the relationship is 
different when the board member is a chairperson or not, an outside board member or not, and the 
quality of board members compared to other board members in the same industry. In the second 
paper, in assessing the effect of native board members on the performance of immigrant 
entrepreneurs compared to native entrepreneurs, I test if the relationship varies based on different 
characteristics of the board member and the entrepreneur. Similarly, in the third paper, quartile 
analysis is conducted to examine if the relationship varies in different parts of the human capital 
distribution. 
Human capital is a multidimensional construct that cannot be captured by any single 
indicator (Folloni & Vittadini, 2010). Comparing two individuals when the difference between 
them varies significantly regarding different dimensions of human capital is challenging. For 
example, how do we compare a college graduate with two years of work experience to a high 
school graduate with 15 years of experience? Therefore, it is more meaningful if we can construct 
a human capital measure that combines different dimensions of human capital, such as education 
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and experience, into a continuous one-dimensional scale. Portela (2001)7 suggests one such 
method whereby we can multiplicatively combine two or more human capital dimensions based 
on the individual’s relative position in the distribution of each of these human capital dimensions. 
Which dimension of human capital to use in building a composite measure depends on the 
relevance of these dimensions in the context of our research question. I use this method to 
construct a composite human capital measure for board members using education, experience, 
and board experience in the first paper. Similarly, I also use this to measure the human capital of 
employees and entrepreneurs in the third paper using education, experience, and person fixed 
effects. I do not use this method to measure the human capital of immigrant and native 
entrepreneurs or board members in the second paper because the wage penalty faced by 
immigrants in the labor market will misleadingly yield lower human capital scores for them. The 
details of how I built the measures are explained in the respective papers.  
Measuring Performance 
The relationship between human capital and entrepreneurial firm performance may differ 
based on the measure of firm performance used (Unger et al., 2011). Therefore, it is important to 
ensure that the dependent variables capture meaningful aspects of firm performance in the 
context of the research questions. Extant research in the field tends to use financial performance, 
such as sales, assets, profitability, etc., or the operational performance of firms, such as 
innovativeness, market share, employment size, and quality (Unger et al., 2011; Marvel, Davis, & 
Sproul, 2016). Unger et al. (2011) argue that human capital theory is more relevant in explaining 
                                                            
7 There have been suggestions for alternative measures to unify different dimensions of human capital into a linear 
scale, such as the latent human capital measure by Folloni and Vittadini (2010) and the aggregated index of human 
capital by Arrazola and Hevia (2007). 
27 
financial performance since the theory originated in order to explain differences in the financial 
returns of education for employees. In my papers, I use both types of measures. 
One of the topics entrepreneurship scholars are most interested in is the growth of new 
firms. In studying which growth measures are most relevant in entrepreneurship research, 
Davidsson, Delmar, and Wiklund (2006) observe that sales growth has been the most accepted 
measure of performance from both a conceptual and a convenience point of view. They point out 
some flaws in employment and asset growth compared to sales. They argue that employees can 
be replaced with machines, which means that having fewer employees is not necessarily a sign of 
poor performance. Similarly, they point out that asset growth is less relevant in the service sector. 
However, it is also important to point out that some entrepreneurial firms may have long product-
gestation periods during which they hire employees to create products that can be sold only in a 
few years’ time. In such firms, sales revenues, let alone profitability, may only appear after 
several years. Sales growth may be an inappropriate indicator in these cases. Besides sales, 
employment, and assets growth, Gilbert, McDougall, and Audretsch (2006) identify market share 
growth as a popular growth indicator used in entrepreneurship research. 
Given that any single indicator cannot fully capture performance because of the diverse 
nature of entrepreneurial businesses, the best practice is to use multiple, objective indicators of 
firm performance (Murphy, Trailer, & Hill, 1996; Davidsson, Delmar, & Wiklund, 2006). 
Therefore, I use asset, employment, and sales growth as indicators of firm performance in my 
first paper. In the second paper, which explores performance differences between immigrant and 
native entrepreneurs and whether native board members can moderate such performance 
differences, I add a profitability measure (EBITDA margin) and equity ratio because I expect 
them to be different for immigrant and native entrepreneurs. The third paper is different from the 
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first two in terms of the dependent variable because, in that paper, I am interested in the 
relationship between the quality of first and second employees. Therefore, the human capital of 
the second employees is the measure of performance in that paper. 
Data Sources 
In all three papers in this thesis, I use Norwegian registry data. The data come from 
different government agencies and is merged by Statistics Norway using unique firm and person 
identifiers. It has detailed information on demography, education, income, and the labor market 
status of all individuals legally residing in Norway; furthermore, it contains financial and 
business information on all firms registered in Norway as well as information on individuals 
connected to firms through various roles. The variables used in these studies are taken from 
various registers, as shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 for papers 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Data sources 
are discussed in each of the papers separately, so here I would like to discuss the general pros and 
cons of using registry data in entrepreneurship and human capital research in general. 
Entrepreneurship research has suffered from a lack of rich data that allows researchers to 
understand the mechanisms underlying this dynamic phenomenon. Ireland, Webb, and Coombs 
(2005) underscore that “the available data [are] typically used to form convenience samples 
rather than samples that are most appropriate to test the researcher’s theoretically based 
expectations.” Traditionally, empirical entrepreneurship research has mostly employed primary 
data, of which the predominant form is survey data, which has prompted calls for the use of 
longitudinal objective data to overcome most of the weaknesses of survey designs (Chandler & 
Lyon, 2001; McDonald et al., 2015). More specifically, there have been calls to use linked 
employer-employee datasets to study entrepreneurship as they help us untangle the interaction of 
industry, firm, and individual dynamics (Campbell, 2006; Echambadi, Campbell, and Agarwal, 
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2006). These datasets allow entrepreneurship researchers to “develop a clearer picture of how 
new firms come into being, obtain workers, grow, shrink, and exit, and how this dynamic process 
is related to employment and economic growth” (Goetz, Hyatt, McEntarfer, & Sandusky, 2016, 
p. 21). Consequently, we are seeing growing use of linked employer-employee data in 
entrepreneurship research (Dahl & Klepper, 2015; Coad et al., 2017; Burton, Dahl, & Sorenson, 
2018). 
Because of the extensive welfare state policies (Sørensen, 2004) and perhaps the tolerance 
for high transparency in these societies, the Nordic countries8 collect and make available 
comprehensive data on firms and individuals. In explaining the advantages of Norwegian registry 
data, Hovde Lyngstad and Skardhamar (2011) list the following: 
. . . the ability to maintain data on the total population; the possibility of studying 
small subpopulations; a virtually continuous timeline in longitudinal datasets; using 
panel data designs with no sample attrition; having few or no non-responses or 
other missing data; making connections between different observation units, such 
as family members; and the ability to construct research designs that are practically 
impossible with surveys (p. 613). 
In the Norwegian registry data, we can identify an individual’s family relationships, the 
level and type of education she has obtained, the firms she has worked for in the past and tenure 
there, her occupation, her income disaggregated into different sources, and welfare benefits she 
has received, including unemployment benefits, parental benefits, and sickness benefits. With 
                                                            
8 Timmermans (2010) presents a comprehensive description of the Danish registry database. 
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this richness of information, Norwegian microdata is extremely suitable for research on human 
capital and entrepreneurship.  
Despite the strengths of the registry data, it has some weaknesses that may limit its 
usefulness in answering certain research questions. For example, the registry databases are not 
suitable for understanding motivations or other cognitive aspects of entrepreneurship. This is 
particularly challenging when studying nascent entrepreneurship, where most activities are not 
registered in government databases. 
Another challenge of using Norwegian registry data is the identification of new firms. 
Many firms change their company registration, meaning that they may appear as new firms in our 
samples even when they are not really new. Great care should therefore be taken in making sure 
that we weed out re-registered firms. Some of the steps I have taken to remove those potential re-
registered firms include removing firms that start out with a certain threshold of employees, 
removing firms that have employees registered for more than six months before their formal 
registration, removing firms that share their unique job identifier with other firms in previous 
years, and firms that are established as subsidiaries of existing firms. 
Yet another challenge when using the registry data is the inability to precisely identify the 
activities firms are involved in, as explained by Timmermans (2010). First, using industry 
classifications like NACE codes involves tradeoffs. Using more granular classification may give 
us a more precise idea of what the firm is involved in, but then we will make the cell size so 
small that we run into statistical challenges. Using less granular classification will group together 
firms that are very diverse in terms of their activities. Second, industry classification may not 
even represent the actual activities a firm is involved in. Therefore, firms in an industry 
division/class may not belong together in terms of what they actually do. This means that the 
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actual industry controls we use in our models may lead to erroneous results. Third, it is difficult 
to learn about the business model of firms through registry data. Therefore, effects that are the 
result of business model peculiarities are difficult to identify. 
Finally, in the Norwegian registry data, it is not possible to ascribe an individual’s income 
to particular jobs. This is because we have annual income that is not linked to the jobs database. 
Therefore, if an individual has held multiple jobs, we are unable to ascertain income from those 
jobs separately. This was particularly problematic for us while computing person fixed and firm 
fixed effects using a wage equation in the third paper. When an individual holds multiple jobs in 
multiple firms, it is impossible to identify firm fixed effects since we do not know what portion 
of their income they earned from which firm. I removed those individuals from our sample when 
calculating person fixed effects for that reason. 
Table 1 
Variables Used in Paper I and Their Source Datasets 
Variables Variable type Source register 
Asset growth Continuous Register of Company Accounts in Brønnøysund 
Sales growth Continuous Register of Company Accounts 
Employee growth Continuous Register of Company Accounts 
Board member death Dummy Population Register (Befolkning) 
Board experience Continuous 
Corporate and Business Register (Virksomhets- og 
foretaksregisteret) 
Board member has above average 
Human Capital 
Dummy 
Education Register, Population Register, Corporate 
and Business Register 
Board member is Chairperson Dummy Corporate and Business Register 
Board member is Outsider Dummy 
Corporate and Business Register, Population Register, 
Register of Employers and Employees (FD Trygd),  
Education of owners, CEO, board 
members 
Continuous Education Register (Utdanning) 
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Single/multiple owner firms Dummy Corporate and Business Register 
Age of owners, CEO Continuous Population Register 
Family ownership of CEO Ratio Population Register, Corporate and Business Register 
CEO is a board member Dummy Corporate and Business Register 
Industry category Categorical Corporate and Business Register 
   
   
Table 2 
Variables Used in Paper II and Their Source Datasets 
Variables Variable type Source register 
Asset growth Continuous Register of Company Accounts 
Sales growth Continuous Register of Company Accounts 
Employee growth Continuous Register of Company Accounts 
Full-time equivalent employment 
days 
Continuous Register of Company Accounts 
Equity ratio Ratio Register of Company Accounts 
EBITDA margin Ratio Register of Company Accounts 
Immigrant status Dummy Population Register  
Assimilated/Not assimilated Dummy Population Register 
Education of founders Continuous Education Register 
Presence of native board member Dummy Corporate and Business Register, Population Register 
Presence of native, non-family 
native board members 
Dummy Corporate and Business Register, Population Register, 
Presence of native board member 
with industry experience 
Dummy 
Corporate and Business Register, Population Register, 
Register of Employers and Employees 
Marital status Dummy Population Register 
Gender Dummy Population Register 
Age Continuous Population Register 
Education categories Dummy Education Register 
Industry Categorical Corporate and Business Register 
Region Dummy Register of Company Accounts 
33 
Big city Dummy Register of Company Accounts 
 
Table 3  
Variables Used in Paper III and Their Source Datasets 
Variables Variable type Source register 
Human capital of founders and 
employees 
Continuous 
Education Register, Population Register, Corporate 
and Business Register, Register of Employers and 
Employees (FD Trygd), Income Register 
Occupation similarity Dummy Register of Employers and Employees 
Family ownership of employee Dummy Population Register, Corporate and Business Register 
Immigrant status Dummy Population Register 
Marital status Dummy Population Register 
Gender Continuous Population Register 
Age Continuous Population Register 
Education categories Dummy Education Register (Utdanning) 
Industry Categorical Corporate and Business Register 
Industry skill ratio Ratio Register-based employment statistics 
Industry labor intensity Continuous Register-based employment statistics 
Big city Dummy Register of Company Accounts 
 
Choice of Empirical Strategy 
The research question, the research setting, and the nature of variables of interest dictate 
the choice of empirical strategy. The empirical strategy, in turn, dictates whether we can make 
causal inferences or just associational inferences. The gold standard for empirical research 
designs that enables causal inferencing is the randomized experiment. However, as Angrist and 
Pischke (2010) note, conducting randomized experiments is time consuming, expensive, and 
above all, not always practical. In cases where randomized experiments are not possible, natural 
or quasi-experiments are preferred for causal inference. A natural experiment exploits an 
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exogenous treatment of the population to study changes in variables of interest. When natural 
experiments that allow for causal inferences are not possible either, then we can make only 
associational inferences. 
While associational inferences help enhance our understanding of the phenomena in 
question, causal inferences help us identify the mechanisms. Bromiley and Johnson (2006) argue 
that the objectives of strategy research are to explain firm behavior and firm performance and 
offer prescriptions that enhance firm performance. These objectives can only be achieved by 
focusing on the mechanisms underlying the phenomena. This, in turn, dictates that our research 
should aspire to make causal identifications. In one of the earliest reviews of entrepreneurship 
research, Low and MacMillan (1988, p. 155), emphasized the “need to pursue causality more 
aggressively.” At the same time, Bromiley and Johnson (2006, p. 26) observe that “scholarship 
often starts with general tests of high-level association and then moves to clearer theories and 
tests of the underlying mechanisms.” Since entrepreneurship is a relatively young field, the study 
of many aspects of the phenomena are still in their infancy. Therefore, studies establishing 
associations between constructs can also be valuable in advancing the field. 
Periodic reviews of entrepreneurship research (Low & MacMillan, 1988; Ireland, Webb, 
& Coombs, 2005; Marvel, Davis, & Sproul, 2016) have consistently focused on the need for the 
use of longitudinal studies in entrepreneurship, primarily because it is difficult to establish causal 
linkages with cross-sectional studies. Further, given the dynamic nature of entrepreneurship, we 
need to observe firms over a long period to understand their characteristics and performance 
more accurately. In line with these calls, two of my papers use panel data while the other one 
uses cross-sectional data in accordance with the nature of the research questions. 
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Another issue that is raised in strategy research in general and is equally applicable to 
entrepreneurship research is the endogeneity concern. Entrepreneurs, employees, board members, 
etc., choose certain actions over others (like entrepreneurs hiring employees or board members 
joining or leaving a firm) with an eye to the expected outcomes of such actions. This makes the 
identification of the actual effect of the explanatory variable (human capital of board member, for 
instance) on firm performance erroneous if we do not account for the endogeneity. See Rocha et 
al. (2018) for a detailed discussion of sources of endogeneity and how they may be addressed. 
Where possible, I have tried to alleviate these concerns in my papers. 
The three papers in this thesis use three different empirical strategies. In the first paper, I 
use the death of a board member as a treatment for the entrepreneurial firm. Although death is an 
exogenous treatment in the sense that the firm has no control over a board member dying, there 
may be an indirect association between board member death and firm performance. Older board 
members are both more likely to die and to be wealthier than younger board members. 
Consequently, to the extent that board members financially back the firm, the exogeneity 
assumption may still be violated since the treated firms may have benefited from wealthy board 
members by starting out bigger, for example. Therefore, we take an extra step to match the 
treatment and control firms on a number of dimensions, including firm size in the second year of 
founding, to make sure that we are not comparing apples to oranges. Furthermore, the fact that 
the treatment variable is time variant means that we can use fixed effects models to estimate the 
treatment effect. This estimation strategy gets rid of omitted variables bias and helps to make a 
causal claim about the relationship between board member characteristics and firm performance. 
The second paper studies the difference between immigrant and native entrepreneurs’ 
performance and whether having a native board member affects the performance difference. This 
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paper uses a random effects model. Because of the time-invariant nature of our explanatory 
variable (immigrant status of the entrepreneurs), it was necessary to rule out the fixed effects 
estimation even though a Hausman test favored the fixed effects model. Therefore, the choice 
was between a random effects model and OLS. I used the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier 
(LM), which tests if there are statistically significant variances across firms, to inform this choice. 
The test favored a random effects model. In this paper, the same causal inferences as were made 
in the first paper cannot be made because of the limitations of the estimation strategy. First, the 
unobservable characteristics of immigrant and native entrepreneurs that affect them being in our 
sample (i.e., starting firms) may also affect their performance differently. This means that there 
may be endogenous selection bias. Second, immigrant entrepreneurs who are able to recruit 
native board members may be more embedded in the host country ex ante. This means that any 
change in performance by immigrant entrepreneurs having a native board member may reflect the 
immigrant entrepreneur’s embeddedness in the host country rather than the treatment effect of the 
native board member. Thus, the treatment may also be endogenous. Despite this limitation, I 
believe that the paper makes a significant contribution by establishing an associational inference 
between having a native board member and the performance of immigrant firms, especially 
because this relationship has, to the best of my knowledge, never been examined before. 
The third paper looks at the relationship between the human capital of the first and the 
second employees of an entrepreneurial firm. It is cross-sectional in nature because I am 
interested in the relationship at one point in time. Consequently, OLS and quantile regressions are 
used to estimate the relationship at different parts of the human capital distribution. I do not make 
causal inferences in the paper but firmly establish an associational inference between the two 
employees’ human capital, which I believe helps enhance our understanding of the human capital 
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accumulation process in a new firm. Like the previous two papers, this paper addresses the calls 
for the use of contingency relationships among human capital and entrepreneurial outcomes 
(Marvel, Davis, & Sproul, 2016). I not only tested the relationship in different parts of the quality 
distribution but also tested other contingencies, such as similarity in occupational background 
and industry experience between the two employees (and the entrepreneur). These moderator 
variables provide important clues regarding the mechanisms in operation. 
III. Summary of Articles 
Paper 1: Do Board Members Matter? The Case of Entrepreneurial Firms 
The first paper explores the relationship between board members and firm performance in 
entrepreneurial firms. It answers two questions: (1) Are board members important?; and (2) What 
are the characteristics that make certain board members more important than others? Board 
members are not randomly allocated to firms, and observed correlations between board member 
characteristics and firm performance might be as much about firms with high (low) expected 
performance attracting good (weak) board members as it is about good board members driving up 
performance. In this paper, I use the death of board members as an exogenous shock and 
coarsened exact matching followed by fixed effects estimation to answer these questions. This 
estimation strategy is a significant improvement in dealing with the endogeneity issues that have 
plagued previous research regarding the causal effect of board members on firm performance. 
I find that board members do matter for entrepreneurial firm performance, but not 
unconditionally. Losing an inside board member has a negative effect on firm performance, while 
losing an outside board member does not. Losing the chairperson of the board of directors is 
worse for firms than losing an ordinary board member. Finally, board members with high human 
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capital matter more than board members with lower human capital. Thus, I find that losing board 
members that have high ability (human capital), strong incentives (ownership), and high 
authority/custodianship (the chairperson) has significant effects on firm performance. 
This paper contributes to both the entrepreneurship and the corporate governance 
literature. First, it highlights the importance of non-founder human capital in the form of board 
members. As discussed earlier, this has been a blind spot in entrepreneurship research. Second, 
the estimation of board member effects on firm performance in the corporate governance 
literature has been riddled with endogeneity concerns, which I address with a strong empirical 
strategy in this paper. 
Paper 2: Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Liability of Weak Embeddedness and Overcoming It 
with Native Board Members 
The second paper is at the intersection of immigrant entrepreneurship and corporate 
governance. It answers three important questions: (1) Is there a performance difference between 
firms owned by immigrant versus native entrepreneurs?; (2) Does having a native board member 
affect the performance difference between firms owned by immigrant versus native 
entrepreneurs?; and  (3) What characteristics of native board members make them more valuable 
for immigrant entrepreneurs? 
From the theoretical point of view, I study the immigrant entrepreneurship phenomenon 
through the lens of social embeddedness theory and inquire whether having a native board 
member can help an immigrant firm overcome its relative lack of embeddedness in the socio-
economic structures of the host country. I find that immigrant entrepreneurs, in general, exhibit a 
lower level of performance compared to native entrepreneurs. Immigrant entrepreneurs who have 
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spent substantial time in the host country are able to bridge the performance gap with native 
entrepreneurs to an extent. Immigrants with higher education are better able to bridge the 
performance gap, except in the top quartile. Finally, immigrant entrepreneurs can bridge the gap 
with native entrepreneurs by using board members who possibly serve as bridges connecting the 
firm and its host country stakeholders. However, not all board member are equally important. I 
find evidence that immigrant firm performance is higher when they have non-family native board 
members and native board members with industry experience in the host country. 
This study contributes to the immigrant entrepreneurship and corporate governance 
literatures. I consider immigrant entrepreneurship as a special context of entrepreneurship 
wherein the distance between the entrepreneur and the stakeholders is large, thus inflating the 
impact of board members who can help bridge that distance. Research in this setting—largely 
overlooked until now—is important from managerial (how immigrant entrepreneurs can improve 
their firm performance), policy (how policy makers can help immigrant entrepreneurs integrate 
into the host country market/institutions), as well as scholarly points of view. 
Paper 3: Human Capital Accumulation in New Ventures: The Role of Founders and Early 
Employees 
The third paper studies the relationship between the human capital of first and second 
employees. While the importance of human capital for firm performance is well established, I 
focus on how existing human capital can influence future human capital accumulation in an 
entrepreneurial firm. Basing the hypotheses on network and signaling theory, I study whether 
having a good first employee will help a firm attain a good second employee. I construct a 
composite human capital measure that combines education, experience, and person fixed effects 
to study the impact of the first employee on the human capital of the second employee. 
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Moreover, I investigate different conditions under which the first employee’s human capital is 
more or less influential. 
The findings reveal that there is a positive relationship between first and second employee 
human capital, even after controlling for the human capital of the founder. They further show that 
the relationship varies in different parts of the human capital distribution. When the first and 
second employees share the same industry and occupation background, the correlation between 
their human capital is high in the top quartile, in line with predictions from network and signaling 
theory. On the other hand, the founder’s human capital is positively related with the second 
employee’s human capital, irrespective of their industry-occupation similarity. The findings 
imply that existing employees in an entrepreneurial firm can be used as strategic assets in 
accumulating future human capital. 
IV. Conclusion and Discussion 
Entrepreneurship research has grown by leaps and bounds over the last three decades. 
Throughout, one consistent focus has been identifying factors that can explain and lead to better 
performance by entrepreneurial firms. One identified factor is human capital. The studies that 
have examined the effect of human capital on the outcomes of entrepreneurial firms have, 
understandably, overwhelmingly focused on the human capital of entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, 
this has resulted in severe gaps in our understanding of the relationship between non-founder 
human capital and firm outcomes. As an attempt to address this oversight, I studied the 
relationship between firm outcomes and the human capital of entrepreneurs, board members, and 
employees. While doing so, I focused not only on the direct relationships but also on contexts 
where the relationship would be weakened or strengthened. 
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The findings of the three papers contained herein indicate that non-founder human capital 
can be an important source of competitiveness for entrepreneurial firms. Board members as well 
as employees can contribute substantially to firm performance. From the first paper, we learn that 
losing a high human capital board member is detrimental to firm performance, whereas losing 
low human capital board members has no significant effect. Similarly, we learn from the second 
paper that immigrant entrepreneurs that have native board members with relevant industry 
experience are competitive with native entrepreneurs. Finally, the third paper demonstrates that 
the human capital of current employees can predict the human capital of future employees, 
especially when they share industry-occupation backgrounds and come from the higher end of the 
human capital distribution. 
We can draw some parallels between the founder human capital-firm performance 
relationship, which has been extensively studied (Unger et al., 2011), and the non-founder human 
capital-firm performance relationships focused on here. First, like founder human capital, non-
founder human capital is important for new firm performance, but the effects are usually small. 
For example, losing a board member has a negative effect of 4.8% on employment growth. 
Similarly, there is a small positive correlation (≈ 16%) between the human capital of the first and 
second employees. 
Second, like founder human capital, non-founder human capital is more effective when it 
is task-related. For example, losing a board member with above-industry-median education has 
no significant effect on firm employee growth, but losing a board member with above-median 
task-specific human capital (a measure including education, experience, and board experience) 
has a negative nine percent effect on employee growth. Similarly, for an immigrant entrepreneur, 
merely having a native board member is not adequate to be competitive with similar native firms. 
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Rather, native board members with industry experience are necessary. For a board member 
whose service task relates to linking the firm with various stakeholders in the industry, having 
industry experience is clearly task-specific human capital. Finally, in the third paper, the task of 
the first employee is to help attract a matching second employee. Theoretically, that can happen 
more efficiently if the first and second employees share the same industry-occupation 
background, i.e., have task-specific human capital. That is exactly what the findings show. 
Finally, the human capital measure employed in the third paper indicates that human 
capital seems more important when the outcome of human capital investments (quality in labor 
market proxied by a person fixed effect from a wage equation) are incorporated in the measure. 
For example, the magnitude of the relationship between the human capital of the first and second 
employees when using the composite index (that includes person FE) more than doubles 
compared to the relationship found when using only education as the human capital measure. 
The papers included in this thesis contribute to the entrepreneurship literature. First, they 
extend our knowledge of human capital resources in new firms beyond the entrepreneur. Since 
the research on entrepreneurs’ human capital has received considerable attention and we know a 
great deal about it already, we now need to focus on other sources of human capital that can make 
new firms competitive. Our focus on board members and employees is an attempt to address that 
gap in the literature. Second, in two of the three papers, I have constructed composite human 
capital measures that can better capture the multidimensional nature of human capital.  
The thesis has practical implications for policy makers, entrepreneurs, and investors, all of 
whom have an interest in new firms’ performance. The findings not only tell us that non-founder 
human capital is important for new firm performance but also identify unique characteristics that 
make them useful. For example, the findings of the second paper can guide an immigrant 
43 
entrepreneur trying to be competitive with her native competitors by identifying the type of board 
members that can help her. Similarly, our third paper shows that entrepreneurs may be able to use 
their existing employee network, or use their quality as signals, to obtain good matches when 
hiring more employees. Since it is challenging for new firms to hire promising candidates, these 
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Abstract 
Are board members important to an entrepreneurial firm? Which characteristics makes a 
board member more or less important? Attempts to answer these questions have been plagued by 
serious endogeneity issues. Board members are not randomly allocated to firms, and observed 
correlations between board member characteristics and firm performance might be as much about 
firms with high (low) expected performance attracting good (weak) board members, as it is about 
good board members driving up performance. We use board member death as a treatment to 
study the importance of a board member to a new firm. Board member death is unlikely to be 
related to the expected performance of the focal firm, or to the human capital of the board 
member in question. Furthermore we apply coarsened exact matching to ensure that treated and 
control firms are comparable, and run a fixed-effects panel model to identify the performance 
effects of the loss of a board member. This allows us to make improved quantitative estimates of 
how important a board member is, and how this varies with some key board member 
characteristics. 
 





The existence of a positive association between human capital and firm performance is 
probably one of the least controversial assertions in all of strategy and management. Numerous 
studies in strategic human capital (Coff, 1997; Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Hitt et al., 2001), strategic 
human resource management (Becker et al., 1997; Hoque, 1999), and upper echelons literature, 
among others, have found such a link. Studies in the entrepreneurship literature have established 
that this association exists in new firms as well (Unger et al., 2011). Given the need to shepherd a 
nascent firm through great uncertainties with limited resources and less-developed structures, 
routines, and networks, it is likely that human capital is even more consequential in new firms 
than in older, more established ones. 
The stock of human capital at a firm’s disposal in its early years will mainly consist of the 
human capital of its founder(s), the human capital of its early employees, and possibly, the 
human capital of its board members. Among these three, the role and importance of the 
founder—or the founding team—has by far received the largest amount of scholarly attention in 
entrepreneurship research (e.g., Gimeno et al., 1997; Bosma et al., 2004; Shrader & Siegel, 
2007). The human capital of early employees has also received some attention, although far less 
than that of the founders (Koch & Strotmann, 2013; Rocha, Carneiro, & Varum, 2014). The 
human capital of board members in new firms has received the least amount of attention by far 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Stam, Arzlanian, & Elfring, 2014). 
Among the few studies that have investigated the relationship between board member 
characteristics and firm-level outcomes, findings have been far from consistent. On the one hand, 
it has been suggested that board members can have a particularly large performance effect in 
young firms simply because such firms lack so many of the resources that more established firms 
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have had time to accumulate (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003; Zahra, Filatotchev, & Wright, 
2009; Bocquet & Mothe, 2010; Kim & Cannella, 2008). On the other hand, it has also been 
suggested that entrepreneurial firms mostly see boards as a formal requirement and typically fill 
the required board positions with aunts and friends (Patton & Baker, 1989; Mace, 1971). This 
suggests that the typical board member is easily replaceable and will not have a significant 
performance effect. 
In this paper, we focus on the role of board members in young firms, and we ask two 
related questions. First, how valuable are board members for firm growth and performance, on 
average? Alternatively, the question could be formulated in this way: is the average board 
member easily replaceable or not? Secondly, we ask if there is systematic variation around this 
average, i.e., do certain characteristics make a board member more or less important? We are not 
the first to ask these questions, but we do believe we are the first to answer them in the way we 
do in this paper, and that our approach has significant advantages in terms of estimating the 
causal effect of board members on firm performance. 
The key problem of estimating this causal effect is to have exogenous variation in the 
independent variable. Board members are not randomly allocated to firms, and any observed 
correlation between board member characteristics and firm performance might therefore be as 
much about firms with high (low) expected performance attracting good (weak) board members 
as it is about good board members driving up returns. Rather than looking at the characteristics of 
incumbent board members, one might, of course, study the performance effects of board 
members joining or leaving boards. Unfortunately, this is also problematic since board members’ 
decisions to join or leave a board are unlikely to be independent of the expected performance of a 
firm, and those board members that come or go are not necessarily representative of the other 
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board members either. In their review of the literature on board demographics, human capital, 
and social capital on firm outcomes, Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill (2013) emphasize the 
endogeneity problems inherent in this literature, and they call on future studies to address this 
issue. We do exactly that. 
Specifically, we use board member death as a treatment to study the importance of board 
members to a new firm. Board member death is unlikely to be related to the expected 
performance of the focal firm or to the human capital of the board member in question. At the 
same time, death does effectively remove the human capital of the deceased board member from 
the firm; thus, it constitutes a sad but useful natural experiment. We are not the first to use death 
as an exogenous treatment to study the effect of human capital on firm performance. This has 
been done in the finance literature for the effect of CEOs (Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, & 
Newman, 1985; Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2010), founders (Becker & Hvide, 
2017) and large shareholders (Slovin & Sushka, 1993).  
We use Norwegian registry data that contain detailed demographic, human capital, and 
family information about all owners, employees, and board members in the Norwegian economy, 
along with financial information on all firms registered in Norway. We apply coarsened exact 
matching to ensure that the treated and control firms are comparable, and we run a fixed-effects 
panel model to identify the performance effects of the loss of a board member; in this way, we 
are able to quantify how important a board member is.  
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Theory and Hypothesis Development 
Human Capital 
Human capital is integral to firm performance as it serves as a source of competitive 
advantage and disadvantage (Coff, 1997; Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Hitt et al., 2001; Wang, He, & 
Mahone, 2009; Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001). It is a critical input in creating all other 
resources, whether brands, reputations, technology, distribution systems, or organizational 
capital, and it is even an important input in increasing itself—in the sense that it takes human 
capital to build human capital. Over the past several decades, the claim of a positive association 
between performance and human capital has been tested and affirmed in a range of studies. A 
summary of these findings is the meta-analysis by Crook et al. (2011), which documents a 
statistically significant positive relationship between human capital and firm performance. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this positive relationship also holds in the case of new firms, as the meta-
analysis by Unger et al. (2011) finds. Indeed, it might be argued that the relationship is even 
stronger in newborn and young firms, given that uncertainty is a key feature of the exercise of 
entrepreneurship (Foss & Klein, 2012; McKelvie, Haynie, & Gustavsson; 2011) and human 
capital predicts an individual’s ability to adapt to a changing environment and deal with 
disequilibria and uncertainty (Nelson & Phelps, 1966; Schultz, 1975). Notably, this is not only 
true for early-stage high-tech firms but also for an immigrant opening a restaurant serving ethnic 
food. 
The most important and influential human capital source in a new firm is arguably its 
founders. The fact that most of the studies on new firms focus on the founders’ human capital is a 
reflection of their primary importance (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Feeser & Willard, 
1990; Vesper, 1990; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Vanaelst et 
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al., 2006; Roberts, Klepper, & Hayward, 2011; Baptista, Karaoz, & Mendonca, 2014). A second 
source of human capital in a young firm is its early hires. The human capital of employees and its 
effect on firm performance has received substantial attention in the strategic human capital and 
human resource management literatures, including the case of new firms (Koch & Strotmann, 
2013; Rocha, Carneiro, & Varum, 2014; Heneman, Tansky, & Camp, 2000). Hence, there is 
considerable knowledge about this association too. Finally, and most importantly, for the present 
paper, yet another potential source of human capital is the board of directors of a firm. 
Boards and Board Members 
The corporate governance literature identifies three key tasks for board members—
control, service, and strategy (Huse, 1990; Neville, 2011; Machold & Farquhar, 2013). Control 
tasks revolve around monitoring the conduct and performance of the management team and 
ensuring that the firm is on track to achieve its goals. Service tasks include giving counsel and 
advice to the management team on managerial issues as needed. Service and strategy are 
sometimes lumped together into one category because the board is serving as a resource in both 
cases. These tasks include “providing legitimacy, expertise, advice, and counsel, facilitating 
access to resources and linking the firm to external stakeholders, building external relations, 
aiding in strategy formulation” (Machold & Farquhar, 2013, p. 149). Given the importance of 
these tasks, a board member can potentially add substantial value to a firm. In this paper, we are 
examining this through the lens of the effect of the loss of a board member. We analyze how the 
loss of a board member affects firm performance in young, entrepreneurial firms by comparing 
actual performance to their contra-factual performance absent such a loss.  
 If the loss of a board member has no noticeable effect on firm performance, then this must 
mean that board members are either easy to replace or that it is not even important to replace 
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them in order to maintain expected performance. In either case, it would indicate that board 
members are typically not a strategically valuable asset to a young firm. If, on the other hand, the 
effect of losing a board member is, on average, significantly negative, or at least significantly 
negative for board members with certain characteristics, then this would indicate the opposite. 
Board members are, or at least some board members are, strategically valuable to young, 
entrepreneurial firms. 
Regarding the former view, it is fully conceivable that most young, entrepreneurial firms 
have boards because of the formal requirement to do so and that beyond large owners in the firm, 
it is a matter of convenience who joins the board. Decisions are, in reality, made by the founder 
or the founding team, and the board is just a rubber-stamping organ that formalizes those 
decisions. It is also possible that while young firms would like to have high-caliber individuals as 
both investors and board members, most young firms cannot hope to attract such board members. 
Whether the problem is the demand or the supply of human capital for entrepreneurial firms, the 
end result will be easily replaceable board members.  
An alternative view holds the opposite. Precisely because young firms are typically not 
well endowed with human capital in the form of decision-making skills, business experience, 
networks, and so on, board members are likely to be strategically important contributors to firm 
performance and growth. This does not necessarily imply that every board member in every firm 
is valuable and difficult to replace but rather that a competent board member with incentives to 
use that competence for the good of the firm is indeed valuable to the firm and, hence, should be 
costly to lose.  
 Boards and board members have been criticized as being “creatures of the CEO” (Patton 
& Baker, 1989) or “rubber stamps” (Mace, 1971) and for failing to fulfill their obligations and 
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thus being unable to influence firm performance as intended. These criticisms are, however, 
mostly based on studies done on samples of large, established firms. Would boards behave any 
differently in new firms? If boards in large firms are “creatures of the CEO,” boards in new firms 
will be “creatures of the owner(s),” in particular, the entrepreneur(s). If even boards in large firms 
are “rubber stamps,” it is quite hard to conceive of them standing up to the all-powerful, 
concentrated ownership of an owner-manager-founder in a new firm. This skepticism against 
boards in smaller firms is not a recent phenomenon; Mace (1948) criticized such boards as 
“including merely subservient and docile appointees of the owner-manager” (p. 87).  
Surveys of owner-CEOs indicate that they expect board members to play a 
service/strategy role more than a control role (Neville, 2011; Van den Heuvel, Van Gils & 
Voordeckers, 2006). Therefore, it seems more realistic to view board members in young firms as 
human capital resources that contribute constructively toward firm performance through 
counseling, network access, and other kinds of assistance, rather than as controlling agents. As 
far as the service/strategy role of board members is concerned, Castaldi and Wortman (1984) 
argue that small firms can use their board of directors to overcome weaknesses arising from their 
smallness and threats borne out of the external environment. When used strategically, boards 
could have a significant positive impact. For well-established, large firms with access to the 
human capital of a trained workforce, external consultants, in-house experts, and professional 
managers, the additional human or relational capital the board members bring might be negligible 
compared to their human capital stock. However, for new firms, which are usually characterized 
by having bare-bones resource stocks, the expertise or networks that board members bring could 
make a significant, positive difference. So, while new firms are less likely to reap significant 
benefits from the control function of board members, they are more likely to need and benefit 
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from the service/strategy function. Hence, the loss of a board member should have a negative 
performance effect on average. This forms the basis of our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that lose a board member will experience a downturn in 
performance compared to firms that do not lose a board member. 
Outside and inside board members 
A large part of the corporate governance literature is dedicated to board independence. 
Board independence is achieved by having outside board members who are not related to owners 
and who are neither CEOs nor themselves employees of the firm. In theory, having an outside 
board member is a good thing. She will not only bring her watchful and independent eyes to 
monitor and control managers but also her human and relational capital to extend the resource 
stocks available to the firm. Yet, in empirical studies, findings do not always support this 
seemingly simple and intuitive idea. A meta-analytic review of the association between board 
composition and financial performance by Dalton et al. (1998) did not find a clear pattern. In a 
thorough, systematic review of corporate governance in entrepreneurial firms, Li, Terjesen, and 
Umans (2018) conclude that we still do not fully understand the effect of board member 
independence on firm performance.  
With regard to focusing on control tasks, it is not clear that an outside board member is 
able to bring much to the table. In new firms, which are usually characterized by either family 
ownership and/or owner-management, agency conflicts are much smaller than in larger firms 
with fragmented ownership and greater distance and information asymmetry between owners and 
managers. The control function of outside board members is therefore more relevant and 
pertinent when shareholders are not in a position to monitor the firm directly. In a new firm with 
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a small number of owners, it is more likely that all owners are fairly close to the firm themselves; 
hence they do not need to rely on an external board member to carry out monitoring on their 
behalf. 
The outside board member, however, may have a positive effect on firm performance 
through the service/strategy role. One could argue that an inside board member, i.e., owners, 
family members of owners, or employees of the firm, are likely to contribute to the firm 
regardless of their seat on the board. Therefore, having an outsider board member in the firm 
adds one extra source of human capital, while an inside board member does not. It is also true, 
however, that an outside board member may not have as strong a commitment to the firm as an 
inside board member will. Still, as long as the board has some inside board members, having 
outside members to complement them only adds to the relatively small human capital stock of a 
new firm. This suggests that having an outside board member can have positive performance 
implications for new firms, and losing an outside board member should therefore have a negative 
effect on performance: 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms that lose an outside board member will experience a downturn in 
performance compared to firms that do not lose a board member. 
Losing an insider board member can have a negative performance effect for several 
reasons. First, of course, there is the direct loss of human capital by the firm. Second, if the inside 
board member is an owner, there is the effect of losing an owner or an employee in addition to 
losing a board member. Third, if the inside board member is a family member of the owner 
and/or the entrepreneur, the grief at the loss of a loved one may further subtract critical human 
capital from the firm. The loss of an inside board member should, therefore, also have a negative 
effect on performance: 
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Hypothesis 2b: Firms that lose an inside board member will experience a downturn in 
performance compared to firms that do not lose a board member. 
Between an outside and an inside board member, losing the latter should have a larger 
adverse effect on the performance of the firm. Inside board members have larger stakes in the 
firm and incentives to invest more time and resources; hence, the human capital loss to the firm 
will—all else being equal—be larger if an internal board member becomes unavailable. Inside 
board members are a source of funding that might be challenging for a new firm to replace. And 
finally, when an inside board member dies, the emotional impact on other key individuals in the 
firm may impose added costs and problems on the firm that are larger than when an outside board 
member dies. 
Hypothesis 2c: Firms that lose an inside board member will experience a downturn in 
performance compared to firms that lose an outside board member. 
The human capital of board members 
Human capital is decisive for economic outcomes, both for firms and individuals, because 
human capital is decisive for productivity (Becker, 1962). Presumably, this basic relationship 
holds on the factory floor, in the boardroom, and anywhere else in-between.   
Schultz (1975) argues that investment in human capital, i.e., education and experience, 
helps individuals enhance their ability to allocate and reallocate resources. In other words, human 
capital enables people to adapt their resource allocation in the face of change and learning. 
People with such dynamic skills are highly valuable for new firms, given the turbulence and 
change they are likely to face. New firms face a dynamic external environment as they try to 
carve out a viable position, but they also face a rapidly changing internal environment, for 
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instance, as a result of hiring new people or introducing new structures and processes (Scott & 
Bruce, 1987). Therefore, new firms are likely to be particularly sensitive to variations in the 
human capital of key personnel and their resulting ability to facilitate adaptation to the rapid 
changes they experience. 
Board members are in a unique position to use their control role to caution the young firm 
about dangers lurking in the environment and to use their service role to help the firm better 
adjust to internal and external changes. To the extent that the board members have the authority 
to perform their control function, members with high human capital ought to be more capable of 
fulfilling this role, ensuring higher and more sustainable growth and performance.  
From the point of view of the service and strategy function, what board members bring to 
the table is their human and relational capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Their human capital 
enables them to positively influence performance through better advice and strategic input, while 
their relational capital enables them to affect performance by helping firms obtain legitimacy, 
secure resources, and generally better manage relationships with external stakeholders. While 
existing research, as we have argued, suffers from serious endogeneity problems, empirical 
findings have been supportive of a positive association between the general human capital of 
board members and firm performance (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Khanna, Jones, & Boivie, 
2014; Kor & Misangyi, 2008). In sum, then, there seems to be both a conceptual and an empirical 
basis to hypothesize that board members with higher human capital are more important to a firm 
than board members with lower human capital. 
Hypothesis 4a: Firms that lose a board member with a level of human capital above the 
industry median will experience a downturn in performance compared to firms that do 
not lose a board member. 
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Hypothesis 4b: Firms that lose a board member with a level of human capital above the 
industry median will experience a downturn in performance compared to firms that lose a 
board member with human capital below the industry median. 
Loss of the chairperson 
The chairperson in a firm is arguably a highly influential member of the board—indeed, 
often the most influential member. In new firms, they are usually large owners themselves, which 
provides them with strong incentive to play both control and service roles. Secondly, we expect 
that the role of chairperson will tend to be filled by a board member with comparatively high 
levels of human capital (compared to other board members).   
Here we are interested in chairpersons who do not simultaneously serve as the CEO of the 
firm so that we do not confound the board member effect with the CEO effect. This restriction 
may dampen the effect of the loss of a chairperson for two primary reasons: first, a non-executive 
chairperson will not be as influential in a firm as an executive chairperson will be; second, the 
loss is limited since the executive team will still be around. Despite this, we expect that the loss 
of a chairperson will cause an adverse effect on firm performance and that this effect is larger 
than the loss of an ordinary board member.  
Hypothesis 5a: Firms that lose the chairperson of the board will experience a downturn 
in performance compared to firms that do not lose a board member. 
Hypothesis 5b: Firms that lose the chairperson of the board will experience a downturn 
in performance compared to firms that lose an ordinary board member. 
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Data Sources and Sample Construction 
We use Norwegian registry data to test how important board members are to the growth 
of a firm. We exclusively sample privately owned limited liability firms. We merge a range of 
different registry databases to obtain our dependent, explanatory, and control variables. These 
registries have the advantage that they contain information on all firms registered in Norway as 
well as all employees, owners, and board members that reside in Norway. 
The source of accounting data is the Register of Company Accounts, in which every 
registered firm must submit its annual financial statement. The source of information on 
ownership and the allocation of roles such as CEO, chairperson, or board member is the Business 
and Enterprise Register. Employer-employee links were obtained from the Register of Employers 
and Employees. Information on education came from the National Education Database, which 
contains detailed information about the education level and category of the entire population. 
From this dataset, we use the highest level of completed education and the category of education 
for employees, founders, and board members in our analyses. Finally, we use the National 
Registry as a source of additional demographic information, such as dates of birth and death, 
municipality of residence, immigration category, and family relationships such as parents, 




Our sample selection starts with the identification of privately owned limited liability 
firms that were established between the years 2000 and 2010 with up to three individual owners.9 
From this list, we exclude the following:  
 firms that are majority owned by other firms;  
 firms that never achieve an annual revenue of NOK 50,000 (~USD 5,800);  
 firms in which the CEO is not identified;  
 firms in which the CEO dies inside the window of +/- 5 years of a board member’s 
death, so that the effect of the CEO death does not confound the effect of board 
member death (this means that we also exclude firms where the dead board member 
was also the CEO); and 
 firms that experience another board member death inside the window of +/- 5 years of 
a board member death. 
Applying these restrictions to the sample gives us 54,001 firms. We winsorize the top and 
bottom one percent of assets and sales of the firms in their second year of operation to eliminate 
outliers. This results in 52,458 firms, out of which 291 experience a board member death. 
Measuring Growth 
As proxies of firm performance, we use three different size-based growth indicators—
asset, employee, and sales growth. These are some of the most commonly used indicators to 
measure firm performance in entrepreneurial firms. Davidsson and Wiklund (2006) argue that the 
                                                            
9 We impose the owner count criterion to be able to better control for owner-specific effects. Even with this 
restriction, we retain over 80% of the firms. 
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choice of growth indicators should be informed by both empirical and theoretical considerations. 
They support using sales, employment, and asset growth when governance structures are the 
units of analysis, as is the case in our paper. 
Delmar (2006) critically examines the empirical growth literature on new firms and 
recommends the use of objective growth indicators such as employee and sales growth. He 
cautions against using asset growth since it is more relevant to capital-intensive industries. This 
criticism of asset growth may be less relevant in our case because we exact-match the control and 
treatment firms based on industry codes, as explained in detail below. Therefore, in effect, we are 
comparing treated firms in a manufacturing (service) industry to control firms in a manufacturing 
(service) industry. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the treated firms are unequally 
distributed between manufacturing and service industries. 
Similarly, although sales growth is widely used in the growth literature, Gilbert, 
McDougall, and Audretsch (2006) remind us that sales growth may be a misleading indicator of 
performance when firms belong to industries in which product development takes a long time, 
thus favoring employment growth. Delmar (2006) argues that employment growth and sales 
growth do not necessarily have to be correlated since an entrepreneur may respond to an increase 
in demand by hiring employees, increasing sub-contracting, or increasing labor productivity. 
Therefore, it is conceivable that a firm may be able to lay off employees, shed some assets, and 
still maintain (or even increase) sales by improving productivity or subcontracting. 
We accept all three growth measures to be indicators of performance, but we caution that 
they may not necessarily be aligned in the same way. 
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Explanatory Variables 
Death of a board member 
We use a binary treatment variable to indicate whether a firm experiences a board 
member death or not. This variable absorbs the effect of losing a board member. The binary 
variable indicating the treatment status of a firm will tell us if board members in general are 
important to the firm or if they are easy to replace. However, it is perhaps more interesting to 
examine if certain board members are more important than others. To this end, we subdivide the 
dead board members based on their characteristics. 
Human capital 
A board member’s human capital measures her ability to influence firm performance 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). When a board member dies, a certain stock of human capital is taken 
away from the firm. Traditionally, years of education and experience are used separately as 
indicators of human capital. However, we argue that this is inadequate. Education, work 
experience, and board experience are different dimensions of a board member’s human capital. 
Judging a board member based on these dimensions taken separately does not truly reflect the 
value she brings to the firm. Therefore, we combine the three into a composite human capital 
measure. 
We use two different measures of board members’ human capital to quantify the stock of 
human capital that is taken away. First, we use the number of years of education the dead board 
member had. Then we create a composite measure of human capital by combining years of 
education, experience, and board experience using the method proposed by Portella (2001) and 
illustrated in Appendix A. We calculate the median human capital in the industry in the given 
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year and differentiate firms that lose board members below the median human capital and above 
the median human capital. We then compare the performance of these two groups of firms with 
firms that do not lose any board members. 
Chairperson 
The chairperson of a firm is a particularly important member of the board of directors. 
She likely enjoys more authority than other board members, and those selected for this role are 
prone to have particularly high levels of human capital. Therefore, we examine the effect of 
losing a chairperson compared to a normal board member, using an indicator variable. 
Outsider/Insider 
A board member that is also an owner of the firm, a family member of an owner, or an 
employee in the firm may have stronger incentives to contribute to the firm, relative to an 
outsider. Therefore, we use an indicator variable to distinguish inside board members and outside 
board members and test whether the effect of losing an inside board member is stronger than the 
effect of losing an outsider. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the relationships between board members and owners. The table includes 
board members in 40,795 firms during the second year of operation. Since we have ownership 
data from 2004 onwards only, this sample excludes firms if their second year of operation was 
before 2004 or after 2011.10 Out of the 65,899 board members in our sample, more than half are 
owners themselves. Approximately 18% of the board members are family members of the 
                                                            
10 This sample also excludes firms that are not present in our database in their second year. 
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owners, and about 28% are outsiders, i.e., neither owners nor family of owners. Out of the 40,795 
firms, 36,866 firms (90%) have at least one owner or family member of an owner on the board, 
and 12,235 firms (30%) have at least one outsider on their board. Outsiders are defined as board 
members that are neither owners, relatives of owners of the firm with at least a 1% stake, nor 
employees of the firm. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Table 2 shows the distribution of board size in our sample in the second year of operation. 
Over 60% of firms have only one board member, and the average board size is 1.61. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Table 3 provides a comparison of descriptive statistics between treated and control firms 
in the second year of operation. The treated firms in our sample have higher assets, equity, and 
sales compared to control firms. As expected, the average age of board members in treated firms 
is higher than that of control firms. The owners of treated firms are also older, on average, than 
the owners of control firms. The age of CEOs are similar in the two groups. Years of education of 
board members, owners, and CEOs are marginally higher for the control group. The control 
group contains a higher proportion of single-owner firms (43%) compared to the treated firms 
(15%). Family ownership of board members and CEOs is higher in the control firms than in the 
treated firms. Finally, the treated firms have larger boards than do control firms. 
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-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Table 4 shows the distribution of firms in NACE aggregation categories. It shows that 
firms in the treated and control groups have similar distributions. Almost a third of the firms in 
both categories come from the wholesale and retail trades. Construction, business services, and 
the real estate sector also have substantial representation in the sample. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Estimation Strategy 
Our study is based on the premise that the death of a board member exogenously removes 
a stock of human capital from the firm, which allows us to identify the effect of that loss on a 
firm’s performance. This effect will tell us how important a board member was to the firm and 
whether they are easily replaceable. Therefore, our sample consists of a pool of treated firms, 
which experience board member death, and a pool of control firms, which do not experience 
board member deaths. 
While death is an exogenous event, there may still be some, albeit weak, correlation with 
firm performance. For instance, older board members are more likely to die compared to younger 
board members. We also know that older people in general are wealthier than younger people. 
Firms with wealthier owners are likely to outperform firms with less wealthy owners up to a 
certain level (Hvide & Moen, 2010). To the extent that these board members have ownership 
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stakes in the firms, or are financially backing them, there may be a correlation between board 
member death and firm performance. We see from the descriptive statistics that the firms in the 
treated and control groups are not entirely similar. In order to make sure that the two groups are 
comparable to each other in the analysis sample, we employ coarsened exact matching (Iacus, 
King, & Porro, 2012). CEM constructs a sample of the treated and control firms that minimizes 
the multivariate distance between the two categories, thereby giving us a more balanced sample. 
It also assigns weights to the control firms based on how many treated and control firms there are 
in each bin, relative to control and treated firms in the entire sample. 
We use the second year for each firm so that we have the first full year of operation for all 
firms in our sample. Then we force exact matches between treated and control firms on year of 
founding, industry,11 single/multiple owners, and industry-year adjusted sales and assets 
quintiles. By including second-year sales and assets quintiles as matching variables, we are 
essentially matching on lagged dependent variables in addition to other observed covariates. This 
addresses the concern that firms with older board members—who are more likely to die—are 
established on a larger scale and, therefore, have higher expected performance than the control 
firms. More generally, we are ensuring that the treatment and control firms are similar in terms of 
age, size, industry, and ownership type. 
Table 5 shows the imbalance between the treated and control samples based on the 
selected matching variables before and after implementing CEM. As we can see from the 
measure of imbalance (multivariate L1 distance), the matching process has significantly reduced 
the imbalance between the treatment and control firms, particularly with respect to the first three 
                                                            
11 We use intermediate NACE aggregation (A*38), which aggregates the 88 NACE Rev. 2 divisions into 38 
categories. 
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covariates. After matching, our analysis sample consists of 270 treated firms and 6,130 control 
firms. Our matching process has discarded 21 treated and 46,035 control firms, resulting in a 
much more balanced sample. 
After the construction of the matched sample, we estimate the following fixed-effects 
panel model:12 
yit = α0 + β1Z + γTi + τi + υi + εit 
 
In this model, yit represents the outcome variables (log of assets, sales, and employees), and Z 
represents board-, owner-, and CEO-specific control variables. The variable Ti, which represents 
the treatment dummy, is 1 for years after a firm experiences board member death and 0 for years 
before board member death. Its value is 0 for the control firms for all years. The coefficient on Ti, 
γ, gives us the effect of board member loss on a firm’s performance. Additionally, τi is time-
specific effects (year dummies), υi is firm-specific fixed effects, and εit is idiosyncratic error. 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 6 presents the findings on whether a board member is important to a firm on 
average, and Tables 7, 8, and 9 present the findings on whether certain characteristics make some 
board members more important than others. The first three columns in Table 6 show the 
coefficients on the natural log of assets, sales, and employees, with year dummies and firm fixed 
effects only. Then, we add control variables related to owners and CEOs. The regressions in 
                                                            
12 Hausman’s specification test favored a fixed effects model. 
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Tables 7, 8, and 9 include the same control variables as in Table 6. The reference group in all 
tables includes firms that did not experience board member death. 
We find a significant effect of board members on asset growth but not on sales. When a 
firm loses a board member, the firm experiences about 12.3%13 lower asset growth than a firm 
that does not experience a board member death. The mean effect on employment is negative 
4.8% but is significant at the 0.1 level only. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
In Table 7, we see the effects of board member loss based on their human capital. We 
have, in effect, divided the sample into three groups. The reference group includes firms where 
no board member dies. In the second group, a board member dies, but she does not have above-
median human capital in the industry in the relevant year. The final group has firms where a 
board member with above-median human capital in the industry dies. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The first three columns in Table 7 use education years as the indicator of human capital. 
The final three columns use a combination of education, experience, and board experience as the 
                                                            
13 A coefficient of -0.131 on log of asset translates to: [exp(-0.131) – 1] = 12.3%. 
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indicator of human capital. We believe that the latter human capital measure is the best indicator 
of how valuable a board member is to a firm. 
With only education years as our human capital measure, we see a statistically significant 
negative effect of 16.3% on assets for firms that lost a less qualified board member, but no effect 
when losing board member with above-industry-median education years. While this seems 
counterintuitive, it is possibly a result of the fact that owner-board members are marginally less 
educated than non-owner board members; hence, the effect we capture here is that of ownership. 
In other words, it is likely that the effect captured by the lower education group is confounded 
with the effect of ownership. The average ownership of board members with below-median 
education years is 65.3%, while it is 59% for board members with above-median education years. 
Therefore, in this context, education years alone is an inadequate measure of human capital. 
There is also no effect on sales or employment. 
In the final three columns, we use education years, experience, and board experience to 
create a composite human capital variable. Then, we compare the effect of losing a board 
member with above industry-median human capital to that of losing a below-median board 
member.14 The loss of a board member with above-median human capital has negative effects on 
employment (-9%), but there is no significant effect if the dead board member has below 
industry-median human capital. The effects on two treated groups are statistically different for 
employment at the 0.05 significance level. In terms of assets growth, losing a board member with 
                                                            
14 We also compare the effect of losing a board member whose human capital is the highest on the board where she 
serves to losing board members whose human capital is not. The findings are similar to those reported here. These 
regressions are available from the authors. 
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above industry-median human capital has a negative effect of 15.9% significant at the 0.05 level, 
but losing a below-median board member has no effect. We find no effect on sales growth. 
From this part of the analysis, we conclude that losing board members with high levels of 
human capital is detrimental to firm performance, whereas losing low-human-capital board 
members has no significant effect. 
In Table 8, we focus on the loss of the chairperson. The results show a significant 
negative effect on asset (-16.6%) and employment growth (-7.7%) for firms where the 
chairperson dies (while we do not see a statistically significant effect from the loss of an ordinary 
board member on employment growth). We also see a negative effect on assets (-9.2%) when 
ordinary board member dies, but it is only significant at the 0.1 level. However, the difference 
between the effects experienced by the two treated groups is not statistically significant. This is 
partial evidence that losing a chairperson has a larger negative effect on firm performance than 
losing an ordinary board member. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Finally, in Table 9, we see that compared to firms that do not lose a board member, the 
firms that lose a board member who is either an owner, a family member of an owner, or an 
employee experience negative effects on assets (-14.3%) and employment (-5.6%). For firms that 
lost an outside board member, neither effect was significant. Again, however, the effects 
experienced by the two treated groups are not statistically different. This, again, is partial 
evidence that losing an inside board member has a larger negative effect on firm performance 
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compared to losing an outside board member. One potential explanation we propose for the 
existence of the effect due to losing an inside board member but not an outside board member is 
the grief that the founder may go through as a result of losing a family member. However, we 
find that losing board members with higher human capital is more detrimental to the firm than 
losing less capable board members. Assuming that grief is independent of the human capital of 
the deceased person, this implies that while grief may play some part in explaining the decline in 
performance, it is unlikely to be the dominant mechanism. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The research question we posed in this paper was if board members in new firms are 
important or not, and which characteristics make them more or less important. We are by no 
means the first to address this question, so our claim to originality is not in the question we ask 
but rather in the way we proceed to answer it.  
We believe that existing empirical work on this question suffers from severe endogeneity 
problems that our approach minimizes. The problem, in short, is that board members are not 
randomly allocated to firms, nor do they randomly leave boards. This tends to influence the 
estimated effects of board member characteristics on performance. For example, good board 
members may be systematically attracted to firms with higher expected performance, and they 
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may be likely to leave boards when expected performance takes a turn for the worse. Problems 
such as these will bias coefficient estimates.  
To reduce these problems, we do two things. Firstly, we examine instances where a board 
member dies. The idea here is that this event is causally unrelated to performance. It occurs 
randomly in the sense that it does not occur more in firms with higher than lower expected 
performance. Secondly, to the extent that they exist, we address any systematic differences 
between firms where board members die compared to firms where board members do not die by 
implementing coarsened exact matching. In addition, we employ a fixed effects model to estimate 
the effect of losing a board member, which should account for any differences in the unobserved 
characteristics of these firms, should such differences exist. We believe we are the first to 
combine these empirical strategies in research on boards in new firms. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows: board members matter, but not 
unconditionally. On average, the loss of a board member will have a negative effect of about 
12.3% on assets and 4.8% on employment compared to firms that do not lose a board member. 
However, we find no effect on sales. Further, we look at various characteristics of board 
members to identify which of them are more important.  
We find that board members with ownership in the firm matter, while outside board 
members do not. Losing a board member with ownership reduces assets by 15.3% compared to 
untreated firms and employees by 5.5% relative to untreated firms. Again, the coefficients for 
sales are not significant.  
Next, the loss of a chairperson matters more than the loss of ordinary board members. 
Losing a chairperson has a negative effect of 16.6% on assets and 7.7% on employees. Losing an 
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ordinary board member does not have a statistically significant effect on employees, while it does 
have a negative effect of 9.2% on assets. This effect is only significant at the 0.1 level.  
Finally, board members with high human capital matter more than board members with 
lower human capital. If the board member with the highest human capital dies, the reduction in 
assets relative to untreated firms is 13.1%, and the reduction in employees is 8.8%. If someone 
else on the board dies, there are no significant effects on sales or employees, but there is a 
negative 11.3% effect on assets, significant at the 0.1 level. In sum, the higher the human capital, 
the bigger the loss relative to comparable, untreated firms. 
Although the goal of our paper was to examine the presence of board member effects on 
firm performance, not to test specific mechanisms, it seems natural to offer some speculation 
about the mechanism through which these effects might operate. We find that losing board 
members that have high ability (human capital), strong incentives (ownership), and high 
authority/custodianship (the chairperson) has a significant effect on firm performance. These 
traits coincide with the board member duties of control and service/strategy identified in 
corporate governance literature. For instance, losing a high-ability custodian of the firm might 
dissuade a firm from making asset investments or hiring new employees in the short run. Both 
the loss of the human capital of board members to help the firm identify wise investments as well 
as the loss of h financial backing could be reasons why losing them tends to negatively impact 
asset and employee growth. 
It is slightly puzzling that we do not see any effect on sales. We may offer a few possible 
reasons why this might be the case, but we are unfortunately unable to offer any definitive 
answers. The first reason relates to our study, which suffers from a statistical power issue due to a 
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fairly small number of treated firms. The t-statistics in Tables 5 and 6 for sales, which are large 
but below the statistical threshold for significance at the 0.1 level, hint in that direction. 
A second reason could be that the contribution of board members with respect to sales is 
often largely of a one-off nature. A board member brings her relevant ideas, network, and 
relational assets to a firm. Once she has transferred them to the firm, they stick with the firm even 
when the board member no longer exists. A board member that leaves a firm acrimoniously may 
cut off networks and relationships, but when the board member dies, such ties may remain intact. 
In our study, we ensure that the CEO of the firm is alive for all firms during the study period. 
This means that the effect of losing a board member is cushioned to some extent, particularly 
regarding sales.  
The final reason for not observing any effect on sales in our study might be that there is a 
lag in this effect so that it cannot be observed within the relatively short window we observe in 
our data. After lagging behind competitors in assets and employees, eventually, a sales decline 
will follow. An argument against this explanation may be that a sales decline will be equally 
likely to lead an employee decline as it is to lag it. 
Future Research 
Most of the existing research on the importance of board members has been conducted on 
samples of large, mature firms. We cannot necessarily extrapolate the findings of these studies to 
entrepreneurial firms because the roles performed by board members in large firms (more 
control, less service) may be significantly different from the roles performed in entrepreneurial 
firms (less control, more service) and because entrepreneurial firms must endure greater resource 
scarcity than established firms. In this sense, our study contributes to both the corporate 
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governance and entrepreneurship literatures. Our goal has been to establish whether board 
members are important to entrepreneurial firms and the characteristics that make them more or 
less important. Future research should also explicitly compare the effect of board members on 
entrepreneurial firms vis-à-vis larger, older firms, which is outside the scope of this paper.  
Decomposing the effects of board members on new firms begins by measuring, in a 
statistically robust manner, whether there are any such effects or not and the broad patterns of 
variation in these effects. However, we need much more refinement of our understanding of how 
board members may help new firms. First, we need insight into the precise mechanisms through 
which board member effects exist. Related to this is the question of identifying the contribution 
of board members that are one-time and sticky as well as those that require the continued 
presence of a board member. For instance, the control function is likely to require the board 
member to be present. However, in new firms, where the owner or owners are proximate to the 
day-to-day activities of the firm, the control function of board members may not be very 
important. On the other hand, the service/strategy function may be more valuable, but a large part 
of this resource may be a one-time contribution for new firms, which will stick even after a board 
member leaves unless she leaves acrimoniously. In this context, the fact that a board member 
leaving a firm has little or no measurable effect does not necessarily mean that the board member 
did not bring value to the firm. 
Another research avenue is the supply and demand of board members, outside board 
members in particular. Outside board members did not matter for performance in our study. The 
reason may be that new firms are rarely able to attract sufficiently skilled external board members 
even if they want to; i.e., new firms might face a very limited supply of board members. The 
reason may also be a failure of demand. New firms may undervalue the potential contribution of 
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board members and not seek to recruit them or just nominate seat-fillers in the first place. 
Understanding these issues better may have practical implications for founders that wish to 
maximize their chances of success as well as for policy makers that seek to stimulate the social 
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Portela (2001) proposed a way of multiplicatively combining several skill measures such 
as education, experience, or unobserved skill into one composite skill measure. The construction 
process of the composite skill measure is as follows. First, we start with the average education 
years in the sample. Then, we correct for the relative position of the individual in schooling 
distribution of the sample. 
S = mschool*𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 
The correction factor aischool is calculated as follows: 
𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 = 0.5 +
𝑒(𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖−𝑚𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) 𝑠𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙⁄
1 + 𝑒(𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖−𝑚𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) 𝑠𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙⁄
 
where 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 is the formal education years of individual i, mschool is the average education 
years in the sample and sschool is the standard deviation of education years in the sample. This 
calculation of the correction factor imposes a cumulative logistic distribution on the skill 
measure. The correction factor ranges from 0.5 to 1.5. For an individual with 0 years of 
education, the skill level will be half the average schooling years in the sample. For individuals 
with the maximum years of education (22 years in our sample), the skill level will be 1.5 times 
the average schooling years, and individuals for whom education years is equal to the average 
education years in the sample, the correction factor is 1. Imposing a cumulative logistic 
distribution assumes increasing positive returns of schooling up to a certain point (average 
education years) and then diminishing positive returns thereafter.  
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After correcting for schooling, we correct for the relative position of the individual in the 
general experience distribution and board experience distribution in our sample in the same way 
we did for schooling: 




where 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖 is the general experience of individual i, 𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 is the average experience 
in the sample for the education years of person i, and 𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 is the standard deviation of 
experience in the sample for the relevant number of education years.  
𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0.5 +
𝑒(𝐵𝐸𝑖−𝑚𝐵𝐸|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟) 𝑠𝐵𝐸|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟⁄
1 + 𝑒(𝐵𝐸𝑖−𝑚𝐵𝐸|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟) 𝑠𝐵𝐸|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟⁄
 , 
where 𝐵𝐸𝑖 is the board experience of individual i, 𝑚𝐵𝐸|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟 and 𝑠𝐵𝐸|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙,  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟 
are mean board experience, and the standard deviation of board experience, respectively, in the 
sample for the relevant number of education years and general experience. 
Thus, our final skill index is as follows: 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 ∗ 𝑎𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 . 
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Table 1  
Board Composition in the Sample in the Second Year of Operation 
Relationship with owner Frequency Percent Cum. 
Mother 624 0.95 0.95 
Father 1,815 2.75 3.70 
Offspring 2,276 3.45 7.15 
Sibling 1,955 2.97 10.12 
Spouse 5,311 8.06 18.18 
Owner 35,507 53.88 72.06 
Outsider 18,411 27.94 100.00 
Total 65,899 100.00  
Note: The table shows board members in 40,795 firms during the second year of their operation. Since we 
have ownership data from 2004 onwards only, this sample excludes firms if their second year of operation 
was before 2004 or after 2011. Out of the 40,795 firms, 36,866 (90%) firms have at least one owner or 
family member of an owner on the board, and 12,235 (30%) firms have at least one outsider on their 
board. Outsiders are defined as board members that are neither owners, relatives of owners of the firm 
with at least a one percent stake, nor employees. 
 
Table 2 
Board Composition from the Sample in Second Year of Operation 
 Board Size Frequency Percent Cum. 
 1 24,693 60.53 60.53 
 2 8,826 21.64 82.16 
 3 5,813 14.25 96.41 
 4 1,239 3.04 99.45 
 5 193 0.47 99.92 
 6 26 0.06 99.99 
 7 3 0.01 100.00 
 8 1 0.00 100.00 
 9 1 0.00 100.00 
Total firms  40,795 100.00  
Mean board size 1.61    




Table 3  














Note: Since we have ownership data from 2004 onwards only, the statistics related to ownership excludes firms whose second year of operation 
was before 2004 or after 2011.  
 
52,167 control firms 
Board member is not dead  
291 treated firms 
Board member is dead 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Assets (in thousands) 1,968.53 3,068.07 21.00 29,608.00  2,868.00 4,471.58 25.00 28,020.00 
Equity (in thousands) 206.71 547.87 0.00 25,640.00  340.62 997.36 100.00 11,202.00 
Employees 2.18 3.66 0.00 71.00  2.43 4.59 0.00 47.00 
Sales (in thousands) 2,877.08 4,848.25 0.00 38,827.00  3,253.99 5,103.75 0.00 37,183.00 
Avg. age of board members 44.26 9.53 20.00 85.00  52.29 10.71 24.00 85.00 
Avg. age of owners 43.97 9.48 9.00 85.00  49.69 10.24 26.00 78.00 
Age of CEO 43.70 10.16 20.00 84.00  44.63 10.19 24.00 76.00 
Avg. education years of bm 13.64 2.48 0.00 22.00  13.09 2.30 8.00 21.00 
Avg. education years of owners 13.61 2.45 0.00 22.00  13.07 2.35 6.00 20.50 
Education years of CEO 13.56 2.60 0.00 22.00  13.17 2.45 8.00 21.00 
Single owner firm 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00  0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Family ownership of bm 0.87 0.22 0.00 1.00  0.79 0.26 0.08 1.00 
Family ownership of CEO 0.87 0.23 0.00 1.00  0.78 0.28 0.08 1.00 
Average board tenure 1.04 0.19 1.00 2.00  1.04 0.18 1.00 2.00 
Board Size 1.53 0.85 1.00 9.00  2.07 1.12 1.00 9.00 
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Table 4  




 Frequency Proportion 
 Control Treated Total Control Treated Total 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 362 4 366 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Manufacturing, mining, quarrying and other industries 3,014 25 3,039 0.06 0.09 0.06 
Construction 8,393 40 8,433 0.16 0.14 0.16 
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and 
food services 15,729 89 15,818 0.30 0.31 0.30 
Information and communication 2,143 12 2,155 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Financial and insurance activities 2,598 16 2,614 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Real estate activities 5,450 46 5,496 0.10 0.16 0.10 
Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service 
activities 9,721 43 9,764 0.19 0.15 0.19 
Public administration, defense, education, human health and social work 
activities 2,777 11 2,788 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Other services 1,961 5 1,966 0.04 0.02 0.04 
Total 52,148 291 52,439 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 5 
Sample Imbalance Before and After Coarsened Exact Matching 
Before matching        
Multivariate L1 distance  0.88245       
        
Univariate imbalance     L1   mean min 25% 50% 75% max 
Founding year 0.24711 -1.7825 0 -2 -3 -2 0 
Industry 0.13905 -0.73548 0 0 0 -1 -1 
Single/multiple founders 0.2731 -0.2731 0 0 0 -1 0 
Sales quintile 0.08745  0.20213 0 0 0  1 0 
Assets quintile 0.07076  0.24315 0 0 0  1 0 
        
After matching        
Number of strata 8,102       
Number of matched strata 243       
 Control Treated      
All 52,167 291      
Matched 6,130 270      
Unmatched 46,037 21      
        
Multivariate L1 distance  8.349e-15       
        
Univariate imbalance L1 mean min 25% 50% 75% max 
Founding year 8.7e-15 2.7e-11 0 0 0 0 0 
Industry 8.1e-15 3.3e-13 0 0 0 0 0 
Single/multiple founders 1.5e-15 2.1e-15 0 0 0 0 0 
Sales quintile 6.7e-15 3.6e-14 0 0 0 0 0 




Effect of Board Member Death on Firm Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Assets Sales Employees Assets Sales Employees 
       
Board member is dead -0.0781+ 0.0362 -0.0497* -0.131** -0.00190 -0.0490+ 
 (-1.67) (0.34) (-1.96) (-2.76) (-0.02) (-1.83) 
Avg. education of owners    -0.0644* -0.134*** -0.0234* 
    (-2.29) (-3.30) (-2.15) 
Largest owner’s education    0.0104 0.0366 -0.00818 
    (0.53) (1.29) (-0.88) 
Single owner firm    -0.0777+ -0.143 -0.0620* 
    (-1.75) (-1.62) (-2.51) 
Avg. age of owners    0.0341+ -0.0400 -0.00939 
    (1.72) (-0.97) (-0.48) 
Square of avg. age of owners    -0.000492* 0.000222 0.0000586 
    (-2.43) (0.55) (0.29) 
Family ownership of CEO (%)    -0.0596 -0.0881 -0.0157 
    (-0.80) (-0.58) (-0.37) 
Education of CEO    0.0000619 -0.00000603 0.00861 
    (0.00) (-0.00) (1.07) 
Age of CEO    0.0358+ -0.00658 -0.00516 
    (1.96) (-0.22) (-0.27) 
CEO is a board member    -0.0301 -0.0132 -0.00689 
    (-1.41) (-0.45) (-0.62) 
Square of age of CEO    -0.000371* 0.0000155 0.0000469 
    (-2.05) (0.05) (0.25) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 48,781 48,728 48,782 44,044 43,994 44,045 
overall R2 0.0239 0.0006 0.0000 0.0163 0.0481 0.0506 
t statistics in parentheses 







Effect of Dead Board Member’s Characteristics on Firm Performance: Human Capital 
Human capital measure Education years Edu. years, experience, and board exp. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Assets Sales Employees Assets Sales Employees 
       
Dead bm has below-
median HC in industry 
-0.179** -0.00277 0.0422 -0.0787 0.162 0.00680 
(-3.36) (-0.03) (-1.41) (-1.12) (1.04) (0.19) 
       
Dead bm has above-
median HC in industry 
-0.0588 0.00149 -0.0755 -0.173** -0.134 -0.0942** 
(0.71) (0.01) (-1.43) (-2.86) (-1.02) (-2.58) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 44,044 43,994 44,045 44,044 43,994 44,045 
overall R2 0.0163 0.0481 0.0506 0.0163 0.0482 0.0509 
 
Note: t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





Effect of Dead Board Member’s Characteristics on Firm Performance: Chairperson 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Assets Sales Employees 
    
Dead bm was not the chairperson -0.0968+ 0.115 -0.0288 
 (-1.68) (0.81) (-0.82) 
    
Dead bm was a chairperson -0.182* -0.179 -0.0797* 
 (-2.46) (-1.32) (-2.11) 
    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 44,044 43,994 44,045 





Effect of Dead Board Member’s Characteristics on Firm Performance: Outside Board Member 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Assets Sales Employees 
    
Dead bm was outside bm -0.0460 0.211 -0.0193 
 (-0.54) (1.04) (-0.35) 
    
Dead bm was either owner, family, or 
employee 
-0.155** -0.0644 -0.0577+ 
(-2.86) (-0.55) (-1.93) 
    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 44,044 43,994 44,045 
overall R2 0.0163 0.0482 0.0507 
 
Note: t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
All regressions use same control variables shown in Table 6. Treatment sample restricted to +/- 4 
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Immigrant Entrepreneurship: The Liability of Weak Embeddedness and Overcoming It 
with Native Board Members 
Sujit Pandey 
NHH Norwegian School of Economics 
 
Abstract 
The question of performance differences between immigrant- and native-owned firms 
is far from settled. One big disadvantage immigrant entrepreneurs have is the lack of 
embeddedness in the host country’s socio-economic structures. We study the performance 
difference and find that immigrant-owned firms perform worse than native-owned firms. 
Next, we examine whether native board members can help immigrant entrepreneurs embed 
themselves in the host country and thereby close the performance deficit. We find evidence 
that not all native board members can do so, but certain types of board members can. 
 
Keywords: Immigrant entrepreneurship, Board members, Corporate Governance, Human 




International migration has been rapidly growing over the years. The United Nations’ 
International Migration Report shows that significant demographic changes have occurred in 
North America, Oceania, and Europe as a result of international migration. In addition, the 
relative ease of immigration across most countries in Europe and its implications for 
economic migration has been a subject of great debate in recent years. In this context, research 
into immigrant entrepreneurship, such as this study in which we examine the performance of 
immigrant entrepreneurs relative to native entrepreneurs, can have profound policy 
implications.  
There are arguments that favor immigrant entrepreneurs outperforming native 
entrepreneurs and vice versa. Economic migrants are described as tending, on average, to be 
more able, ambitious, aggressive, entrepreneurial, or otherwise more favorably selected than 
similar individuals who choose to remain in their place of origin. Hence, they are favorably 
self-selected to outperform native entrepreneurs (Chiswick, 1999). Constant and Zimmermann 
(2006) argue that the very act of seeking opportunities in a foreign country and assuming the 
risks that accompany migration are entrepreneurial. Thus, immigrants are likely to have 
entrepreneurial/human capital that is superior to that of natives, which should give them an 
edge in terms of business performance. 
There may also be some market-driven advantages for immigrant entrepreneurs in the 
host country. For instance, the ethnic enclave hypothesis suggests that a community of 
immigrants in the host country is in itself a distinct economic sector that provides a higher 
payoff for human capital brought from the home country for both workers and entrepreneurs 
(Portes & Shafer, 2007). Even outside the enclaves, immigrant entrepreneurs may have 
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opportunities in sectors such as food and hospitality, where the local population may be 
attracted by differentiated products, such as ethnic cuisines. 
The third source of advantage for immigrant entrepreneurs comes from the 
relational/social capital in the home country that an immigrant entrepreneur may be able to 
exploit by either sourcing products from or exporting products to the home country 
(Brzozowski, Cucculelli, & Surdej, 2014; Miera, 2008). 
Another set of arguments claims the advantage is held by native entrepreneurs relative 
to immigrant entrepreneurs. First, immigrants are not socially embedded in the host country to 
the extent that natives are.15 This hinders them from spotting opportunities, accessing 
resources, and making informed decisions based on all available information. Second, 
immigrant entrepreneurs tend to be financially less well-off than native entrepreneurs at the 
time of starting their business. The lack of networks and physical assets in the host country 
may also lower their ability to secure outside financing. Therefore, they may not be able to 
establish (or quickly grow) the firm to an efficient scale. 
Finally, since the host country labor market may undervalue the human capital of an 
immigrant, immigrants may more often choose entrepreneurship/self-employment out of 
necessity rather than pursuing opportunities in the market (Kloosterman et al., 1998). Such 
subsistence entrepreneurs may not be capable of growing—or motivated to grow—their 
business beyond the level of income that affords them a decent living. In addition, they may 
be pursuing business ideas with more limited upside potential. This would drag down the 
average performance of immigrant entrepreneurs compared to native entrepreneurs. 
                                                            
15 They lack familiarity with and the ability to navigate the formal and informal institutional environment and 
endure a relative lack of social capital. 
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Following these opposing arguments, three possibilities emerge. First, the factors 
favoring immigrant entrepreneurs are stronger than those that oppose them, and they 
outperform native entrepreneurs, as Borjas (1986) and Neville, Orser, Riding, and Jung (2014) 
find. Second, the factors opposing immigrant entrepreneurs overpower those that favor them, 
and they underperform relative to native entrepreneurs, as Sahin, Nijkamp, and Stough (2011) 
assert. Finally, the two factors might cancel each other out, and the two sets of entrepreneurs 
may exhibit similar performance levels, as found by Constant and Zimmermann (2006). 
Amidst these theoretically and empirically contradictory findings, we ask and answer 
two pertinent questions. (1) How do immigrant entrepreneurs perform in comparison to 
native-born entrepreneurs? (2) Can immigrant entrepreneurs offset their lack of social 
embeddedness by appointing local board members to or hiring local people for executive 
positions? While the first question has been asked previously, albeit sparsely and with 
inconsistent answers, the second question has, to the best of our knowledge, not been studied 
so far. Furthermore, while most of the immigrant entrepreneurship research to date seems to 
focus on self-employment, we study privately owned limited liability firms, which represent 
more serious entrepreneurial endeavors. 
Aliaga-Isla and Rialp (2013), in their systematic review of immigrant 
entrepreneurship, observe that the performance of immigrant firms has not received adequate 
attention in the literature. Indeed, the majority of studies we reviewed have examined 
selection into self-employment or performance in specialized contexts such as immigrant 
enclaves (Constant & Zimmermann, 2006; Ohlsson, Broomé, & Bevelander, 2012; Ndofor & 
Priem, 2011). This study contributes to immigrant entrepreneurship research by contrasting 
the performance of immigrant- and native-owned limited liability firms, which typically 
involve more serious entrepreneurial endeavors, using the rich Norwegian microdata. Equally 
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importantly, we contribute to the budding literature of corporate governance in small firms by 
examining the effect of a board member on immigrant firms’ performance. 
Since immigrant entrepreneurship is sometimes regarded as an alternative way of 
integrating immigrants into the host country’s economy, especially when the labor market is 
struggling (Hjerm, 2004), this study may have substantive policy implications.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
The natural starting point in examining the performance of immigrant entrepreneurs 
vis-à-vis native entrepreneurs is to focus on two crucial questions: (1) Are the two groups 
different in terms of resource endowments; and (2) Is the business environment more 
challenging to one group than to the other? Resource-based theory highlights the importance 
of certain resources in firms’ competitiveness, thus serving as an appropriate lens through 
which to look at the first question. Social embeddedness theory presents a relevant framework 
to study the second question because it tells us about the importance of relationships between 
a firm and socio-economic institutions. Social embeddedness theory extends beyond the 
social capital or network of entrepreneurs, thus making it a more relevant theoretical lens for 
this paper because, in the context of immigrant entrepreneurship, the distance between firms 
and socio-economic institutions in a host country is as important a differentiating factor 
between immigrant and native entrepreneurs as social capital or networks. 
Resource-Based Theory 
Human/Entrepreneurial capital 
For a new venture, the entrepreneur’s human capital is one of its most important 
resources. Entrepreneurs with high human capital usually outperform those with low human 
capital. Parker (2009, p. 176) points out that “immigrants are better educated and motivated 
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than natives.” In our analysis sample, too, we find evidence of a statistically significant, albeit 
marginal, difference in higher education years favoring immigrant entrepreneurs compared to 
native entrepreneurs. We must note that, while making this comparison, we are assuming that 
the education system in the home and host countries of immigrant entrepreneurs are similar 
and impart a similar quality of education, which may not always hold true. 
Alvarez and Busenitz (2001), in their effort to reconcile resource-based theory and 
entrepreneurship, propose the incorporation of opportunity-seeking behavior of entrepreneurs 
as a key resource giving firms a potential competitive advantage. Immigrants, primarily 
economic migrants, have demonstrated opportunity-seeking behavior by crossing national 
borders to pursue profitable opportunities. This also indicates a risk-taking nature (Parker, 
2009, p. 176). Therefore, the immigrant population tends to be more able, ambitious, and 
entrepreneurial (Chiswick, 1999; Constant & Zimmermann, 2006). The combination of 
knowledge/resources from the home country and market needs of the host country can inspire 
immigrant entrepreneurs to come up with unusual and innovative solutions or simply to 
exploit arbitrage opportunities. 
There may also be cases in which immigrants become necessity entrepreneurs. The 
labor market in the host country may undervalue the human capital of immigrants, resulting in 
a penalty in wages or unemployment. Thus, immigrants who believe that their abilities are 
undervalued, or are unemployed or underemployed, may seek self-employment as a substitute 
for a salaried job. Such necessity entrepreneurs do not fit the “able, ambitious, and 
entrepreneurial” characterization we just presented when describing immigrant entrepreneurs. 
Their motivation for firm creation is subsistence; thus, they may not push for further growth 
beyond a point that reflects a fair value for their abilities in the labor market, and they may 
undertake a more limited search for promising entrepreneurial opportunities. This plausible 
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argument points toward a disproportional presence of necessity entrepreneurs in the 
population of immigrant entrepreneurs. However, we must be mindful that necessity 
entrepreneurs also exist in the population of native entrepreneurs. The threshold for being 
pushed into entrepreneurship out of necessity may, however, be different for natives and 
immigrants. 
Financial capital 
Having sufficient financial capital to start a business at a minimally efficient scale is 
important for firm survival and growth. Hvide and Møen (2010) find that the wealth of 
entrepreneurs before they start a business has a positive effect on venture performance up to 
the third quartile; however, it turns negative in the top quartile. This implies that financial 
constraints have real consequences for new firms. Immigrant entrepreneurs may be 
disproportionately affected by financial constraints for a number of reasons. First, they have 
lower income levels in general and will have lower savings to finance a venture on their own. 
Second, while natives have their family members to chip in financially, first-generation 
immigrants may not have such sources to depend on. Finally, since immigrants are likely to 
have smaller stocks of personal wealth, financial institutions may reject their financing 
requests for lack of collateral (Cavalluzzo & Wolken, 2005). Financial capital, which is 
valuable but not rare or inimitable, does not necessarily give any firm a sustained competitive 
advantage. However, for a new venture, it can have significant effects on survival and 
performance.  
Social Embeddedness Theory 
A Polish businessman in Norway usually has neither a network of friends nor 
even a rather modest social circle at his disposal. His network is in Poland 
and therefore outside the borders of his business activity. Devoid of its 
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support, he is in for a more troublesome start than his Norwegian counterpart, 
who starts his business in a well-known environment (Chalupa, 2014, p. 74). 
It turns out that people with foreign-sounding and last names that are difficult 
to pronounce for Norwegians are more prone to bankruptcy as company 
owners and directors (Chalupa, 2014, p. 76). 
Social embeddedness refers to the fact that economic activities occur within social 
structures and that the outcomes of such activities are directly or indirectly influenced by the 
actors and structures in the society. “Embeddedness refers to the social, cultural, political, and 
cognitive structuration of decisions in economic contexts” (Beckert, 2003, p. 769). The 
structures within which a firm is embedded offer resources, opportunities, and challenges. An 
entrepreneur who is a part of that structure can draw resources, identify and exploit 
opportunities, and overcome constraints to the extent that the entrepreneur and the 
environment are congruent (McKeever, Anderson, & Jack, 2014). Conversely, an outsider 
may struggle to navigate the structural context and exhibit worse performance despite equal or 
higher human capital compared to her native analog. As such, the ability of an entrepreneur to 
grasp the socio-economic peculiarities of an industry while making economic decisions will 
affect the outcome of these decisions. Immigrant entrepreneurs are likely to be less able to 
perceive and adapt to such variables while making decisions. In line with this argument, 
empirical findings indicate that social embeddedness affects financial performance in 
entrepreneurial firms (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002; Jack & Anderson, 2002). To the extent that a 
native entrepreneur is better able to assess these variables compared to immigrant 
entrepreneurs, a native entrepreneur will be making decisions under conditions of risk, while 
an immigrant entrepreneur will be making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. This 
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implies that a native entrepreneur will make relatively more favorable decisions than her 
immigrant counterpart will. 
The economic actions of a firm’s stakeholders are also shaped by the social sphere of 
which they are a part. This means that for an immigrant entrepreneur, customers’ 
requirements and preferences, suppliers’ conditions and expectations, as well as competitors’ 
behavior may be different in the host country compared to the home country. Inability to 
bridge such differences and adapt to the host country’s social, cultural, political, and cognitive 
structures will affect the chances of obtaining legitimacy in the host country for immigrant 
entrepreneurs. This, in turn, will affect performance and the probability of survival. 
While the arguments based on social embeddedness theory have so far favored native 
entrepreneurs, the theory can also provide favorable arguments for immigrant entrepreneurs. 
On the one hand, immigrants are part of larger social structures in the host country, where 
they face disadvantages compared to natives. On the other hand, immigrants are also often 
part of tightly knit enclaves, which “provide information networks, protected markets for 
ethnic products, and a steady supply of workers” (Parker, 2009, p. 172). The benefits 
originating from these enclaves to the entrepreneur, however, depend on the size of the 
enclave, their disposable income, and demand for such products (Parker, 2009). 
The prediction by social embeddedness theory about the performance of native versus 
immigrant entrepreneurs will thus depend on the magnitude of the liability immigrant 
entrepreneurs experience based on their weak embeddedness in the larger socio-economic 
structures of the host country, compared to the magnitude of benefits it can extract from the 
enclaves or home country. Immigrant entrepreneurs with an “enclave strategy” in a relatively 
small country like Norway may face a low “ceiling.” Therefore, social embeddedness theory 
seems to suggest a net advantage for native entrepreneurs. 
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Hypothesis 1: On average, native entrepreneurs outperform immigrant entrepreneurs. 
Not all immigrant entrepreneurs will have the same degree of deficit regarding social 
embeddedness compared to natives. Individuals who have lived a substantial period of their 
lives in the host country will have had opportunities to learn about it and reduce this deficit. 
The longer immigrants have been in the host country, the greater the chances that they have 
assimilated into the host country’s socio-economic structures. 
Hypothesis 2: On average, firms founded by immigrant entrepreneurs who have spent 
a substantial period of their lives in the host country will perform better than firms 
founded by immigrant entrepreneurs who have spent less time there. 
Although there is a competitive disadvantage for immigrants compared to natives, the 
magnitude of the disadvantage may vary across the immigrant entrepreneur population based 
on their human capital endowment. Immigrant entrepreneurs with high human capital will be 
better able to overcome the liability of weak embeddedness compared to those with low 
human capital. First, higher education level may improve an entrepreneur’s ability to absorb 
information from the environment and spot opportunities. These could either be opportunities 
presented by ethnic enclaves or arbitrage opportunities presented by differences between the 
home and host countries’ markets. Second, education may improve the managerial capability 
of entrepreneurs. Finally, education may signal the quality of the entrepreneur to the 
stakeholders and thus affect performance (Van der Sluis, Van Praag, & Vijverberg, 2005). 
These arguments imply a moderating effect of education on the performance differences 
between immigrants and natives. 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the educational level of an immigrant entrepreneur, the less 
she will underperform a native entrepreneur.  
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Overcoming disadvantage due to social un-embeddedness 
We have argued and hypothesized that the lack of social embeddedness of an 
immigrant entrepreneur in the host country will hinder performance. An important question, 
then, is whether this disadvantage can be mitigated somehow. One way of overcoming this 
disadvantage is to include natives in the firm in some capacity. Immigrant entrepreneurs can 
tap into these native individuals’ understanding of the local socio-economic context as well as 
their personal ties and networks. One such source of human and social capital that might help 
immigrant entrepreneurs is a native board member. 
The Board Member Role in New Ventures 
The corporate governance literature identifies two primary functions of a board 
member—control and resource provision. The control function of board members relates to 
keeping the self-serving nature of managers in check and protecting the interests of owners. 
This argument, rooted in agency theory, presumes that if given the opportunity, management 
will pursue their self-interests at the expense of the owner’s interest. This function may be 
more relevant in large or public firms where owners may not be able to keep track of the 
everyday activities in the firm. The firms that constitute our sample—new, single-owner 
firms—are unlikely to experience such problems since the owner is the manager in the vast 
majority of cases. Therefore, board members are more important as resource providers, i.e., 
they perform a service function. One commonly used theory to explain the service function of 
board members is resource dependency theory. 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) succinctly summarize the roles board members play and how 
those roles affect the financial performance of the firms. The three important service-related 
roles they list (based on resource dependency theory) are especially relevant to the current 
discussion. First, board members help firms co-opt external resources by leveraging their 
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social capital. This could be obtaining credit lines from banks or recommending potential 
employees. Second, board members play a boundary-spanning role. They “help the firm 
interface with its general and competitive environment . . . and absorb environmental 
uncertainty by providing information” (Zahra & Pearce, 1989, p. 297). Finally, firms can 
leverage the reputational capital of their board members to acquire or enhance organizational 
legitimacy. Huse and Zattoni (2008) find evidence of board members’ roles in helping firms 
acquire legitimacy during the start-up phase. Similarly, the meta-analysis by Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) demonstrates that board size is positively correlated with firm 
performance, which suggests that board members have an important resource-provision role. 
As discussed earlier based on social embeddedness theory, immigrant entrepreneurs’ 
weak embeddedness in the socio-economic structures in the host country puts them at a 
disadvantage compared to native entrepreneurs. The three roles we just discussed are 
precisely the issues that disproportionately affect them. They may not be able to draw 
resources from the environment effectively; furthermore, they may not be able to correctly 
assess intricate interrelationships among various stakeholders and how these may constrain 
their ability to pursue certain strategies. As outsiders, they may struggle to gain legitimacy, 
while their strongly embedded local competitors may acquire legitimacy more easily.  
Having native board members may, in itself, be a sign of an immigrant entrepreneur’s 
stronger embeddedness in a host country, compared to those that do not have native board 
members. A formal role in a nascent organization is a commitment that people are likely to 
make only if they have strong ties with the founder. Therefore, if an immigrant entrepreneur 
has a native board member, this could be an indicator of the social capital she has 
accumulated. While this suggests a different mechanism that links the presence of native 
board members to higher firm performance, both mechanisms predict a positive link to 
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performance. Therefore, if immigrant firms underperform compared to native firms, as we 
hypothesized, then having a native board member will reduce the performance gap. On the 
other hand, if immigrant firms outperform native firms, then having a native board member 
will further increase the performance gap. 
Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: Having a native board member will affect the performance gap 
between immigrant and native entrepreneurs in the immigrant entrepreneurs’ favor. 
Hypothesis 4b: Firms founded by immigrant entrepreneurs that have native board 
members will perform better than firms founded by immigrant entrepreneurs that do 
not have native board members. 
There will, of course, be substantial heterogeneity among native board members. 
Numerous studies of board composition have shown that certain board members are more 
valuable than others. A considerable focus has been dedicated to the presence of outside board 
members (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005; Calabro & Mussolino, 2013). The meta-analysis by 
Dalton et al. did not find any conclusive evidence of a link between board independence and 
firm performance. However, for a new firm, having an outside board member might indicate a 
higher quality founder, precisely because the founder has demonstrated an ability to recruit an 
outsider. Furthermore, since insiders (family members and owners) are already incentivized to 
help the firm succeed even if they do not occupy a board position, having an outsider board 
member will mean that they have extra resources they can leverage. In our context, this means 
that an immigrant entrepreneur who has a non-family member as a board member—instead of 
a native spouse, for example—might have enhanced performance: 
Hypothesis 5a: Having a native outside board member will affect the performance gap 
between immigrant and native firms in immigrant entrepreneurs’ favor. 
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Hypothesis 5b: Firms founded by immigrant entrepreneurs that have native outside 
board members will perform better than firms founded by immigrant entrepreneurs 
that do not have native non-family board members. 
Finally, we look at one of the important human capital characteristics of native board 
members that tends to influence their value to immigrant firms—their industry experience. 
Having knowledge of industry practices and having relationships with important stakeholders 
within the industry is an especially important resource to access for an immigrant 
entrepreneur. Zahra and Pearce (1989) explain that “boards which fit the firm’s external 
environment or aid in absorbing uncertainty enhance company performance” (p. 299). 
Industry experience is a particularly important variable because it is not only a measure of the 
relevancy of the human capital of a board member but also an indicator of the relevant social 
capital she may bring to the table. It will help eliminate the competitive disadvantage 
compared to natives arising from differences in embeddedness. Therefore, we believe that 
immigrant entrepreneurs who have board members with industry experience will have a 
competitive advantage. 
Hypothesis 6a: Having native board members with industry experience will affect the 
performance gap between immigrant and native firms in immigrant entrepreneurs’ 
favor. 
Hypothesis 6b: Firms founded by immigrant entrepreneurs that have native board 
members with industry experience will perform better than firms founded by 
immigrant entrepreneurs that do not have such board members. 
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Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data Sources 
Traditionally, immigrant entrepreneurship research has suffered from a “dearth of 
statistical data on immigrant population” (Aliaga-Isla & Rialp, 2013, p. 21). One of the 
strengths of our study is the use of rich Norwegian microdata that has detailed information on 
all residents in Norway, including the immigrant population, to test our hypothesis. Our 
variables come from five different registers: (1) the population register, which that has 
detailed demographic variables on the entire population of residents in Norway; (2) the 
company register, which has accounting information for all limited liability firms registered in 
Norway; (3) the corporate and business register, which has information about firm ownership 
and who occupies the key roles in each firm; (4) the register for employment relationships, 
which has information on the nature and duration of the jobs all individuals have in all firms; 
and (5) the education register, which has detailed information on years, levels, and fields of 
study on most individuals registered in Norway. 
Sample Generation 
We exclusively use single-owner firms so that the immigration status of the main 
decision maker in the firm can be neatly identified. Our sample contains only limited liability 
firms. Whereas most studies in the immigrant entrepreneurship literature focus on self-
employment and sole proprietorships, our focus on limited liability firms looks at more 
serious entrepreneurial endeavors. This sample also suits us because board members are an 
integral part of our study, and limited liability firms are required to have a board by law 
(unlike sole proprietorships). 
We start by identifying single-owner firms that started between the years 2004 and 
2010. The period was chosen because 2004 is the first year of our ownership data, and we 
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wanted to look at the first five years of observations for all firms conditional on survival. 
There is right censoring after the year 2014. There were 40,871 single-owner firms registered 
between 2004 and 2010. Out of those, 2,429 were owned by immigrants and 38,442 by 
natives. We exclude firms in which the owners are under 18 and over 67 years of age, the 
retirement age in Norway, and we only include firms that appear for two years in the 
database. We impose this restriction to make sure that we have at least one full year’s 
observation for the dependent variables. This also helps us get rid of some special purpose 
companies that may have been established for a particular transaction. This restriction may, 
however, add some survivor bias by getting rid of some legitimate firms that are shut down in 
their first year of operation. 
Weeding out shell companies and holding companies is essential to make sure that we 
are conducting our analysis on firms with real activities. To this end, we impose a set of 
constraints. First, we remove all firms that do not have at least two years of sales in the first 
five years. Second, we also remove firms that do not have salaried workers in the firm for at 
least two out of the first five years. Third, we remove firms that experience any ownership 
change within the period of study. Finally, we winsorize the data by year on sales, assets, and 
employee count and remove the top one percent of either of those three categories. The final 
sample size after imposing these sampling restrictions was 13,386 firms, among which 1,331 
were immigrant owned. 
“The roles dataset” from the corporate and business register contains information 
about board members and the firms to which they are linked. We include board members that 
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The choice of performance measures for new ventures is not always straightforward. 
Most studies use size and growth measures based on sales and employees (Murphy, Trailer, & 
Hill, 1996; Davidsson, Delmar, & Wiklund, 2006). The size and growth of assets are also 
used in several studies (Becker & Hvide, 2017; Davidsson et al., 2006), although Delmar 
(2006) cautions against using asset measures because they are usually less relevant in non-
manufacturing industries. It is also common to use profitability measures such as return on 
assets or profit margins. Similarly, efficiency and market share have also been used as 
measures of performance. Sometimes these measures can be misleading indicators of 
performance, especially for firms that focus on product development in the first several years 
of their life and then turn to focus on revenue or profitability. The best practice is to use 
multiple, objective indicators of firm performance because any single indicator cannot fully 
capture the performance given the diverse nature of businesses (Murphy et al., 1996; 
Davidsson et al., 2006). Accordingly, we use several indicators of firm performance. 
Sales. We take the natural logarithm of the total sales revenue of a firm. In order to 
make sure that we do not lose years where sales were reported as zero while the firm was still 
active, we add 10 to the original sales figures before transforming. 
                                                            
16 We have included deputy board members in the study because, for the purposes of our research question, 
deputy board members can also be effective in serving as a bridge between an immigrant entrepreneur and the 
host country’s social structures. 
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Assets size. This variable is the natural logarithm of the total assets value of a firm. As 
in the case of sales, we add 10 to the original assets value before transforming so that we do 
not lose observations where assets were reported as zero even though the firm was still active. 
Employees. This is the natural logarithm of the number of employees that work in a 
firm, the founder included. For active firms, we add 1 before transformation to avoid losing 
observations where the reported employee number is zero. 
Full-time equivalent employment days. It is plausible that many of the jobs created 
by new firms are part-time. This implies that the employee count will not necessarily give an 
accurate picture of the production activity of the firm. Therefore, we create a variable that 
measures the equivalent of full-time days of employment generated by firms. Like for the 
other dependent variables, we use a natural logarithm transformation for this variable. 
Equity ratio. As discussed earlier, we believe that immigrant entrepreneurs will face 
greater financing constraints compared to native entrepreneurs. To confirm this hypothesis, 
we use an equity ratio, which measures the portion of fixed assets that is covered by equity 
capital. This variable is also the natural log transformed. 
EBITDA margin. We look at the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, and 
depreciation to total income as a measure of operating profitability. 
Explanatory variables 
Immigrant status. The statistical agency of Norway—Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB)—
has defined the following six categories of immigration status: (A) Born in Norway with two 
Norwegian-born parents, (B) Immigrants, (C) Norwegian born with immigrant parents, (D) 
Foreign born with one Norwegian-born parent, (E) Norwegian born with one foreign-born 
parent, and (F) Foreign born with two Norwegian-born parents. We define immigrant 
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entrepreneurs as those who belong to the second category, i.e., first-generation immigrants. 
This variable is used to test Hypothesis 1. 
Assimilated/Not assimilated entrepreneurs. We assume that an entrepreneur who 
has spent at least one third of her life in the host country or arrived in the host country aged 13 
or younger has been assimilated. Based on this, we create a dummy variable that is coded 0 if 
the entrepreneur is native, 1 if an assimilated immigrant and 2 if a non-assimilated immigrant. 
We use this variable to test Hypothesis 2. 
Education. Education is measured by the years of formal schooling that entrepreneurs 
have had. To test Hypothesis 2, we interact quartiles of education years of the entrepreneurs 
with their immigration status.  
Presence of native board member. This variable divides the sample into four 
categories based on whether a firm has at least one native board member: (1) native-owned 
firms without a native board member, (2) native-owned firms with native board members, (3) 
immigrant-owned firms without a native board member, and (4) immigrant-owned firms with 
a native board member. We are primarily interested in comparing the performance of the 
fourth group of founders with other groups. This variable tests Hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
Presence of non-family, native board members. Like the previous variable, this 
variable divides the sample into four categories based on whether a firm has at least one none-
family, native board member. The variable is coded as (1) for native-owned firms without a 
non-family, native board member, (2) for native-owned firms with at least one native non-
family board member, (3) for immigrant-owned firms without a non-family, native board 
member, and (4) for immigrant-owned firms with at least one non-family, native board 
member. This variable tests Hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
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Presence of native board member with industry experience. This variable 
categorizes firms into the following four groups. The groups are coded as (1) for native-
owned firms without a native board member with industry experience, (2) for native-owned 
firms with at least one native board member with industry experience, (3) for immigrant-
owned firms without a native board member with industry experience, and (4) for immigrant-
owned firms with at least one native board member with industry experience. We consider 
board members who have worked at least two of the past five years in the same three-digit 
NACE industry as having industry experience. 
Control variables 
We control for several variables that have been found to affect firm performance in 
new firms. 
Marital status of owner. This is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the 
entrepreneur is married.  
Gender. This is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the entrepreneur is female. 
Studies have found differences between males and females for a variety of characteristics that 
can affect entrepreneurial outcomes. For instance, the meta-analysis by Byrnes, Miller, and 
Schafer (1999) finds that males usually take more risks than females. In entrepreneurship 
research, many studies find that female entrepreneurs underperform relative to male 
entrepreneurs (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1991; Du Rietz & Henrekson, 2000; 
Bardasi, Sabarwal, & Terrell, 2011), which may partly be a result of gender discrimination 
and partly a result of the type of businesses female entrepreneurs choose to start. 
Age, Age squared. These are continuous variables capturing the age of the 
entrepreneur and its square. The latter accounts for the non-linear effects of age on firm 
performance, which have been found in previous research. 
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Education categories. Different fields of education give people different skillsets. 
Some of these skillsets may be more relevant for innovating, managing, or selling products. 
For instance, people with education in the natural sciences may create innovative products, 
while people with business degrees may be better at running an organization. Therefore, we 
create an education category dummy variable based on the Norwegian Standard Classification 
of Education (NUS). The variable is coded as (0) General subjects, (1) Humanities and arts, 
(2) Teacher training and pedagogy, (3) Social sciences and law, (4) Business and 
administration, (5) Natural sciences, vocational and technical subjects, (6) Health, welfare, 
and sport,  (7) Primary industries, (8) Transport and communications, safety and security, and 
other services, and (9) Unspecified broad field of education. 
Firm age. This is a continuous variable indicating the number of years since firm 
registration. 
Industry. It is highly probable that there are systematic differences in terms of which 
industries immigrants predominantly choose to enter, compared to natives. Therefore, we 
control for the industry fixed effects by including three-digit NACE code dummies in all our 
models. 
Region. Industry structures, economic conditions, as well as the demography of 
residents varies across the five geographic regions in Norway. There are also some policies 
designed to encourage entrepreneurship in the sparsely populated northern parts of Norway. 
Therefore, we control for region fixed effects by including region dummies.  
Big city. Entrepreneurial opportunities, market characteristics, as well as demographic 
characteristics in big cities may be different compared to other areas. To account for such 
differences, we include a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is based in one of 
the four largest cities in Norway in terms of population. 
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Year dummies. We include year dummies to control for business cycle effects. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the entrepreneurs and firms in our sample 
based on the region of origin. The sample consists of all firms in the year after registration.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
With an average age of 44.44 years, native entrepreneurs are older than any group of 
immigrant entrepreneurs. Among the immigrant entrepreneurs, Eastern Europeans are the 
youngest group, with an average age of 39.37 years. Western European entrepreneurs have 
the highest level of education on average, followed by Anglo-Saxons and Nordics. The 
proportion of married entrepreneurs is highest (63%) in the “Rest of the World” category, 
which includes Asia, Africa, and Latin/Central America, while the majority of Nordic 
entrepreneurs are not married. Norwegians and Western Europeans have fewer female 
entrepreneurs (around 20%). The Rest of the World category has 24% female entrepreneurs, 
while Eastern Europeans have 23%. 
Norwegians owned the firms with the highest capital, and Eastern Europeans owned 
the firms with the lowest capital. However, the difference between the averages is not 
substantial because most firms have the minimum required amount of NOK 100,000 
(approximately USD 11,800) as capital. In terms of sales, firms founded by Eastern European 
immigrants, followed by the Rest of the World category, are ahead. Norwegian-owned firms 
have the highest asset value, while the equity ratio is highest for Anglo-Saxon entrepreneurs 
and the Rest of the World category, implying either their choice to not seek, or an inability to 
get, external finances for asset investments. 
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We measure four different indicators of employment: (1) employee headcount, (2) 
full-time equivalent employment days, (3) full-time equivalent employment days for non-
owner employees, and (4) full-time equivalent employment days for employees that are 
neither owners nor family members of the owners. For all four of these measures, the Eastern 
Europeans and the Rest of the World category are clearly ahead, indicating their involvement 
in mostly labor-intensive industries. The Anglo-Saxon entrepreneurs generate the least 
employment. 
Tables 2 and 3 break down which industries native and immigrant entrepreneurs are 
involved in. There are some clear differences and, yet, some similarities. Regarding the 
similarities, Table 2 shows that for both groups of entrepreneurs, “Wholesale and retail trade, 
transportation and storage, accommodation and food service activities” represents the biggest 
industry sector, followed by “Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support 
service activities” and “Construction.” Table 3 presents a more granular level. The table 
shows the top five industry groups (NACE three-digit classification) for native and immigrant 
entrepreneurs. For immigrant entrepreneurs, restaurant and mobile food service activities 
constitute over 15% of the firm population. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 and 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Table 4 shows the types of board members native- and immigrant-owned firms have. 
It is not a surprise that native entrepreneurs have a smaller share of non-family board 
members (34%) compared to immigrant entrepreneurs (45%) because of availability. About 
46% of board members for immigrant entrepreneurs are their spouses, while nearly 40% of all 
board members in native-owned firms are spouses of the owners. Around 26% of board 
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members in native-owned firms are related by birth, while the number is about 8% for 
immigrant-owned firms. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Empirical Findings 
For our main analyses, we run random effects regressions on panel data. Since our 
main variable of interest, the immigration status of entrepreneurs, is time invariant, we are 
unable to use fixed effects regression for this study. Therefore, the choice was between 
random effects and pooled ordinary least square regressions. In order to choose between the 
two models, we used the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. The null hypothesis 
in this test is that there is no statistically significant variance across units (firms in our case). 
When we implemented this test, the null hypothesis was strongly rejected, implying that there 
are significant differences across firms in our sample. Therefore, we opted for a random 
effects model. However, we also ran pooled OLS regressions as robustness checks. 
Results 
Tables 5 through 13 report the results of the hypothesis tests. In Table 5, we use a 
binary variable indicating an entrepreneur’s immigration status to assess its association with 
seven different performance indicators. We find evidence that being an immigrant 
entrepreneur is associated with around 9% lower sales compared to native entrepreneurs. 
Similarly, immigrant-owned firms have nearly 17% lower assets but still generate similar 
levels of employment. Their operating profitability is nearly 9% lower compared to native 
entrepreneurs. Their capital base is around 7% less, and they finance a higher portion (around 
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12%) of assets by themselves, as evidenced by a higher equity ratio. These figures, together, 
indicate support for our Hypothesis 1. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
In Table 6, we present the results for the association between firm performance and 
how long an entrepreneur has lived in the host country. All native entrepreneurs constitute the 
reference group. Immigrant entrepreneurs who arrived in the host country at the age of 13 or 
younger, or those who have spent at least one third of their lives in the host country, are 
considered assimilated, while others are not. The results indicate that those who have spent 
substantial time in the host country perform marginally better than those who have not. In 
terms of sales, the assimilated immigrant-owned firms are similar to native firms, while non-
assimilated immigrant-owned firms register less in sales. The non-assimilated immigrants also 
have lower profitability. However, the non-assimilated do not differ from assimilated 
immigrants in terms of employment creation and equity ratio. Thus, we have found partial 
support for Hypothesis 2. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the test for the moderating effect of education on 
immigrant firms’ performance. There is a positive effect of education on immigrant 
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entrepreneurs up to the third quartile. Up to that quartile, higher education gives them higher 
sales, assets, employees, employment days created, and a lower equity ratio, which means that 
they have more of their assets financed from outside sources. Thus, we find evidence to 
support Hypothesis 3. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------- 
In Table 8, we present the performance differences between native- and immigrant-
owned firms based on whether they have a native board member. The reference group is 
native entrepreneurs who have at least one native board member in their firm. Surprisingly, 
native firms that do not have a native board member are the best performers across the board. 
The immigrant firms that do not have a native board member have worse sales, assets, 
profitability, and a higher equity ratio. Thus, we reject our Hypothesis 4a, which stated that 
firms founded by immigrant entrepreneurs that have native board members will perform as 
well as the firms founded by native entrepreneurs that have native board members. Similarly, 
the difference in performance between immigrant firms that have native board members 
compared to those that do not have a native board member is not statistically significant for 
any performance measures except operating profitability, for which the former group 
performs worse, and equity ratio, for which the former group has more capital per unit of 
asset. This means that we reject Hypothesis 4b. Therefore, merely having a native board 
member is not sufficient for immigrant firms to close the gap with native firms. 
-------------------------------- 




In Table 9, we show results of testing for Hypotheses 5a and 5b, which concern the 
performance implications of having an outside native board member for native- and 
immigrant-owned firms. The reference group is native firms that do not have an outside native 
board member, which is also the largest group. The results show that having an outside native 
board member does not imply better performance for either native or immigrant 
entrepreneurs. The immigrant-owned firms that have an outside native board member are not 
statistically different from any other groups in terms of sales, assets, and employment 
generation. This indicates that the immigrant firms perform on a par with native firms that 
have an outside native board member. However, we do not find that they outperform other 
categories. Therefore, we do not reject Hypothesis 5a, i.e., immigrant entrepreneurs who have 
been able to recruit outside board members close the performance gap with similar native 
entrepreneurs. However, we do not find that the immigrant firms that recruit outside native 
board members are statistically different from immigrant firms that do not recruit outside 
native board members. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 5b. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
-------------------------------- 
In Table 10, we present the results of testing for Hypotheses 6a and 6b. Here, we look 
at the relationship between firm performance and whether or not the native and immigrant 
entrepreneurs have a native board member with industry experience. The reference group 
consists of native-owned firms that have native board members with industry experience. The 
results clearly show that both immigrant and native firms that do not have a native board 
member with industry experience underperform on almost all performance measures. 
However, the immigrant firms with native board members that have industry experience 
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perform as well as their native counterparts. Therefore, we do not reject either of these 
hypotheses. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
In this paper, we tried to answer two related questions. First, we explored if immigrant 
and native entrepreneurs exhibit any difference in performance. Second, we examined 
whether an immigrant entrepreneur can take steps to address the performance difference. 
We can identify four major findings from this study. First, immigrant entrepreneurs, in 
general, perform worse compared to native entrepreneurs. Second, immigrant entrepreneurs 
who have spent substantial time in the host country are able to bridge the performance gap 
with native entrepreneurs to an extent. Third, immigrants with higher education are better able 
to bridge the performance gap, except in the top quartile. Finally, immigrant entrepreneurs 
can bridge the gap with native entrepreneurs by using board members as “linking pins, 
connecting the firm and its environment” (Zahra & Pearce, 1989, p. 299). However, not all 
board members are equally effective in doing so. We find evidence that outside native board 
members and native board members with industry experience in the host country are able to 
perform this task effectively. 
These findings indicate that social embeddedness is indeed valuable for new firms. 
Immigrant entrepreneurs suffer from a lack of it. They can overcome this deficit in two ways. 
First, they can learn more about the host country’s institutions, industry, markets, etc., 
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themselves and build networks. Our finding that immigrants who have lived longer in the host 
country reduce the performance gap with native entrepreneurs indicates that immigrants can 
embed themselves in socio-economic institutions of the host country over time. Second, they 
can benefit from the presence of native board members who know the social-economic 
structure of the industry well. 
Our study design does not enable us to identify the actual mechanism through which 
the use of board members helps immigrant-owned firms. We cannot rule out a selection effect 
whereby the immigrant entrepreneurs who are able to recruit native board members with 
industry experience are systematically more embedded ex ante. However, even if we 
hypothetically accept that the entire effect is due to the selection, the story of social 
embeddedness and its effect on firm performance still holds true. Most likely, both selection 
effects (more embedded entrepreneurs are able to recruit native board members with industry 
experienced) and treatment effects (native board members with industry experience help 
immigrant entrepreneurs embed a firm into the socio-economic structures of the host country) 
exist. 
Future Research 
Although we find circumstantial evidence for it, we cannot make any causal claim 
regarding the effect of the social (un-)embeddedness of immigrant entrepreneurs on their 
performance. We see that immigrant-owned firms that recruit certain types of board members 
are able to bridge performance gaps with their native counterparts, but we cannot claim that 
the mechanism through which this gap is bridged is alleviating immigrant-owned firms’ social 
un-embeddedness.  Our study design and available variables do not allow us to make such 
claims. Future research can look into this mechanism in detail. Perhaps a qualitative or a 
mixed method research approach is better suited to explore the mechanism. 
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It would also be interesting to investigate if, like board members, immigrant 
entrepreneurs can use native executives or native co-founders to help overcome their lack of 
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Descriptive Statistics for Entrepreneurs and Firms in Sample Based on the Region of Origin   
 Norwegians Nordics West. Europeans East. Europeans Eng. Speakers Others 
Variables mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
Entrepreneur’s age 44.44 9.33 42.74 8.86 43.87 8.66 39.37 8.20 43.64 9.47 39.77 8.73 
Entrepreneur’s education  13.71 2.60 14.29 2.90 15.07 3.00 14.13 2.69 14.52 3.00 13.16 3.50 
Entrepreneur married (0/1) 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.63 0.48 
Entrepreneur’s gender 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 
Capital (natural log transformed) 4.78 0.45 4.71 0.37 4.73 0.38 4.71 0.34 4.76 0.46 4.72 0.37 
Sales (natural log transformed) 7.20 1.50 7.19 1.60 7.01 1.48 7.59 1.29 7.09 1.61 7.49 1.45 
Assets (natural log transformed) 6.79 1.08 6.71 1.18 6.69 1.07 6.61 1.04 6.74 1.20 6.67 1.10 
Equity ratio (Equity/Assets) 0.27 0.85 0.29 0.69 0.26 0.60 0.29 0.55 0.33 0.82 0.32 0.90 
Number of employees 2.30 2.70 2.30 2.80 1.90 2.20 3.60 3.70 2.00 2.60 3.20 3.10 
FTE employment days 565 720 572 781 464 614 1,023 1,227 479 660 752 835 
FTE days for non-owner 351 658 364 726 268 547 799 1,153 295 599 552 771 
FTE days for non-owner, non-family 302 617 320 706 225 534 718 1,111 253 568 454 708 
Count 10,108  605  265  245  318  629  
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Table 2  
Industry Distribution based on High Level NACE Aggregation (A10) (Year 2010) 
 
Table 3 




  Natives Immigrants Total 
     
1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.6 % 0.5 % 0.6 % 
2 Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry 4.5 % 4.1 % 4.5 % 
3 Construction 20.4 % 17.9 % 20.2 % 
4 Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, 
accommodation and food service activities 25.9 % 37.5 % 27.0 % 
5 Information and communication 4.9 % 2.5 % 4.7 % 
6 Financial and insurance activities 2.2 % 0.5 % 2.1 % 
7 Real estate activities* 4.4 % 2.2 % 4.2 % 
8 Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support 
service activities 24.2 % 21.7 % 24.0 % 
9 Public administration, defense, education, human health and 
social work activities 8.7 % 10.6 % 8.9 % 
10 Other services 4.2 % 2.5 % 4.0 % 
     
Total  100% 100% 100% 












s 711 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy 7.4 % 
412 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings 6.9 % 
702 Management consultancy activities 5.4 % 
477 Retail sale of other goods in specialized stores 4.4 % 
432 Electrical, plumbing and other construction installation activities 4.2 % 














s 561 Restaurants and mobile food service activities 15.2 % 
412 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings 7.0 % 
862 Medical and dental practice activities 7.0 % 
711 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy 6.7 % 
812 Cleaning activities 5.6 % 
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Table 4: Board composition 
Relation with BM Native Immigrant Total 
Mother 3.6 % 0.7 % 3.4 % 
Father 7.5 % 1.1 % 7.0 % 
Offspring 8.5 % 5.1 % 8.2 % 
Sibling 6.5 % 1.5 % 6.0 % 
Spouse 39.8 % 46.0 % 40.3 % 
Non-family 34.2 % 45.5 % 35.2 % 
Total 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
 
 
 Has board member 
Does not have 
board member 
Total 
Native-owned firm 88.7 % 11.3 % 100 % 
Immigrant-owned firm 43.6 % 56.4 % 100 % 
Total 84.4 % 15.6 % 100 % 
Firms with non-owner native board members at age 2 
 
 Has board member 
Does not have 
board member 
Total 
Native-owned firm 22.8 % 77.2 % 100 % 
Immigrant-owned firm 17.0 % 83.0 % 100 % 
Total 22.2 % 77.8 % 100 % 
Firms with non-owner, non-family native board members at age 2 
 
 Has board member 
Does not have 
board member 
Total 
Native owned firm 8.9 % 91.1 % 100 % 
Immigrant owned firm 4.8 % 95.2 % 100 % 
Total 8.5 % 91.5 % 100 % 




Table 5  
 
Performance Differences Between Immigrant- and Native-Owned Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





Entrepreneur is immigrant -0.0903* -0.183*** 0.0133 0.0300 -0.0883* 0.115*** 
 (-2.07) (-5.21) (0.73) (0.56) (-1.98) (3.36) 
Entrepreneur is married 0.0853*** 0.0362* 0.0552*** 0.167*** 0.0327 -0.0457** 
 (4.09) (2.38) (7.14) (6.66) (1.23) (-2.93) 
Entrepreneur is female -0.208*** -0.354*** 0.0141 0.130*** -0.121* 0.293*** 
 (-6.66) (-13.66) (1.10) (3.37) (-2.33) (11.40) 
Entrepreneur’s age 0.0990*** 0.0522*** 0.0204*** 0.0711*** 0.0160 -0.0525*** 
 (10.64) (7.34) (5.65) (6.17) (1.53) (-7.35) 
Square of entrepreneur’s age -0.00112*** -0.000545*** -0.000233*** -0.000783*** -0.000210+ 0.000557*** 
 (-10.90) (-6.85) (-5.92) (-6.23) (-1.80) (6.96) 
Entrepreneur’s edu. years -0.0274*** 0.0129* -0.00855*** -0.0193* -0.00895 -0.0139** 
 (-4.02) (2.41) (-3.52) (-2.40) (-0.89) (-2.61) 
Firm age 0.140*** 0.103*** 0.0803*** 0.242*** -0.0379** -0.0818*** 
 (18.76) (18.96) (28.10) (27.05) (-3.16) (-15.16) 
Firm is in a top-4 city 0.00868 0.00248 -0.0141 -0.0561 -0.0295 -0.0159 
 (0.29) (0.11) (-1.22) (-1.54) (-0.86) (-0.69) 
_cons 5.344*** 6.178*** 0.981*** 4.029*** -0.356 -1.084*** 
 (11.65) (22.47) (6.16) (8.82) (-1.32) (-3.50) 
Education categories (nine) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (3-digit NACE) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
r2_o 0.236 0.150 0.289 0.166 0.006 0.106 
N 53,634 53,651 53,659 53,659 51,780 53,651 
Notes:  
- t statistics in parentheses. 
- + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 





Effect of the Length of Residence in the Host Country for Immigrant-Owned Firms’ Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





Entrepreneur has assimilated -0.0675 -0.177*** 0.0138 0.0374 -0.0752 0.102* 
 (-1.32) (-4.31) (0.65) (0.60) (-1.42) (2.57) 
Entrepreneur has not assimilated -0.132* -0.195*** 0.0125 0.0165 -0.113+ 0.138** 
 (-2.11) (-4.23) (0.46) (0.21) (-1.93) (3.01) 
Entrepreneur is married 0.0852*** 0.0362* 0.0552*** 0.167*** 0.0326 -0.0457** 
 (4.09) (2.38) (7.13) (6.66) (1.22) (-2.93) 
Entrepreneur is female -0.208*** -0.353*** 0.0141 0.130*** -0.120* 0.292*** 
 (-6.64) (-13.64) (1.10) (3.37) (-2.32) (11.39) 
Entrepreneur’s age 0.0988*** 0.0521*** 0.0204*** 0.0710*** 0.0160 -0.0523*** 
 (10.63) (7.32) (5.65) (6.17) (1.52) (-7.33) 
Square of entrepreneur’s age -0.00112*** -0.000544*** -0.000232*** -0.000782*** -0.000210+ 0.000556*** 
 (-10.89) (-6.84) (-5.92) (-6.23) (-1.79) (6.95) 
Entrepreneur’s edu. years -0.0272*** 0.0129* -0.00855*** -0.0193* -0.00885 -0.0140** 
 (-4.00) (2.41) (-3.52) (-2.39) (-0.88) (-2.62) 
Firm age 0.140*** 0.103*** 0.0803*** 0.242*** -0.0380** -0.0817*** 
 (18.71) (18.95) (28.10) (27.03) (-3.17) (-15.14) 
Firm is in a top-4 city 0.00822 0.00236 -0.0142 -0.0563 -0.0298 -0.0157 
 (0.28) (0.10) (-1.22) (-1.54) (-0.87) (-0.68) 
_cons 5.350*** 6.180*** 0.981*** 4.031*** -0.353 -1.088*** 
 (11.67) (22.48) (6.16) (8.82) (-1.31) (-3.52) 
Education categories (nine) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (3-digit NACE) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
r2_o 0.236 0.150 0.289 0.166 0.006 0.106 
N 53,634 53,651 53,659 53,659 51,780 53,651 
Notes:  
- t statistics in parentheses. 
- + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
- Errors clustered at firm level. 
- Baseline group is native-owned firms. An immigrant is considered to have assimilated if she has spent at least one third of her life in the host country or was aged 




Moderating Effect of Education on Performance of Immigrant and Native-Owned Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Sales Assets Employees Employment days EBITDA margin Equity ratio 
Entrepreneur is Immigrant -0.219*** -0.242*** -0.00805 0.0408 -0.0261 0.145** 
 (-3.29) (-4.54) (-0.28) (0.53) (-0.57) (2.79) 
Second edu. quartile -0.0505* -0.00526 -0.0247*** -0.0822** -0.0252 -0.000975 
 (-2.33) (-0.44) (-3.33) (-3.25) (-0.83) (-0.08) 
Third edu. quartile -0.139** -0.0251 -0.0421* -0.0994+ -0.0347 0.0327 
 (-2.96) (-0.66) (-2.34) (-1.75) (-0.62) (0.87) 
Fourth edu. quartile -0.104 0.0666 -0.0706* -0.109 -0.110 -0.0779 
 (-1.41) (1.10) (-2.58) (-1.23) (-0.89) (-1.30) 
Immigrant X 2nd quartile 0.169+ 0.112+ 0.0252 0.0561 -0.140 -0.0961 
 (1.84) (1.91) (0.67) (0.55) (-1.20) (-1.60) 
Immigrant X 3rd quartile 0.348*** 0.164* 0.109* 0.229+ 0.00179 -0.153+ 
 (3.55) (1.98) (2.39) (1.84) (0.03) (-1.83) 
Immigrant X 4th quartile 0.152 0.0419 -0.0142 -0.250* -0.175 0.0506 
 (1.44) (0.50) (-0.34) (-1.96) (-1.27) (0.58) 
Entrepreneur is married 0.0866*** 0.0366* 0.0555*** 0.166*** 0.0324 -0.0458** 
 (4.15) (2.41) (7.17) (6.65) (1.20) (-2.94) 
Entrepreneur is female -0.211*** -0.354*** 0.0131 0.129*** -0.122* 0.292*** 
 (-6.75) (-13.67) (1.02) (3.35) (-2.33) (11.41) 
Entrepreneur’s age 0.0973*** 0.0524*** 0.0191*** 0.0674*** 0.0149 -0.0530*** 
 (10.41) (7.33) (5.28) (5.84) (1.41) (-7.40) 
Square of entrepreneur’s age -0.00110*** -0.000550*** -0.000218*** -0.000742*** -0.000196 0.000565*** 
 (-10.66) (-6.87) (-5.52) (-5.89) (-1.64) (7.03) 
Entrepreneur’s edu. years -0.0166 0.00389 0.000176 -0.00291 0.00692 -0.00490 
 (-1.41) (0.42) (0.04) (-0.21) (0.50) (-0.54) 
Firm age 0.135*** 0.103*** 0.0777*** 0.233*** -0.0416** -0.0827*** 
 (16.93) (18.35) (26.22) (24.87) (-3.04) (-14.75) 
Firm is in a top-4 city 0.0103 0.00209 -0.0137 -0.0577 -0.0296 -0.0149 
 (0.35) (0.09) (-1.18) (-1.58) (-0.86) (-0.65) 
_cons 5.294*** 6.276*** 0.926*** 3.962*** -0.494+ -1.169*** 
 (11.39) (21.97) (5.65) (8.41) (-1.89) (-3.67) 
Education categories (nine) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






- t statistics in parentheses. 
- + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
- Errors clustered at firm level. 
  
r2_o 0.237 0.151 0.290 0.167 0.006 0.107 





Native and Immigrant Firms with or without Non-Owner Native Board Member 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









      
No No 0.221*** 0.0271 0.0562*** 0.205*** 0.00673 -0.0406 
 (5.59) (1.10) (3.94) (4.28) (0.14) (-1.62) 
Yes No -0.0376 -0.137** 0.0326 0.0822 -0.0208 0.0500 
 (-0.66) (-2.86) (1.21) (1.14) (-0.57) (1.08) 
Yes Yes -0.103+ -0.228*** 0.00378 0.0149 -0.158* 0.178*** 
 (-1.73) (-4.49) (0.14) (0.20) (-2.19) (3.59) 
Entrepreneur is married 0.0818*** 0.0351* 0.0543*** 0.163*** 0.0306 -0.0441** 
 (3.91) (2.31) (6.98) (6.51) (1.14) (-2.82) 
Entrepreneur is female -0.206*** -0.352*** 0.0148 0.132*** -0.119* 0.291*** 
 (-6.59) (-13.59) (1.15) (3.42) (-2.29) (11.32) 
Entrepreneur’s age 0.0991*** 0.0523*** 0.0204*** 0.0711*** 0.0162 -0.0526*** 
 (10.65) (7.34) (5.65) (6.17) (1.55) (-7.36) 
Square of entrepreneur’s age -0.00112*** -0.000545*** -0.000232*** -0.000783*** -0.000212+ 0.000557*** 
 (-10.89) (-6.85) (-5.91) (-6.23) (-1.81) (6.96) 
Entrepreneur’s edu. years -0.0282*** 0.0129* -0.00874*** -0.0201* -0.00885 -0.0138** 
 (-4.13) (2.40) (-3.59) (-2.49) (-0.88) (-2.60) 
Firm age 0.139*** 0.103*** 0.0801*** 0.241*** -0.0378** -0.0817*** 
 (18.61) (18.96) (28.02) (26.94) (-3.16) (-15.15) 
Firm is in a top-4 city 0.00767 0.00190 -0.0145 -0.0571 -0.0305 -0.0151 
 (0.26) (0.08) (-1.24) (-1.56) (-0.89) (-0.65) 
cons 5.223*** 6.156*** 0.950*** 3.918*** -0.373 -1.052*** 
 (11.38) (22.36) (5.97) (8.57) (-1.36) (-3.40) 
Education categories (nine) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (3-digit NACE) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
r2_o 0.235 0.150 0.289 0.166 0.006 0.106 
N 53,634 53,651 53,659 53,659 51,780 53,651 
Notes:  
- t statistics in parentheses. 
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- + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
- Errors clustered at firm level. 






Native and Immigrant Firms with or without Non-Family Native Board Member 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









      
No Yes -0.0522* -0.0340+ 0.00261 -0.00821 0.00975 0.0405* 
 (-1.98) (-1.75) (0.25) (-0.25) (0.30) (2.07) 
Yes No -0.113* -0.201*** 0.00561 0.0310 -0.0519 0.129*** 
 (-2.33) (-5.00) (0.27) (0.52) (-1.30) (3.31) 
Yes Yes -0.0522 -0.143 0.0533 0.0147 -0.249+ 0.103 
 (-0.49) (-1.38) (0.96) (0.11) (-1.72) (1.03) 
Entrepreneur is married 0.0802*** 0.0339* 0.0559*** 0.166*** 0.0315 -0.0425** 
 (3.77) (2.20) (7.08) (6.51) (1.13) (-2.68) 
Entrepreneur is female -0.209*** -0.354*** 0.0138 0.130*** -0.120* 0.293*** 
 (-6.67) (-13.67) (1.08) (3.37) (-2.31) (11.41) 
Entrepreneur’s age 0.0996*** 0.0525*** 0.0204*** 0.0712*** 0.0160 -0.0528*** 
 (10.70) (7.37) (5.63) (6.17) (1.51) (-7.40) 
Square of entrepreneur’s age -0.00112*** -0.000548*** -0.000232*** -0.000784*** -0.000209+ 0.000561*** 
 (-10.95) (-6.89) (-5.90) (-6.23) (-1.77) (7.01) 
Entrepreneur’s edu. years -0.0275*** 0.0128* -0.00853*** -0.0194* -0.00896 -0.0138** 
 (-4.04) (2.40) (-3.51) (-2.40) (-0.90) (-2.59) 
Firm age 0.140*** 0.103*** 0.0803*** 0.242*** -0.0379** -0.0818*** 
 (18.75) (18.97) (28.10) (27.05) (-3.17) (-15.16) 
Firm is in a top 4 city 0.0107 0.00352 -0.0143 -0.0558 -0.0295 -0.0173 
 (0.36) (0.15) (-1.23) (-1.53) (-0.87) (-0.75) 
_cons 5.333*** 6.173*** 0.982*** 4.027*** -0.356 -1.077*** 
 (11.63) (22.47) (6.17) (8.81) (-1.31) (-3.48) 
Education categories (nine) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (3-digit NACE) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
r2_o 0.236 0.150 0.289 0.166 0.006 0.106 
N 53,634 53,651 53,659 53,659 51,780 53,651 
Notes:  
- t statistics in parentheses. 
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- + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
- Errors clustered at firm level. 





Native and Immigrant Firms with or without Non-Family Native Board Member with Industry Experience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







Native bm with 
industry exper. 
      
No No -0.301*** -0.147*** -0.160*** -0.548*** 0.0685 0.146*** 
 (-10.49) (-7.73) (-13.30) (-15.71) (0.81) (7.24) 
Yes No -0.383*** -0.324*** -0.138*** -0.497*** -0.0380 0.252*** 
 (-7.43) (-8.18) (-6.38) (-8.01) (-0.43) (6.43) 
Yes Yes 0.0542 -0.148+ 0.0257 0.226 0.113 0.115 
 (0.41) (-1.69) (0.45) (1.47) (1.20) (1.28) 
Entrepreneur is married 0.0843*** 0.0358* 0.0550*** 0.165*** 0.0332 -0.0453** 
 (4.06) (2.36) (7.20) (6.67) (1.25) (-2.91) 
Entrepreneur is female -0.205*** -0.352*** 0.0156 0.136*** -0.121* 0.291*** 
 (-6.60) (-13.66) (1.23) (3.56) (-2.35) (11.39) 
Entrepreneur’s age 0.0989*** 0.0521*** 0.0201*** 0.0706*** 0.0159 -0.0524*** 
 (10.70) (7.35) (5.63) (6.21) (1.52) (-7.37) 
Square of entrepreneur’s age -0.00112*** -0.000545*** -0.000230*** -0.000784*** -0.000208+ 0.000558*** 
 (-11.00) (-6.88) (-5.96) (-6.33) (-1.77) (7.00) 
Entrepreneur’s edu. years -0.0268*** 0.0131* -0.00833*** -0.0183* -0.00882 -0.0141** 
 (-3.95) (2.46) (-3.48) (-2.30) (-0.88) (-2.65) 
Firm age 0.135*** 0.101*** 0.0780*** 0.234*** -0.0372** -0.0796*** 
 (18.14) (18.57) (27.56) (26.29) (-3.16) (-14.77) 
Firm is in a top-4 city 0.0117 0.00392 -0.0128 -0.0510 -0.0298 -0.0174 
 (0.40) (0.17) (-1.12) (-1.42) (-0.87) (-0.76) 
_cons 5.616*** 6.314*** 1.134*** 4.530*** -0.416 -1.217*** 
 (12.49) (23.14) (7.44) (10.30) (-1.46) (-3.99) 
Education categories (nine) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry (3-digit NACE) dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
r2_o 0.242 0.155 0.305 0.181 0.006 0.111 
N 53,634 53,651 53,659 53,659 51,780 53,651 
Notes:  
- t statistics in parentheses. 
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- + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
- Errors clustered at firm level. 
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Abstract 
Attracting human capital of competitive quality is a challenge for most new ventures. 
Existing research emphasizes the role of founders in attracting new employees. In this paper, we 
extend the focus to also include how the quality of a firm’s early hires, affect the quality of 
subsequent hires. Using rich Norwegian micro-data, we compare and contrast the influence of the 
human capital of the founder and the first employee, on the human capital of the second 
employee. We find that, on average, the influence of the first employee is comparable to that of 
the founder. The influence is stronger in the low end of the human capital distribution, and when 
the first and second employees share occupational backgrounds. We also find a declining 
marginal effect of the first employee’s human capital as founder human capital increases, and 
vice versa. This implies that human capital of the founder and the first employee are not mutually 
reinforcing. 
Keywords: Human capital accumulation, New ventures, Signaling, Networks  
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Introduction 
It is a widely established fact that most new ventures start small and remain small over 
their lifespan (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). For these ventures, recruitment is not a topic of concern, 
given that they are created as a vehicle for a self-employed individual to conduct his or her 
activities. For new ventures that have even modest ambitions for growth, it is a different story. 
Entrepreneurs have to engage in practices that allow them to search, identify and select 
prospective employees that (hopefully) contribute positively to the value creation and -capture by 
their young firm. Attracting employees is difficult, and attracting high quality employees is even 
more challenging. The ability to attract workers of sufficient quality is nevertheless crucial for 
future success, since human capital is well documented as a key driver for the survival and 
growth of new ventures (e.g. Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011; Baptista, Karaöz, & 
Mendonça, 2014; Hernández-Carrión et al., 2016). Additionally, the ability to attract sufficiently 
qualified workers might also affect the likelihood of accumulating other resources. 
Still, recruitment practices for entrepreneurs tend to be characterized as unprofessional, 
unstructured, informal and opportunistic, and new ventures are generally not regarded as 
attractive places to work. They lack the legitimacy of more established firms, they offer lower job 
security (Geroski, 1995; Litwin and Phan, 2013), pay lower wages17 (Brixy, Kohaut and 
Schnabel, 2007, Ouimet & Zarutskie, 2014), and they offer less non-pay benefits (Schnabel et al., 
2011). So, under these conditions, how can new ventures attract employees of competitive 
quality? Existing research emphasizes two aspects. Signals that the entrepreneurs can send about 
his or her abilities (Chapman et al., 2005; Rynes, Bertz and Gerhart, 1991), and/or by relying on 
                                                            
17 While there have been several studies finding that new firms pay less than established firms, a recent study by 
Burton, Dahl and Sorenson (2018) find that, after controlling for employee characteristics, new firms pay wage 
premium after taking away firm size effects. 
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social- or professional networks (Leung, Zhang, Wong, & Foo, 2006). Both place the founder at 
center stage. 
This focus on the founder in research on new venture emergence and performance is 
understandable. However, from the perspective of human capital accumulation, this is also a 
somewhat narrow perspective, since once an entrepreneur has started hiring, recruitment 
decisions are likely to be influenced by both founders and early employees (Montgomery, 1991; 
Hensvik and Skans, 2013). By also considering early employees, two additional aspects come 
into play. First, prospective employees have little or no performance history available when 
assessing the quality of an entrepreneurial firm, and need to rely on other, often fuzzy signals. 
While the experience, skill-set and education of the founder may be a good signal of 
entrepreneurial skills, judgment, and the quality of the business idea (Matusik, George, & Heeley, 
2008), it is not obvious that the founder(s) is the best signal for prospective employees about 
what it is like to work for the firm. In fact, the human capital of a new venture’s early hires – 
which reveals which types of employees the firm employs, who a prospective employee will 
work with if s/he joins the firm, etc. – may for many prospective employees be a more direct and 
relevant signal than the human capital of the founder(s). Second, early employees increase the 
size of the firm’s available network, and the higher the human capital quality of the new 
venture’s early employees, the higher the quality of the human capital in this extended network 
will tend to be. From this it follows that the early hire(s) should have an important effect on the 
quality of subsequent hires. 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the focus in research on human capital 
accumulation in entrepreneurial firms, from an exclusive focus on the founder to also include 
how the quality of a firm’s early hires, affect the quality of subsequent hires. More specifically, 
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we focus on the very first stage of this process, by empirically examining i) the relative impact of 
the quality of the first employee and the founder, on the quality of second employee’s human 
capital, ii) whether this varies between the high- and low end quartiles of the labor market, iii) the 
importance of overlap in job category and industry background for the relative impact of the 
founder and the first employee, and iv) whether the founder and the first employee’s human 
capital are complements or substitutes in terms of attracting a high quality second employee. 
Focusing on the first and second employee allows us to create clear indicators of the role of 
founders vs. early (first) employees on the quality of subsequent (second) employees. 
We test our hypotheses on privately owned new ventures that were established in Norway 
in the period 2004-2015, that have hired at least two employees. The Norwegian employer-
employee matched dataset we use in this paper has detailed information on firms as well as all 
individuals associated with the firms, such as founders and employees. This richness makes it an 
attractive dataset to study human capital accumulation in new ventures. To capture the human 
capital quality of the founder, first employee and second employee, we combine both observable 
(education and work experience) and unobservable dimensions of human capital (person fixed 
effects) to form a composite human capital index. As a robustness test we also perform our 
analyses using more traditional measures of human capital quality, such as education and 
experience. 
From our analyses, a number of interesting insights emerge. First, we find that the human 
capital of the first employee is, overall, equally (or more) important than that of the founder. 
Second, we find (admittedly somewhat weak) evidence that the importance of the first 
employee’s human capital is strongest in the lower quartiles of the labor market, while the 
founder’s human capital becomes more important in the top quartile. Third, we find that the first 
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employee’s impact increases if there is overlap in job categories. Somewhat surprisingly, we do 
not find the same pattern for the impact of the founder. Fourth and finally, we find a negative 
interaction effect between the human capital of the founder and that of the first employee, which 
indicates that the signal of quality and networks of the founder and early employees seem to be 
substitutes rather than complements. 
Our findings contribute to both research and practice. We contribute to research on 
entrepreneurship by examining an overlooked aspect of the initial stages of human capital 
accumulation, specifically how the early hiring events by an entrepreneur affect subsequent 
hiring events. Given the special role ascribed to human capital accumulation for firm survival, 
performance and growth, we believe that understanding the path dependencies created by early 
hiring events is of considerable importance. We also contribute to research on strategic human 
capital more generally, by adding more resolution to the early stages of human capital 
accumulation in a firm, a period when this process both highly critical and particularly 
challenging. For practice, our findings emphasize the importance of early employees for a firm’s 
later efforts to accumulate human capital. A better understanding of how the initial hiring 
decision creates path-dependencies that either improve or constrain subsequent hiring, should be 
of use to the founders that make these decisions, and to those that provide advice or funding to 
them. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we elaborate on 
existing knowledge about the labor market for new ventures and the challenges entrepreneurs 
face in recruiting. In addition, we develop the hypotheses that form the center of our empirical 
analysis. Following the hypotheses, we present our empirical setting and methodological strategy. 
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Next, we present our findings and conclude with a discussion and some final reflections on our 
findings. 
Human Capital and Entrepreneurial Firms 
Labor Market for New Ventures 
Research on human capital and entrepreneurship has offered convincing empirical 
evidence that there is a positive relation between the quality of human capital and the long-term 
performance of new ventures. Such positive effects are observed for the quality of the founder’s 
human capital (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Feeser & Willard, 1990; Vesper, 1990; Cooper 
et al. 1994; Vanaelst et al., 2006; Roberts, Klepper, & Hayward, 2011; Baptista et al., 2014), but 
notably also for the quality of the human capital of early employees (Coad, Nielsen and 
Timmermans, 2017; Geroski, Mata and Portugal, 2010). Such strong performance effects can be 
explained by the fact that the human capital of a new venture usually makes up a substantial share 
of its total assets (Coad et al., 2017). The indirect performance effects of human capital may also 
be large, via the ability of a new venture to accumulate and acquire additional productive 
resources – including additional human capital. 
To attract high quality human capital, entrepreneurs have to maneuver in complex and 
informationally opaque labor markets. The essential function of the labor market is to match 
employees and employers, and in a perfectly functioning labor market the quality of a firm is 
matched to the quality of a worker (Becker, 1973; Chade, Eeckhout and Smith, 2018). However, 
real life labor markets are riddled with demand- and supply side frictions that reduce the 
efficiency of this matching process (Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012). These frictions arise 
among other things because the knowledge and other characteristics embodied in employees can 
be tacit, causally ambiguous, firm specific, and socially complex (Coff, 1997), and because 
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employees have intent, aspirations and preferences that do not necessarily coincide with those of 
a hiring firm (Ehrhart and Ziegert, 2005; van Prooijen and Ellemers, 2015). Such features of 
human capital increase the challenges faced by a hiring firm when it is assessing the “true” value 
of a potential employee. 
On the positive side, frictions arising from asymmetric information and other adjustment 
costs associated with identifying-, dissolving- and establishing new matches implies that firms 
may end up hiring “better” employees than the quality of their firm should imply (Campbell, 
Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012; Mackey, Molloy & Morris, 2014; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). 
This opens up for a rent potential by acquiring resources for less than they are worth (Barney, 
1986). On the negative side, labor market frictions implies that firms may instead end up 
recruiting human capital of “lower” quality than the quality of the firm should imply, leading to 
competitive disadvantage. 
Besides these general labor market frictions, entrepreneurial firms face a number of 
specific disadvantages while recruiting new employees. On the demand side, new ventures have 
less time, money and resources available for human capital search, which increases the 
challenges related to identifying the “right” employees (Cardon & Stevens, 2004). On the supply 
side, a job offer from a newly established venture is more difficult for potential candidates to 
evaluate. Information about the viability of the firm, its future HR-policies, its management 
practices, its culture, its strategy, its reward policies, and so on, will be more uncertain than in 
older and more established firms. In addition, new ventures have smaller stocks of assets (Leung 
et al., 2006), pay lower wages (Ouimet & Zarutskie, 2014), they have little or no performance 
history to show for themselves, and last but not least a higher risk of failure (Geroski, 1995). All 
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this implies that new ventures face extra challenges in recruiting from the labor market, and that 
they are perceived as more risky employers in the eyes of potential recruits. 
Alleviating Labor Market Frictions 
Contrary to established firms, new ventures typically do not have formalized human 
resource practices to handle these frictions; nevertheless, they can attempt to reduce this handicap 
through signaling. Entrepreneurs can attempt to send signals that indicate the quality of the firm 
and thus appear more attractive for higher quality employees (Chapman et al., 2005). Due to the 
lack of a long track record and the inherently uncertain nature of establishing and growing a 
successful business, there are limits to which signals can be used and their effectiveness. One 
signal both entrepreneurs and prospective employees can send is the quality of their human 
capital (Bublitz, Nielsen, Noseleit and Timmermans, 2018). This can be through formal 
qualifications and experience, such as what might be conveyed through a CV. Prospective future 
employees are also likely to interact directly with existing organizational members, both the 
founder(s) and early employees, during a hiring process. This direct interaction makes the signal 
quality stemming from a new venture’s existing human capital both clearer and more visible for 
prospective candidates (Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel, 2011). 
Moreover, entrepreneurs can recruit from their preexisting social- or professional 
networks (Leung et al., 2006). From the new venture’s perspective, recruiting from existing 
networks has the additional benefit that it will have prior information about the potential 
employees, without having to go through an extensive search and screening process. This 
alleviates the problems of asymmetric information that new ventures face in the labor market. For 
prospective employees, this will also be beneficial, because they will have prior information 
about the individual(s) running the firm, and can better assess the quality of the firm than if they 
160 
had to rely on general information about the firm, and other, often fuzzy, signals about its quality 
(Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973). 
 While relying on social- and professional networks for recruitment may counter some of 
the disadvantages faced by new ventures, it also implies that the quality of a firm’s existing human 
capital stock will be positively correlated with the quality of new hires. One reason to expect a 
positive correlation is due to assortative matching and the subsequent homophily of networks 
(McPherson et al. 2001). In our context, this means that individuals with high human capital will 
tend to have networks comprised of other individuals with high human capital, and individuals 
with low human capital will tend to have networks of other people with low human capital. If 
recruiting is mainly done through networks, assortative matching and homophily predicts a positive 
correlation between the human capital of people within the firm, and the outside pool of candidates 
they are recruiting from. 
Founders, Early employees and Subsequent Hires. 
In line with the arguments presented above, research has documented a positive 
relationship between the quality of the founder’s human capital, and the quality of the human 
capital (s)he hires (Rocha, van Praag, Folta and Carneiro, 2018 ). However, beyond the first 
hiring event, recruitment is often a shared responsibility between founders and the early 
employees (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). This shared responsibility has largely been ignored in the 
literature on human capital accumulation in new ventures. Our goal is to investigate more 
explicitly the role the quality of early employees play, and the potential consequences early 
recruitment decisions have for future hiring events.  
In very beginning it is obvious that the key network utilized for recruitment purposes will 
be that of the founder, and that the founder’s human capital will serve as the prime signal of firm 
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quality. But as soon as the first employee has been hired, it seems equally likely that the first 
employee will start to play a role as the firm tries to recruit additional employees. The first 
employee adds to the network that can be used to recruit new candidates, and he/she also adds 
additional resolution to the signals prospective employees can use to assess the quality of the new 
venture and the attractiveness of being employed there. Based on the above reasoning, we 
formulate the following as our baseline hypothesis: 
H1: The human capital quality of the founder and the first employee are both positive 
predictors of the human capital quality of the second employee. 
Next, we turn to investigate the relative impact of the human capital of the founder and 
the first employee. Different industries and different business models require different levels of 
human capital to compete. Trivially, if you are launching a cleaning business or a consultancy, 
you are hiring from different strata. Depending on which strata of the labor market the firm 
targets, the relative importance of the signal from the founder versus that of early employees 
might differ. 
In the high end of the labor market, candidates might be more inclined to focus on the 
quality of the founder. The reason is that employees from the high end are likely to have their 
financial outcomes more closely tied to the success of the firm. They are more likely to receive 
ownership  and more likely to be offered bonuses and other kinds of variable pay (Balkin and 
Swift, 2006). The founder’s experience, skill-set and education is a signal of entrepreneurial 
skills, judgment and the quality of the business idea (Matusik, George, & Heeley, 2008), and the 
founder also has considerably higher influence over the future success of the firm than the first 
employee. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
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H2: In the top quartile of the labor market, the founder’s human capital is a stronger 
predictor of the human capital of the second employee than the human capital of the 
first employee. 
In the low end of the quality distribution of the labor market we expect the opposite. 
Subsequent hires are more likely to identify with early employees. Contrary to high-end 
employees, such employees are more likely to be wage earners with a considerably smaller 
“upside” if the new ventures succeeds. Instead of joining the new venture based on an evaluation 
of expected future performance, such employees are more likely to care about recommendations 
by others in the employee role, and the human capital of those in the role closest to their own. 
This means that the human capital of the first employee provides a stronger and more aligned 
signal about the factors most important to them, such as what it is like to work for the firm, which 
type of employees it hires, and who a prospective employee will work with if s/he joins the firm. 
Another important reason is that the network of the first employee may consist of more relevant 
candidates than that of the founder if recruitment is done in a strata that is different from that of 
the founder. If, for example, the founder of a startup in construction has a finance background, 
but seeks to hire carpenters, the network of the first carpenter that is hired is more likely to be 
populated by other carpenters than the network of the founder. While there undoubtedly can be 
exceptions to this, it makes intuitive sense that this is more likely to be true in the low-end of the 
labor market, than in the high end. This leads to our third hypothesis:  
H3: In the bottom quartile of the labor market, the first employee’s human capital is a 
stronger predictor of the human capital of the second employee than the human capital 
of the founder. 
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If the second employee shares job category or occupation with either the founder or the 
first employee, this increases the probability that the candidate has been recruited from the 
network of that individual, and also that the information asymmetry is low compared to 
alternative network relations, such as online social networks or more peripheral business 
networks. Furthermore, it also indicates that the signal value from his or her human capital will 
be particularly high, even in cases where the second employee is not a member of that person’s 
network. We therefore expect that job category overlap will increase the impact of the human 
capital, whether it applies to the founder or the first employee. This leads to our fourth and fifth 
hypotheses: 
H4: Overlap between the job category of the founder and the second employee, makes 
the human capital of the former a stronger predictor of the human capital of the latter. 
 
H5: Overlap between the job category of the first and second employee, makes the 
human capital of the former a stronger predictor of the human capital of the latter.  
The incremental effects of job category overlap are presumably highest in the high end of 
the labor market. The reason is simply that high level human capital is harder for a new venture to 
attract, since they are likely to have better outside options. In the high end, the advantages of 
recruiting from a network where information asymmetries are low and signal value is high, are 
supposedly higher than in the low end. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H6: The positive impact of job category overlap is higher if the firm is recruiting in the 
top quartile of the labor market 
A natural extension is to ask whether the human capital of the founder and the first 
employee are mutually reinforcing in terms of attracting a better second employee, or if the effect 
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of one tends to crowd out the effect of the other. Put differently, whether signals and information 
that can be obtained through the network of the founders and early employees are substitutes or 
complements in terms of attracting a second employee. The main argument for expecting them to 
be complements is that if both the founder and the first employee have high (low) quality human 
capital, this would represent converging signals that the firm is of high (low) quality, and 
subsequently impact which level of human capital the firm is able to attract. This predicts a 
positive interaction effect between the founder and the first employee’s human capital. 
The argument for expecting them to be substitutes is that the firm might rely on the 
network most relevant to the position they seek to fill. Sometimes this may be that of the founder, 
and sometimes it may be that of the first employee. If one network and one signal is more 
relevant than the other, this would weaken the impact of the other. The human capital of the 
founder and first employee will then be substitutes, and we would expect to see a negative 
interaction effect. We are not able to derive a clear expectation on this from theoretical reasoning 
alone; hence, we post these as alternative hypotheses: 
H7a: There is a positive interaction effect between the human capital of the founder 
and the first employee, on the human capital of the second employee. 
H7b: There is a negative interaction effect between the human capital of the founder 
and the first employee, on the human capital of the second employee. 
Data and Methods 
Data and Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we rely on Norwegian employer-employee matched registry data, 
and construct a sample of privately owned, limited liability firms established in Norway between 
165 
2004 and 2014. More specifically, we combine data from five different government registries – 
the education register, the income register, the ownership register, the employer-employee 
relationship register, and the population register. By law, these registries include all individuals 
and firms in Norway, and they can be merged by a person identifier and/or a firm identifier. 
These registries contain numerous variables that provide information about the human capital of 
individuals, their family relationships, labor market history, and detailed information on  the 
firms they are associated with, either as founders or employees. 
Our initial population consists of firms registered in Norway between 2004 and 2014. To 
construct our final sample, we place eight restrictions on the firms/individuals in our sample. 
First, we only include firms with a single owner to more clearly identify the individual who has 
the role of the founder. Second, in order to clearly identify the roles of first- and second 
employee, we only include firms that hired only one person in each of its first two hiring events. 
Third, we only include firms where the first two hiring events were separated by at least six 
months, to ensure that they actually were separate hiring events (e.g., not different starting dates 
from a common hiring event). Fourth, we require the first employee to remain employed in the 
firm for at least three months after the second employee joins the firm, to make sure that the 
second employee is not a replacement for the first employee. Fifth, we require that the founder, 
the first- and the second employee – are at least 18 years old. In sum, these restrictions give us a 
clean setup of one founder, one first employee and one second employee. Sixth, we only include 
individuals where we have at least two years of wage data, which allows us to construct a more 
sophisticated measure of human capital (explained in detail below). Seventh, we remove all firms 
that have a job-identifier code associated with multiple firms, to ensure that these firms are not 
simply existing firms that have been re-registered. For example, if a person is working in a sole-
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proprietorship firm, which is re-registered as a limited liability firm, the job-identifier remains the 
same, but the firm identifier changes. We remove all such instances. Eight, and finally, we also 
remove all firms where the first employee’s recruitment date predates the firm registration date 
by more than a month. For example, if a firm is registered on 30th November 2010, we include it 
as new firm only if it has hired employees no earlier than 1st November 2010. It is normal for 
firms to be operational several months in advance of formal “registration date” in our data. 
Therefore, it is a reasonable assumption to make that a firm that has hired its first employee a 
month in advance of its formal registration is still a new firm.  
After implementing these constraints, we have 1,057 firms in our sample. The effective 
sample is somewhat lower in various analyses due to missing values on control variables. 
Independent Variables 
Human capital in entrepreneurship research has usually been measured in terms of 
investment in education and work experience (Marvel, Davis and Sproul, 2016). However, these 
measures do not give a complete estimate of the quality of a person’s human capital. There can 
be substantial variation among individuals with the same education and experience in terms of 
the value they can add to a firm. In labor economics, a number of scholars have used person fixed 
effects from wage equations as a measure of worker quality (Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 
1999; Combes, Duranton and Gobillon, 2008; Iranzo, Schivardi and Tosetti, 2008), arguing that 
the unobserved heterogeneity captured by the person fixed effects is a better measure of 
productivity.  
We believe that readily observable human capital measures such as education and 
experience do function as signals of quality, but also that a complete human capital measure 
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needs to capture both observable and unobservable (by researchers) quality dimensions. To 
approach such a measure, we follow Portela (2001) and Abowd et al (1999), and multiplicatively 
combine both observable (education and work experience) and unobservable dimensions of 
human capital (person fixed effects) to form a composite human capital index. Essentially, we 
take the baseline skill level, which is the average schooling in the population and apply three 
corrections to account for an individual’s position in the distribution of schooling, experience and 
unobserved quality. The formalization is presented in equation (1).  
   𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 ∗ 𝑎𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑎𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  (1) 
Here, S denotes the skills of person i at time t, mschoolt is the average years of education 
in the population, 𝑎𝑖,𝑡𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 is a person’s actual position in the distribution of schooling, 
𝑎𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 is a person’s experience given the years of schooling, and 𝑎𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 is a person’s 
position in the distribution of unobserved quality given the years of schooling and years of 
experience.  
To calculate 𝑎𝑖,𝑡𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 and 𝑎𝑖𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 we follow Portela (2001), and the formalizations are 
presented in equation (2) and (3) below: 
 𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 = 0.5 +
𝑒(𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖−𝑚𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) 𝑠𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙⁄
1+𝑒(𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖−𝑚𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) 𝑠𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙⁄
    (2) 





Where, 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖, 𝑚𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 and 𝑠𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 are the years of education for individual i, the 
average years of education in the population and the standard deviation of years of education in 
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the population, respectively. Similarly, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖18, 𝑚𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 and 
𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 are years of experience in labor market for individual i, the average years 
of experience in the population given 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 and standard deviation of years of experience in 
the population given 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 respectively. 
To arrive at 𝑎𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒, we first estimate each individual’s unobserved skill following 
Guimaraes and Portugal’s (2010) approach to capture unobserved productivity based on each 
individual’s labor market history. Log of hourly wage is regressed on age, age squared, job 
tenure, job tenure squared, years of education and year dummies as controls, along with worker- 
and firm fixed effects. The worker fixed effect is then used to calculate the correction factor as 
follows (4): 





Where, 𝐹𝐸𝑖, 𝑚𝐹𝐸|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 , 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 and 𝑠𝐹𝐸|𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 are worker fixed 
effect derived from the wage equation, average worker fixed effects among workers with 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 
and 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖, and standard deviation of worker fixed effects among workers with 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 
and 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖, respectively. 
After the composite human capital quality measure is constructed, we demean the 
measure by industry and occupation. This serves two functions. First, it helps us take out industry 
and occupation related effects. Second, it helps us overcome multicollinearity, since the sorting 
                                                            
18 Experience is calculated as potential experience after highest education degree attained i.e. potential experience = 
age – (6 + years of education) 
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mechanism in labor markets results in substantial correlation between the quality of founders and 
employees.  
Finally, we use the composite index of human capital quality to create two independent- 
and one dependent variable. Our independent variables are the human capitalFOUNDER and human 
capitalFIRST that measure the human capital quality of the founder and the first employee, 
respectively, while human capitalSECOND measures the quality of the second employee and serves 
as our dependent variable.  
As a robustness test, we also test our hypotheses using years of education, and years of 
education and experience as alternative measures of human capital quality. The first of these two 
simply captures the number of years of higher education of the founder/first employee/second 
employee, while the latter is a composite variable constructed in the manner explained above, but 
where unobserved skill is not included. 
Moderator variables 
We use Occupation Similarity19 as a moderator variable in one of our models. It is 
measured by two dummy variables – one measures similarity between the founder and the second 
employee and the other between the first employee and the second employee. The variables takes 
the value 1 if the first two digits of the seven digit International Standard Classification of 
Occupations - ISCO 08 are the same, and 0 if they differ. 
Control variables 
                                                            
19 For occupation similarity, we use previous job/firm of the first and second employees while we use current 
occupation/firm for founder. The different treatment of employees and founders is for the following reason: 
Recruitments take some time even after firm founding. On top of it, it is plausible that the founder spends some time 
exploring the industry in which she eventually starts a firm. In cases where founder’s current occupation is unavailable, 
we use the last available occupation. 
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We use a total of seven control variables in our models. Gender is a dummy variable 
where males are the reference group. We include this because there is some evidence of 
differences in the nature and performance of ventures established by male and female 
entrepreneurs, although the sources of such differences (e.g., individual or institutional) can be 
debated (Hughes et al., 2012).  
Family member of the founder is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the first 
employee is a close relative (parent, sibling, spouse or child) of the founder, and 0 otherwise. We 
include this because regular recruitment considerations may be less applicable if the candidate is 
a family member of the founder, and the second employee may interpret the quality signal from 
the first employee differently, if she/he is a relative of the founder.  
Immigrant is based on the “standard for immigration” categorization, which has six 
immigration categories based on the place of birth of parents. We recode it into a dummy variable 
where immigration status is 1 for all founders/first employees born outside Norway, and 0 for 
those born in Norway. We include this control because a large literature on immigrant 
entrepreneurship finds that immigrant and native entrepreneurs are different on average (e.g. 
Farlie, 2008; Kerr, 2008; Hunt, 2011; Kerr and Kerr, 2016). Immigrant entrepreneurs may be 
engaged in different activities that require different skill levels compared to native entrepreneurs, 
even within same industry group. Furthermore, biases may exist in judging the human capital of 
immigrants. For instance, an education degree from another country may be either under- or 
overvalued in the host country.  
We use two measures that capture the education of the founder/first employee, business 
education and science education. Both measures are dummy variables based on the Norwegian 
Standard Classification of Education, which categorize educations using a six-digit code. The 
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second digit of this code denotes the broad field of education, in which group 4 relates to 
“Business and administration” and group 5 relates to “Natural sciences, vocational and technical 
subjects.  
Although we have demeaned our human capital measures by industry and occupation 
groups, we use two additional industry controls that we think are relevant in determining the 
quality of the employees hired. The first is the industry skill ratio, which is measured as the 
proportion of employees in an industry that have at least 15 years of education. We calculated 
this ratio by aggregating the education years for all employees in each industry group (2-digit 
NACE code), per year. The second industry control we use is industry labor intensity. It is first 
measured at the firm level as the ratio between payroll expenses and tangible assets, and then 
aggregated at the industry group level (2-digit NACE code), per year. 
Analysis and Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics from our sample. From this table, we see that the 
founders have the highest human capital quality on average in our sample (mean of 15.64), 
followed by the first- (mean 13.14) and the second employee (mean 12.52). In terms of 
occupational similarity, we see that about 54 percent of the second employees have the same 
occupational code as the first employee, but only 28 percent of the second employees share 
occupational code with the founder. This by itself indicates that the social network of the first 
employee may often contain more relevant candidates than that of the founder. Furthermore, our 
sample contains 17 percent female founders, and 41 percent female first employees. About 28 
percent of the first employees are close relatives of the founder. The share of immigrant founders 
and first employees are 19 and 13 percent respectively. Founders with science and technical 
education background form 36 percent of the sample, while those with a business background 
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only constitute 14 percent. Even among the first employees, the proportion of science educated 
individuals is substantially higher than it is for business. 
(INSERT TABLE 1 HERE) 
Hypothesis 1 stated that the human capital of both the founder and the first employee are 
positive predictors of the human capital of the second employee. To test this, we use OLS 
regressions with human capitalFOUNDER and human capitalFIRST as our independent variables, and 
human capitalSECOND as our dependent variable. The results from this regression are presented in 
Model 1 in Table 2. From Table 2, we see that the human capital quality of both the founder and 
the first employee are positively signed, and that both coefficients are statistically significant 
(p<0.001). Since the skill indices are centered within industry-occupation groups, the coefficients 
represent effects within such groups. We find that a unit increase in human capitalFIRST is 
associated with a 0.146 unit increase in human capitalSECOND. Similarly, a unit increase in human 
capitalFOUNDER is associated with a 0.141 unit increase in human capitalSECOND. Thus we find 
support for Hypothesis 1.  
(INSERT TABLE 2 HERE) 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the impact of the human capital of the founder was stronger in 
the high end of the labor market, while Hypothesis 3 predicted that the human capital of the first 
employee was stronger in the low end of the market. First, and interestingly, we see from Model 
1 that the effect size of the human capital of the founder and first employee are remarkably 
similar (0.146 vs 0.141), and the difference between the two is not statistically significant. To test 
H2 and H3, we conduct quartile regressions (cfr. Model 2, Table 2). From Table 2, we see that 
the relationship between human capitalFIRST and human capitalSECOND is slightly stronger than the 
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relationship between human capitalFIRST and human capitalFOUNDER in the bottom quartile (0.129 
vs 0.108). This flips in the mid quartile, with human capitalFOUNDER becoming a slightly better 
predictor of human capitalSECOND (0.150 vs 0.162). In the top quartile, human capitalFOUNDER 
clearly seems to be a better predictor of human capitalSECOND (0.0980 vs 0.179). Notably, human 
capitalFIRST is not significant at conventional levels in the top quartile (p<0.1), while human 
capitalFOUNDER is (p<0.001). The clear divergence in patterns in the top and bottom quartiles 
indicates that there are indeed differences in these relationships at different ends of the 
distribution. However, the difference between the predictive capacities of human capitalFOUNDER 
and human capitalFIRST are not statistically significant in any of the quartiles. Therefore, we can 
only claim weak support for H2 and H3. 
H4 and H5 predicted that the effect of the founder and first employee’s human capital 
would be stronger when there is an overlap in job category/occupation, while H6 predicted that 
this effect would be the strongest in the high end of the human capital quality distribution of 
second employees. To test this, we include interaction terms between the human capital of the 
founder/first employee, and occupation overlap dummies, respectively. The results using 
occupation overlap as a moderator are presented in Table 3. Based on the OLS (Model 4) results, 
occupation similarity does not moderate the relationship between human capitalSECOND and 
human capitalFIRST or human capitalFOUNDER. However, when we plot the marginal effects of 
human capitalFOUNDER and human capitalFIRST on human capitalSECOND, we notice that occupation 
similarity does affect the relationships. In the first graph of Figure 1, we see that the human 
capitalFOUNDER can predict human capitalSECOND when the two come from different occupational 
backgrounds as indicated by narrow confidence interval that do not contain the null value. On the 
contrary, when they come from same occupational backgrounds, the confidence intervals are 
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wide, and include the null value, indicating lack of a statistically significant relationship. This is 
surprising, but a plausible explanation for this may be the relatively small sample size of firms 
(around 28 percent of 712 firms) where founders and second employees share the same 
occupational backgrounds, leading to wider confidence intervals. With this result, we do not find 
evidence for H4, which claimed that an overlap between the occupation of the founder and the 
second employee would make the founder a stronger predictor of the human capital of the second 
employee. 
The second graph in Figure 1 shows that human capitalFIRST has some predictive capacity 
over human capitalSECOND (i.e., the confidence interval does not contain the null value) when both 
employees share occupational background. However, when they come from different 
occupational backgrounds, the predictive capacity is lost. This lends credence to H5, that overlap 
between the job category/occupation of the first and the second employee has a positive impact 
on the predictive capacity of the human capital of the first employee on that of the second 
employee. 
(INSERT TABLE 3 AND FIGURE 1 HERE) 
H6 predicted that the positive effects of job category overlap would be stronger in the 
high end of the labor market. We examine this by testing the abovementioned interaction terms in 
quartile regressions. Model 4 in Table 3 shows results for the test of H6. Figures 2 and 3 plot the 
relationships of interest to us. Figure 2 shows that the test fails to find support for our prediction, 
since the marginal effect is not higher in the top quartile when the first- and second employee 
share occupational background. However, Figure 2, like Figure 1, shows that human capitalFIRST 
has predictive capacity for human capitalSECOND when the two come from same background but 
not otherwise. Similarly, in the case of the relationship between human capitalFOUNDER and 
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human capitalSECOND, occupation similarity is not significantly different at different ends of the 
distribution, as seen from both Table 4 and Figure 3. However, we do see an upward divergence 
from the median to the top quartile when they have the same occupational background. Again, 
perhaps because of small number of firms where founder and second employee have the same 
occupational backgrounds, the confidence intervals are quite wide leading to statistically 
insignificant differences. As such, we cannot claim support for H6. In line with the results from 
Table 2, the human capital of the founder seems to be quite important in the high end of the labor 
market, irrespective of whether there is overlap in occupation or industry experience or not, since 
neither subgroup contain the null within their confidence intervals - as seen in Figure 3.  
Finally, we move to the interaction effect between the quality of the founder and first 
employee, on the quality of the second employee. Here, the theoretical predictions were less 
clear, which made us suggest two opposing hypotheses (7a and 7b) regarding the sign of the 
interaction effect between the human capital quality of the founder and the first employee. Model 
5 in Table 4 adds an interaction term between the human capital quality of the founder and the 
first employee to the original specification. Compared to Model 1 in Table 2, we see that adding 
the interaction term increases the adjusted R2 of the model from 0.108 to 0.1133, and that the 
interaction term is negatively signed (-0.0145) and statistically significant (p<0.05). This supports 
H7b, and suggest that the human capital of the founder and the first employee are substitutes. 
Model 6 in Table 4 includes the interaction term in quantile regressions. It is evident from the 
results of the quantile regression that the interaction effect between human capitalFOUNDER and 
human capitalFIRST on human capitalSECOND is primarily driven by observations in the upper 
quartiles, and it does not exist in the bottom quartile. 
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The coefficients for human capitalFOUNDER and human capitalFIRST changes slightly upon 
inclusion of the interaction term, and so does the interpretation of the coefficients. The coefficient 
of 0.165 for human capitalFIRST is a measure of the increase in the human capital of the second 
employee, when the human capital of the first employee increases by one unit, in a firm where 
the founder has average human capital within the relevant industry-occupation group. Notably, 
after adding the interaction term, human capitalFIRST becomes more important in the bottom 
quartile (0.157 with the interaction term included vs 0.129 without it) while human 
capitalFOUNDER is only significant at 10 percent level. 
Finally, we run a number of robustness checks with alternative measures of human capital 
quality. More specifically, we use education years and education x experience as our measures of 
human capital quality, and the results are provided in Table 5 in the Appendix. From the table in 
Appendix A, we see that main effects of the human capitalFOUNDER and human capitalFIRST are 
consistent with the results from using the composite measure of human capital, but we also note 
that adjusted R2 and R2 decreases. We also see that the negative interaction effect between our 
two independent variables are not present when using these somewhat cruder measures. All in all, 
this builds confidence in our results, but it also indicates that our preferred measure of human 
capital quality captures more of the “true” human capital quality of the individuals in our sample. 
Conclusion and Limitations 
Our paper aligns with findings in the matching and sorting literature (Guricano and 
Hubbard, 2007; Baptista, Lima and Preto, 2013) in that the human capital quality of the founder 
is a predictor of subsequent hires. Our paper extends these finding by demonstrating that the 
human capital quality of early hires also matters. More specifically, the first employee also acts 
as a signal and a network extension that affects subsequent hires, in our case the second 
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employee. On average, the effect is comparable to that of the founder. A perspective on human 
capital that moves beyond the characteristics of the founder is thus relevant to understand human 
capital accumulation in new ventures, and - we presume - ultimately their performance. Early 
hiring decisions have consequences for who will be hired at later stages. This means that 
founders should be aware of the path dependencies created by their first hiring decisions.  
The effect of founders and employees may manifest themselves differently. We find 
evidence, albeit a weak one, that the magnitude of the relationship between founder/first 
employee human capital and second employee human capital seems to differ on opposite ends of 
quality distribution. The founder exerts greater influence in the top quartile, while the effect of 
the first employee is largest in the bottom quartile. Although the differences were not consistently 
significant, the trend lines suggests that founder quality is a more important determinant in the 
higher end of the quality distribution, while first employee quality is more important in the lower 
end. This pattern is in line with our theoretical reasoning. When hiring important employees, i.e. 
those in top quartile, founders may turn to their network for people they know and can trust. 
Furthermore, employees from the high end are likely to have their financial outcomes tied closer 
to the success of the firm than employees from the low end. Since, founder’s human capital 
serves as a signal of the quality of the firm and it’s prospects, the high end second employees 
may put extra emphasis on the quality of the founder, resulting in a higher correlation between 
the two. In case of the low end employees - who are more likely to be wage earners with limited 
upside tied to firm performance - the human capital of existing employees in the firm provide a 
relevant benchmark for things that may be important to them. Additionally, the founder can look 
into the network of existing employees to hire candidates who may be less important/strategic to 
firm, i.e. those that belong to low end of quality distribution. 
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Our empirical findings also demonstrate that the relationship is more prominent if the first 
and second employees share the same occupational background. It is easier for the second 
employee to read the first employee’s human capital as a signal if they have same occupation. For 
example, a software programmer may be better able to assess the quality of an existing employee 
if that employee is also a software programmer, as opposed to a salesperson. It is also more likely 
that people who share occupational background are members of each other’s network, and that 
the network of the first employee is used to recruit the second employee. 
Finally, we tested whether the human capital of the founder and first employee are 
mutually reinforcing. We find a declining marginal effect of the first employee’s human capital 
as founder human capital increases, and vice versa. This implies that human capital of the 
founder and the first employee are not mutually reinforcing, and instead serve as substitutes of 
one another in determining the quality of the second employee. Examining this from a signaling 
perspective, the declining marginal effect is an indication that the signal from the first employee 
is more prominent if the founder is less qualified, and vice versa. We also found that this effect is 
stronger in the high end of the labor market. Thus, founders with lower levels of human capital 
can alleviate this shortcoming if they are able to attract qualified individuals to join as early 
members of the organization. Inferior founders who are able to hire a high quality first employee, 
due to luck or labor market frictions, can strategically use the first employee as a signal of the 
quality of firm or as a network node, and thus improve her outcome in later hiring events. 
Consequently, the characteristics of the founder is somewhat less deterministic than normally 
assumed.  
Despite these findings, limitations remain. First, we identify a relationship between the 
human capital of the founder and early hires on the ability to attract high quality later hires; 
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however, we are unable to establish any causal relationships. There might also be alternative 
explanations for these correlations that we are unable to rule out. Correlations may be driven by 
anchoring effects, whereby the founder learns about her rank among employers and adjusts her 
expectations based on first employee’s human capital. Second, it is also possible that the 
correlations between the first and second employee is spurious, because the business model 
chosen by the founder dictates what kind of employees are required to implement it. This could 
create correlation between the human capital of the first and second employee, without the 
existence of a causal link between them. For example, if a highly educated and experienced 
person starts a company that provides cleaning services, the quality of employees (who will 
primarily be cleaners) will be more correlated amongst themselves rather than with the founder. 
Still, the first cleaner may not have a causal effect on the hiring of the second cleaner.  
Third, the ability to recruit high skilled employees is not only determined by the human 
capital in the new venture. A new venture might wish to recruit a high quality employee, but 
resource constraints limits the ability to do so. Well-funded startups might be able to recruit high 
human capital individuals in both of the first two hiring events, while poorly funded startups 
might have to settle for lower human capital in both events. This may also cause a spurious 
correlation between the human capital of the first and second employee.     
It is likely that one or more of the alternative mechanisms we outlined here are at play 
when a young firm hires. Future research might attempt to quantify their effects, and also to parse 
out the relative importance of signaling vs. recruiting from networks – which we have lumped 
together. It would also be interesting to examine how the effects of early employees evolve over 
an increasing number of hiring rounds. We have examined round 1 and 2, but what will happen in 
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round 3? Or 4? And so on. There seems to be ample room for scholarship examining the path 
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 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
         
Human capital of founder 1406 15.64 5.02 4.41 12.15 15.13 18.1 34.89 
Human capital of first employee 1366 13.14 4.11 3.24 10.23 12.77 15.58 34.77 
Human capital of second employee 1282 12.52 4.12 4.27 9.54 12.05 14.86 30.23 
Same occupation between first and second employee 2018 0.54 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 
Same occupation between founder and second employee 1952 0.28 0.45 0 0 0 1 1 
Female founder 2007 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 0 1 
Female first employee 2018 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
First employee related to founder 2018 0.28 0.45 0 0 0 1 1 
Founder is immigrant 2018 0.19 0.4 0 0 0 0 1 
First employee is immigrant 2010 0.13 0.34 0 0 0 0 1 
First employee has business education 2018 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1 
Founder has business education 2018 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1 
First employee has science/technical education 2018 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 0 1 




Model Specification Ordinary Least Squares Quantile Regressions 
Dependent Variable Human CapitalSECOND Human CapitalSECOND 
 Model 1  Model 2  
  Q25 Q50 Q75 
     
Independent Variables     
Human CapitalFOUNDER 0.141*** 0.108* 0.162*** 0.179*** 
 (4.13) (2.12) (3.80) (4.00) 
     
Human CapitalFIRST 0.146*** 0.129* 0.150** 0.0980+ 
 (3.74) (2.53) (3.15) (1.78) 
     
Control Variables  0.629 -0.0678 -0.156 
First and second employee have same occupation -0.139 (1.56) (-0.16) (-0.38) 
 (-0.46)    
  -0.147 -0.800 -0.568 
Founder second employee have same occupation -0.568+ (-0.37) (-1.63) (-1.33) 
 (-1.66)    
  -0.821 -0.653 -0.828 
Founder is female -0.690+ (-1.46) (-1.20) (-1.39) 
 (-1.73)    
  0.568 0.858+ 0.407 
First employee is female 0.815* (1.34) (1.80) (0.80) 
 (2.17)    
  0.237 -0.878+ -1.122* 
First employee related to founder -0.824* (0.50) (-1.94) (-2.35) 
 (-2.25)    
     
First employee is immigrant 0.985 -0.498 0.758 0.786 
 (1.45) (-0.49) (0.98) (0.65) 
     
Founder in immigrant -0.180 0.884 -0.253 -0.376 
 (-0.20) (0.73) (-0.18) (-0.28) 
     
First employee has management education 0.827+ 0.0557 0.317 1.648* 
 (1.71) (0.10) (0.47) (2.30) 
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Founder has management education -0.159 0.373 -0.166 -1.073 
 (-0.35) (0.62) (-0.31) (-1.30) 
     
First employee has science education 0.489 -0.0808 0.339 0.177 
 (1.37) (-0.17) (0.77) (0.37) 
     
Founder has science education -0.584+ -0.248 -0.362 -0.764+ 
 (-1.70) (-0.60) (-0.81) (-1.65) 
     
Industry skill ratio -3.701** -6.085*** -2.834 -1.721 
 (-3.06) (-4.24) (-1.55) (-0.94) 
     
Industry labor intensity -0.00582+ -0.00215 -0.00677+ -0.00571 
 (-1.93) (-0.35) (-1.73) (-1.18) 
     
Constant 0.287 -2.055+ -0.0950 2.421* 
 (0.35) (-1.90) (-0.10) (2.07) 
     
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-occupation fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 712 712 712 712 
R2 0.1385 0.0773 0.0865 0.0986 
adj. R2 0.1084    
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Table 3 
Model Specification OLS  Quantile Regression 
Dependent Variable Human CapitalSECOND  Human CapitalSECOND 
 Model 3  Model 4  
  Q25 Q50 Q75 
     
     
Independent Variables     
Human CapitalFOUNDER 0.145*** 0.0864 0.155*** 0.158*** 
 (3.93) (1.48) (3.31) (3.73) 
     
Founder and Second Employee from Same  Occupation -0.489 -0.155 -0.612 -0.844+ 
 (-1.36) (-0.38) (-1.26) (-1.88) 
     
Occupation Similarity x Human CapitalFOUNDER -0.0293 0.00474 -0.0228 0.191 
 (-0.32) (0.04) (-0.20) (1.38) 
     
Human CapitalFIRST 0.116* 0.0946 0.103 0.0363 
 (1.98) (1.30) (1.37) (0.54) 
     
First and Second Employee from Same Occupation -0.174 0.656 -0.211 -0.230 
 (-0.57) (1.60) (-0.47) (-0.59) 
     
Occupation similarity x Human CapitalFIRST 0.0704 0.0865 0.113 0.141 
 (0.93) (0.84) (1.11) (1.39) 
     
Control Variables     
Founder is female -0.690+ -0.722 -0.726 -0.782 
 (-1.73) (-1.26) (-1.37) (-1.39) 
     
First employee is female 0.796* 0.556 0.821+ 0.524 
 (2.13) (1.27) (1.68) (1.10) 
     
First employee related to founder -0.837* 0.0651 -0.888+ -1.337** 
 (-2.29) (0.14) (-1.93) (-2.91) 
     
First employee is immigrant 1.003 -0.484 0.905 0.814 
 (1.45) (-0.44) (1.15) (0.74) 
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Founder in immigrant -0.199 0.736 -0.721 0.0527 
 (-0.22) (0.59) (-0.52) (0.04) 
     
First employee has management education 0.837+ 0.166 0.345 1.418* 
 (1.73) (0.29) (0.51) (2.11) 
     
Founder has management education -0.159 0.160 -0.307 -0.796 
 (-0.35) (0.27) (-0.56) (-1.08) 
     
First employee has science education 0.489 -0.0428 0.290 0.346 
 (1.37) (-0.09) (0.65) (0.76) 
     
Founder has science education -0.597+ -0.355 -0.468 -0.677 
 (-1.74) (-0.83) (-1.06) (-1.53) 
     
Industry skill ratio -3.677** -5.533*** -2.752 -1.836 
 (-3.04) (-3.70) (-1.50) (-1.10) 
     
Industry labor intensity -0.00562+ -0.00424 -0.00737+ -0.00522 
 (-1.90) (-0.66) (-1.86) (-1.17) 
     
Constant 0.295 -1.967+ -0.0142 2.044+ 
 (0.36) (-1.77) (-0.01) (1.80) 
     
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-occupation fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 712 712 712 712 
R2 0.1399 0.0783 0.0881 0.1055 
adj. R2 0.1072    
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4: 
Model Specification OLS Quantile Regression 
Dependent Variable Human CapitalSECOND Human CapitalSECOND 
 Model 5 Model 6 
  Q25 Q50 Q75 
     
Independent Variables     
Human CapitalFOUNDER 0.146*** 0.0929+ 0.171*** 0.169*** 
 (4.27) (1.84) (4.11) (4.22) 
     
Human CapitalFIRST 0.165*** 0.157** 0.171*** 0.0932+ 
 (4.29) (3.19) (3.81) (1.79) 
     
Human CapitalFIRST X Human CapitalFOUNDER -0.0145* -0.0153 -0.0168* -0.0186* 
 (-2.07) (-1.38) (-2.22) (-2.10) 
     
Control Variables     
First and second employee have same occupation -0.115 0.586 0.0108 -0.0507 
 (-0.38) (1.44) (0.03) (-0.13) 
     
Founder and second employee have same occupation -0.581+ -0.259 -0.697 -0.494 
 (-1.71) (-0.64) (-1.49) (-1.17) 
     
Founder is female -0.636 -0.863 -0.525 -0.787 
 (-1.59) (-1.56) (-0.98) (-1.34) 
     
First employee is female 0.821* 0.679 0.869+ 0.571 
 (2.19) (1.56) (1.77) (1.15) 
     
First employee related to founder -0.833* -0.123 -0.938* -1.089* 
 (-2.27) (-0.26) (-2.09) (-2.31) 
     
First employee is immigrant 0.933 -0.134 0.790 0.869 
 (1.40) (-0.13) (1.05) (0.79) 
     
Founder in immigrant -0.232 0.615 -0.417 -0.974 
 (-0.27) (0.50) (-0.33) (-0.78) 
     
First employee has management education 0.829+ 0.151 0.326 1.804* 
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 (1.72) (0.27) (0.51) (2.35) 
     
Founder has management education -0.242 0.0761 -0.469 -1.010 
 (-0.53) (0.13) (-0.86) (-1.21) 
     
First employee has science education 0.482 0.162 0.371 0.370 
 (1.36) (0.35) (0.83) (0.78) 
     
Founder has science education -0.639+ -0.507 -0.429 -0.844+ 
 (-1.86) (-1.20) (-0.96) (-1.82) 
     
Industry skill ratio -3.683** -6.026*** -2.193 -2.174 
 (-3.06) (-4.11) (-1.18) (-1.29) 
     
Industry labor intensity -0.00599* -0.00297 -0.00782* -0.00530 
 (-2.00) (-0.51) (-2.15) (-1.06) 
     
Constant 0.248 -1.686 -0.428 2.220+ 
 (0.30) (-1.55) (-0.44) (1.81) 
     
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-occupation fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 712 712 712 712 
R2 0.1445 0.0849 0.0985 0.1091 


















APPENDIX A: Alternative measures of human capital (Robustness Check) 
Table 5 
     
Model Specification OLS 
Human Capital Measure Edu years Edu years Edu years X 
Experience 
Edu years X 
Experience 
     
Independent Variables     
First employee skill 0.0789* 0.0790* 0.132*** 0.133*** 
 (2.35) (2.37) (4.53) (4.57) 
     
Founder skill 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 
 (4.22) (4.27) (3.79) (3.77) 
     
Founder X First employee skill  0.0124  -0.00229 
  (0.89)  (-0.25) 
     
Control Variables     
First and second employee have 
same occupation 
-0.0476 -0.0473 -0.103 -0.104 
 (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.62) (-0.63) 
     
Founder second employee have 
same occupation 
-0.380** -0.380** -0.757*** -0.756*** 
 (-3.04) (-3.03) (-4.43) (-4.42) 
     
Founder is female -0.143 -0.149 0.0471 0.0472 
 (-0.84) (-0.87) (0.21) (0.21) 
     
First employee is female 0.166 0.171 0.326+ 0.325+ 
 (1.17) (1.21) (1.74) (1.74) 
     
First employee related to 
founder 
-0.0667 -0.0712 -0.391* -0.391* 
 (-0.48) (-0.51) (-2.13) (-2.13) 
     
First employee is immigrant 0.310 0.321 0.570+ 0.569+ 
 (1.38) (1.43) (1.90) (1.90) 
     
Founder in immigrant -0.471+ -0.477+ -0.0587 -0.0582 
 (-1.70) (-1.73) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
     
First employee has management 
education 
0.0963 0.100 0.395 0.393 
 (0.53) (0.55) (1.60) (1.60) 
     
Founder has management 
education 
-0.0810 -0.0731 -0.133 -0.135 
 (-0.46) (-0.41) (-0.55) (-0.55) 
     
First employee has science 
education 
-0.0755 -0.0752 -0.0455 -0.0456 
 (-0.51) (-0.50) (-0.23) (-0.24) 
     
Founder has science education -0.145 -0.138 -0.291 -0.294 
 (-1.06) (-1.00) (-1.63) (-1.64) 
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Industry skill ratio -0.389 -0.416 -1.171+ -1.157+ 
 (-0.81) (-0.87) (-1.83) (-1.81) 
     
Industry labor intensity -0.00376* -0.00386* -0.000532 -0.000551 
 (-2.24) (-2.31) (-0.23) (-0.24) 
     
Constant 0.182 0.174 -0.647 -0.647 
 (0.55) (0.52) (-1.44) (-1.44) 
     
Year fixed effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-occupation fixed 
effects included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 1663 1663 1662 1662 
R2 0.0407 0.0415 0.0625 0.0626 
adj. R2 0.0261 0.0263 0.0482 0.0476 
 
 
